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Climate change is one of the greatest environmental challenges of our time and has 
been the subject of increasing political attention worldwide. Various scientific sources 
link climate change directly to increasing emission of Greenhouse gases (GHG), and 
more specifically CO2. Rising CO2 emissions are pushing up the Earth’s carbon stock and 
increasing global temperatures.  
Following  two  climate-change  related  targets  were  presented  by  the  European 
Commission (EC) on January 23
rd 2008, in the integrated proposal for climate action: 
·  A reduction of at least 20% in GHG emissions by 2020
1 
·  A 20% share of renewable energies in EU energy consumption by 2020 
In addition, achieving a 20% savings of energy consumption by 2020 through energy 
efficiency measures is underlined as one of the key ways in which CO2 emission savings 
can be realised, as has been recently reaffirmed by the EC
2. Earlier, the Green Paper for 
Energy Efficiency (March 2006) also identified energy efficiency as the most effective, 
most cost-effective and rapid manner for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
Lastly,  in  the  context  of  the  Action  Plan  on  Sustainable  Industrial  Policy  (SIP)  and 
Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP) adopted by the European Commission 
on 16 July 2008, it was mentioned that Member States are free to set “incentives” in 
order  to  complement  other  policy  instruments  aiming  at  fostering  eco-friendly 
products  (e.g.  eco-design  requirements  following  from  the  EuP  Directive,  Ecolabel 
Regulation). Indeed, as energy efficient appliances often represent a higher purchase 
price  than  competing  products,  their  sales  remain  inadequate  and  industry  is  not 
encouraged to invest in such products. Finding ways of strengthening demand would 
allow manufacturing of eco-friendly products at a larger scale, so that their production 
costs and final prices for consumers would go down. In order to boost demand in this 
way, many Member States give incentives for buying eco-friendly products, such as 
windows with high thermal insulation or white goods with the highest energy class. 
In this context, a wide range of initiatives are being promoted in different countries in 
the world to encourage eco-designed products by changing the production techniques 
and also by reforming the society towards sustainable consumption patterns. It is often 
suggested that the energy saved will serve as an important incentive for the consumer 
as saved energy is money saved. Nevertheless, financial incentives (for manufacturers 
or users) are being experimented in different countries to further encourage energy 
efficient  products.  As  the  energy  using  products  evolve  much  faster  compared 
products of other sectors, because of innovation in technologies, a dynamic approach 
is needed in policies to take into account such innovation which indirectly affects also 
the consumer behaviour.  
The  absence  of  a  direct  integration  of  economic  criteria  in  eco-design  or  energy 
efficiency  indicators  makes  it  difficult  to  assess  the  trade-offs  in  real  time  and  to 
                                                           
1  Rising  to  30%  if  there  is  an  international  agreement  committing  other  developed  countries  to 
"comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries to contributing 
adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities". 
2  European Commission (2008) Communication on energy efficiency 
  http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/doc/2008_11_ser2/energy_efficiency_communication_en.pdf   
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monitor  the  improvements  (both  in  terms  of  energy  efficiency  and  economic 
efficiency). A deeper insight is therefore needed on possible approaches for integrating 
economic  criteria  with  energy  efficiency  and  what  kind  of  financial  incentives  are 
feasible to motivate the consumers and manufacturers further. 
To understand better the interaction of various fiscal incentive approaches and an 
inter-policy  comparison,  the  present  study  assessed  the  impacts  of  various  tax 
incentives  options  both  from  economic  and  environmental  perspectives  through  a 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Following four product groups were identified by the EC 
due  to  their  relevance,  i.e.  penetration  rate,  sales  in  the  EU,  and  environmental 
impacts. 
·  Refrigerators 
·  Washing Machines 
·  Compact Fluorescent Lamps (with integrated ballast) (CFLi) 
·  Boilers 
In  the  first  step of  this  study,  the  current market of  the  four  product  groups  was 
analysed and the data required for CBA was also collected. Except for boilers, the EU 
Energy Label provides criteria to compare the appliances according to their energy 
efficiency. For white goods, sales of the most efficient products (energy class A++ and 
A+ for refrigerators and A+ for washing machines) are quite low within EU-27 even if 
there are some differences across Member States (MS), for example, the market share 
of washing machines with energy class A+ represented about 9.5% in Italy in 2007 but 
only  2.4%  in  Poland.  Further,  manufacturers’  pricing  strategies  as  well  as  market 
characteristics explain that average prices of white goods, as well as for the other two 
product  groups,  are  often  higher  in  Western  Europe  than  in  Eastern  Europe  (e.g. 
+27.1% higher in 2004 for A+ refrigerators). 
In  the  case  of  CFLi,  which  are  about  4  times  more  efficient  than  traditional 
incandescent  lamps,  the  market  penetrations  have  varied  widely  since  their 
introduction. In some cases, the public perception of CFLi has been compromised by 
consumers’ experiences with the first generation of CFLi that came on the market 
about twenty years ago. These early CFLi were found to have cold light colour, poor 
colour rendering, fairly heavy weight, and large dimensions. In the meantime, most of 
these disadvantages have been significantly reduced. 
For boilers, the most efficient ones i.e. gas condensing boilers, are widely used within 
the EU. However, consumers do not really choose a specific model with regard to its 
energy  efficiency,  but  mostly  follow  installers’  advice.  An  important  issue  for  this 
product category is the wide price difference between MS, e.g. with a ratio of about 5 
between Sweden and Czech Republic or Poland. 
For most of the products analysed in this study, the high purchase price of the most 
efficient models compared to other models remains the main barrier for the uptake of 
these “green” alternatives. Indeed, even if the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of a CFLi is about 
70% lower than the LCC of a traditional incandescent lamp, most consumers focus on 
the  initial  cost.  Nevertheless,  one  can  observe  a  rise  in  consumer  awareness  on 
environmental issues.  
Tax incentives (subsidy or tax credit) are one of the possible mechanisms in order to 
transform  the  market  towards  more  energy  efficient  appliances.  Such  policy  
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instruments have been (or are currently being) used in several MS to promote energy 
efficient appliances. Examples include: 
·  A tax credit for consumers in Italy for refrigerators (since 2007); 
·  Subsidies in Spain and in Hungary for white goods (since 2006 in Spain and 
several campaigns in 2006 and 2007 in Hungary); 
·  A subsidy in Poland for CFLi (1995-1997); 
·  A tax credit for consumers in France for boilers (since 2005). 
The  results  of  these  schemes clearly  show market changes  and  an  increase in  the 
market shares of the most efficient and cost-effective products. 
The second step of the study involved a thorough literature review regarding the state-
of-play of  the  tax  incentives  both  in  EU  and  United  States,  as  well  as  a  review of 
economic and engineering models. The EU review shows that assessments of energy-
related policies are in general carried out on the basis of consumption of energy or 
another energy-efficiency indicator when engineering models are used. In contrast, 
econometric analyses focus on the demand for energy and the estimation of the price-
elasticity of the demand for energy, which is an important tool to enable analysts to 
predict how policies impacting energy prices will affect consumption of energy. 
In  the  US,  there  are  various  measures  in  place  to  promote  energy  efficiency.  The 
measures  generally  fall  into  two  groups:  1)  those  that  directly  assess  the  energy-
efficiency gains of stricter energy standards through tax incentives for individual items; 
and 2) those that evaluate and compare the impacts of energy prices, tax mechanisms 
and other incentives by studying the impacts they have on various parameters that 
determine the demand for energy. 
This study compares the effectiveness of tax incentives with other policy options such 
as the increase of the energy price due to the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Three 
tax-incentive options were chosen following the schemes already used in some MS as 
well as to understand the impacts on the consumers and manufacturers: subsidies for 
consumers, tax credits for consumers, and tax credits for manufacturers. 
Further, the effectiveness of tax incentives is expected to vary among Member States 
due to price differences, as well as market penetration of ‘green’ products. Therefore, 
it is relevant for the same tax incentive option and for the same appliance to compare 
effects for two MS representative of various European regions or usage patterns. Four 
MS were selected on the basis of the existence of relevant policies in the countries as 
well as the availability of the necessary data. The selected countries were: France, Italy, 
Denmark, and Poland. 
Altogether, eight CBA cases have been carried out and a summary of the conclusions is 
presented in Table 1.  
An economic model of consumer behaviour towards the provision of services by the 
appliances was used to evaluate how the sales of energy efficient appliances would be 
affected by tax incentives. It was assumed that consumers compare the net present 
value of the operational costs of services provided by appliances during its lifetime and 
choose the cheapest alternative. 
The results of the CBAs are presented as the difference between the monetary value 
(expressed in Euros) of CO2 emissions reduction, which represents the benefit side of  
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the CBA balance, and the administrative and net welfare costs. The method used to 
estimate the welfare gains and losses in this study is one based on a partial equilibrium 
approach, i.e. by looking at one market at a time and does not consider the impacts of 
changes in prices across markets. An economy-wide approach would certainly be more 
inclusive of other effects but would run into problems of estimation of many of the 
parameters, for which data availability is very limited.  
The way to calculate the net welfare costs (or gains) for different policy options is 
explained below: 
·  In case of subsidies or tax credits, welfare costs are made up of (a) the marginal 
cost of public funds, estimated at 26% of the amount of revenue raised; (b) 
gains in producers’ profits of the extra sales revenue varying between 6% (CFLi) 
and 8.5% (boilers) – 8% for refrigerators and washing machines; and (c) the 
gain  from  the  reduction  of  the  emissions  of  non-GHG  pollutants  from  the 
energy generation (electricity and gas), such as SOx, NOx, particulate matter, 
POPs, and heavy metals. 
·  In  case  of  removing  less-efficient  product  categories  from  the  market,  the 
welfare  cost  arises  from  the  fact  the  consumers  are  made  to  buy  more 
expensive equipments than they otherwise would. The cost is the difference in 
price (adjusted for quality) between the appliance bought without the policy 
and the one bought after the policy is implemented. The welfare gains arise 
from the increased sales of more profitable equipments and the reductions of 
the emissions of non-GHG pollutants. For comparability reasons, the value of 
energy savings to consumers from the use of more efficient appliances is not 
included in welfare gains.  
·  In the case of energy taxes, welfare costs are calculated as follows. First, we 
consider the deadweight loss from the imposition of the tax, based on the 
consumption of energy. Second, we have a welfare cost arising from the fact 
that consumers are made to buy more expensive equipment than they would if 
there were  no  tax.  This cost  is  simply the  difference  in  price  (adjusted  for 
quality) between the appliance bought without a tax and the one bought with 
a  tax.  Third,  we  have  a  welfare  gain  arising  from  the  fact  that  the  policy 
generates  tax  revenue  and  therefore  reduces  the  cost  of  raising  a  similar 
amount of tax from other sources. This gain is calculated using the marginal 
cost of public funds. Fourth, we have the welfare gain to producers from the 
sale of more profitable equipment. Finally, there are gains from the reduction 
of non-GHG emissions in the generation of electricity, calculated at the average 
external cost per kWh for each MS considered. 
The outcomes of these calculations show some significant differences based on the 
type of instrument, the Member State and the product group considered. For instance, 
implementing a tax credit for consumers purchasing efficient boilers in Italy allow both 
higher CO2 emissions reduction and higher welfare gains than increasing the energy 
price (405 MtCO2 and -287 M€ vs. 38 MtCO2 and -23 M€). To take another example, 
increasing the energy price is preferable (in terms of energy consumption and CO2 
emissions) to removing washing machines with energy class ‘B’ from the Polish market. 
However, the two options are quite similar when looking at the welfare gains (271 
ktCO2 and 2.6 M€ vs. 223 ktCO2 and 3.2 M€).  
The analysis presented in this report indicates that incentives to promote the use of 
energy efficient appliances can be cost effective, but whether or not they are depends  
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essentially on the product, the Member State, the market conditions and the design of 
the  instrument.  From  the  cases  considered,  tax  credits  on  boilers  appear  to  be  a 
feasible option in both Denmark and Italy, while subsidies on CFLi bulbs in both France 
and Poland are cost effective in terms of €/ton of CO2 abated. As it can be observed, 
the  results  cannot  be  generalised  and  need  to  interpreted  with  great  attention. 
However, some general observations can be made: 
·  additional energy taxes have positive net benefits in all cases 
·  for boilers tax credits to consumers generate higher net benefits and higher 
energy  saving  than  the  increase  of  energy  taxes,  the  same  applies  to  the  
subsidies for CFLi in Poland 
·  tax credits to manufacturers  have the highest net welfare costs relative to 
benefits of all policy options 
·  removing less efficient product categories from the market has also a relatively 
low capacity to generate energy saving compared with other policy options 
and therefore a fairly negative benefit-cost balance
3 
The results of the cost–benefit analysis are summarised in Table 1. In this table the 
following indicators are used to describe the results: 
·  Benefits–costs:  benefits consist of the monetary value of the savings in GHG 
(CO2) emissions and the costs are net welfare costs, the calculation of which is 
explained above for different policy options. 
·  Energy savings: energy savings in physical units (GWh) over the life-cycle of the 
product in question generated by policy options. 
·  Benefits-costs per GWh saved: benefits-costs per energy saved (€/GWh) over 
the whole life-cycle of the product. This is simply the ratio of the two previous 
indicators,  which  gives  a  more  meaningful  insight,  e.g.  boilers  in  Denmark 
where the benefits-costs per GWh indicator is easily comparable across the 
two policy options than the absolute values of the two indicators individually. 
This first analysis presents some interesting insight to the issue. However, additional 
future  work  is  required  to  understand  the  subject  from  different  perspectives, 
especially regarding whether incentives will lead to higher consumption levels. One 
policy approach could be to complement the incentives for efficient products with a 
penalty  on  non-efficient  ones,  an  approach  currently  under  implementation  and 
testing in France (Bonus-Malus), which is under trial for cars since 2007. In conclusion, 
the tax incentives policies cannot be considered mutually exclusive. For example, a 
higher energy tax combined with targeted tax credits could be used in conjunction to 
ensure modest broad gains in energy efficiency across several sectors, with targeted 
tax credits for those cases where additional benefits can be generated. This approach 
would also ameliorate concerns about distributional issues associated with increasing 
energy taxes. 
                                                           
3 It should be pointed out that for comparability reasons the analysis applied in this study does not include 
the value of energy savings as welfare gain in net welfare cost calculation. However, as far as the benefits 
of  the  policy  for  the  consumers  are  concerned,  the  energy  savings  from  the  use  of  more  efficient 
appliances over the life-cycle of the product about offsets, in the cases considered in this study,  the costs 
from the need to buy more expensive equipment, which is included as welfare cost.   
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per GWh saved 
(€/GWh) 
Refrigerator 





class A+ only) 




3,371,769  237  14,227 







Tax credit for 
manufacturers 
(€100 per appliance 
cl. A+; sold above 
historical levels - 3 
years average) 
-18,558,636  59  -314,553 
B-class and lower 
removed from the 
market (market 
share of classes B 
and C shifted to 
class A) 
-5,052,113  26  -194,312 






Tax credit for 
consumers 
(deducted from 
income tax; 25% of 
the appliance price 
for condensing 
boiler) 
4,565,857  310  14,729 
Energy tax: further 
increase in gas price 
(10%) 
1,231,331  102  12,072 
Italy  692,476,292  40,294  17,186  61,634,591  3,825  16,114 
CFLi 





classes A and B) 




22,110,662  226  97,835 
France  10,471,437  5,504  1,903  24,613,529  430  57,241 
 (*) Policies 1 and 2 are applied on top of baseline scenario. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This  report  presents  the  preliminary  results  of  the  study  reviewing  the  costs  and 
benefits associated with the use of tax incentives to promote the manufacturing and 
the purchase of efficient energy-using products. The analysis is focused on following 
four product groups: 
·  Refrigerators 
·  Washing Machines 
·  Compact Fluorescent Lamps 
·  Boilers 
The  study  analyses  the  effectiveness  of  tax  incentives  in  complement  with  other 
available instruments and attempts to tackle the following questions: 
·  What  environmental  benefits  can  be  achieved  through  energy  efficient 
appliances, the type and scale of any resulting costs, and the degree to which 
these costs are likely to be proportionate to the benefits? 
·  What are the most relevant financial instruments to foster energy efficient 
products? 
·  What is the value added of tax incentives compared to other available financial 
instruments?   
This report includes an analysis of the current situation for the four product groups 
cited above and also provides an overview of the impacts of tax incentives both in 
Europe and in the US.  
Finally, results of the cost-benefit analysis in the form of 8 case-studies are presented.   
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2.  CURRENT SITUATION  
Energy consumption in the EU-27 has continued to increase in the last years, despite 
numerous energy efficiency policies and programmes at the European Union (EU) and 
Member State (MS) levels.  
According to Eurostat, the gas consumption in the residential sector of the EU-25 has 
continued to grow during the period 1999-2004 from 4721 PJ to 5399 PJ representing 
an increase of 14%, while the yearly growth rate in the period 2003-2004 has been 
2.2%. The electricity consumption in the residential sector for the EU-25 has grown by 
10.8% in the period 1999-2004, from 690 TWh in year 1999 to 765 TWh in year 2004 
and by 1.8% in the period 2003-2004. The electricity consumption in the residential 
sector of the EU-25 represented 28.8% of the total electricity consumption in 2004. 
Increased electricity consumption is due to different factors such as: 
·  more penetration of “traditional” appliances (e.g. dishwashers, tumble driers, 
air  conditioners,  personal  computers) which  are  all  still  far  from  saturation 
levels 
·  introduction of new appliances and devices, mainly consumer electronics and 
information and communication technology (ICT) equipment (set-top boxes, 
DVD  players,  broadband  equipment,  cordless  telephones,  etc.)  many  with 
significant standby losses 
·  increased use of “traditional” equipment: more hours of TV watching, more 
hours of use of personal computer (driven by some e-working practice and 
increased use of internet), more washing, and increased use of hot water 
·  increased  presence  of  double  or  triple  appliances  in  the  same  household, 
mainly TVs and refrigerators/freezers 
·  more single family houses, each with some basic appliances and larger houses 
and apartments. This results in more lighting, more heating and cooling, and 
last  but  not  least,  an  increased  older  population  demanding  higher  indoor 
temperatures  and  all-day  heating  in  winter  and  cooling  in  summer,  and 
spending more time at home 
The distribution of the residential electricity consumption by appliance is presented in 
Figure 1 for EU-15
4 and in Figure 2 for EU-12
5 (+ Croatia). Within EU-15, refrigerators 
and freezers contribute to 15% of the electricity consumption in households (22.4% 
within new EU-12 + Croatia (HR)), washing machines for 4% (10.5% within new EU-12 + 
Croatia), lighting for 12% (20% within new EU-12 + Croatia), and heating and cooling 
for 27%
6 (9.9% within new EU-12 + Croatia). 
                                                           
4 AT, BE, DE, DK, EI, FI, FR, GR, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE, SP, UK 
5 BG, CZ, CY, EE, HU, LV, LT, MT, PL, RO, SK, SI 
6 Including ‘Residential electric heating’, ‘Central heating circulation pumps’ and ‘Room air-conditioners’.  
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Figure 1: Electricity consumption in residential appliances in EU-15 in 2004
7 
 




The  electricity  consumptions  by  end-use  equipment  in  the  domestic  sector  are 
presented in Table 2 both for EU-15 and EU-12 (+ Croatia). 
                                                           
7 European Commission DG JRC (2006b)  
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Table 2: Electricity consumption of residential appliances in EU-15 and EU-12 in 2004
7 
Application Area  EU-15 (in TWh)  EU-12 + Croatia (in TWh) 
Heating & Cooling  187  9 
Lighting  85  17 
Refrigerators & Freezers  102  19 
Washing Machines  26  9 
Cooking/Dishwasher  66  9 
Hot Water  65  6 
Consumer Electronics & Stand-by  45  11 
Miscellaneous  128  6 
TOTAL  704  87 
2.1.   EXISTING EU REGULATORY MEASURES AND INSTRUMENTS 
There are two main EU Directives which directly influence the market of energy-using 
products, namely: 
·  The  European  Directive  94/2/EC  defines  the  energy  label  appearance, 
information  to  be  given  to  consumers,  and  information  required  from  the 
manufacturers. The aim of this energy label is to allow consumers comparing 
several products in a neutral manner by providing the main characteristic of 
the  product.  Furthermore,  this  comparative  energy  label  has  stimulated 
manufacturers  to  propose  energy  efficient models  in  order  to  increase the 
competitiveness.  Once  a  label  is  seen  as  having  an  actual  or  potential 
consumer impact, manufacturers are often motivated to remove their worst 
models from the market and improve the efficiency of their current models. 
For example, evaluations have shown that many new products produced in the 
EU  in  the  1990s  were  designed  to  just  cross  the  threshold  of  the  higher-
efficiency categories, as can be clearly seen in Figure 3. Within a few years 
after the launch of EU energy labelling programme, the EU market moved from 
a  random  distribution  of  sales  by  energy  efficiency  prior  to  labelling  to  a 
distribution that shows very large peaks at the thresholds of the efficiency 
classes, demonstrating the clear influence of the Directive on energy labelling. 
·  The European Directive 2005/32/EC establishes a framework for the setting 
of eco-design requirements for Energy-using products (EuP). Adhering to the 
Integrated  Product  Policy  (IPP)  approach,  the  EuP  Directive  is  an  initiative 
attempting  to  improve  the  energy  and  environmental  performances  of  the 
products from the design phase itself, while taking into account the market, 
consumer, and all other stakeholders’ concerns. The first series of preparatory 
studies covering 14 products have been either completed or reached their final 
stage and a second series of 5 studies is in progress (see Table 3). After being 
presented at  the  consultation  forum,  these  implementing  measures  will  be 
subjected to an impact assessment before presenting them to the regulatory 
committee for final vote and adoption. For instance, implementing measures 
will define minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) that will change 
the market towards more energy efficient products. Additional new studies on 
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Figure 3: Impact of EU refrigerator energy label on sales by efficiency index 
 
Further,  a  study  launched  by  the  EC  (DG  Environment)  aiming  to  assess  the 
contribution  that  EuP  implementation  can  make  in  terms  of  greenhouse  gases 
emissions  reductions  in  2020.  This  assessment  will  be  made  per  product  and  per 
Member State, and therefore could be useful in identifying the products that need 
incentives so as to promote the most efficient ones. 
In  addition  to  EuP  and  energy  labelling  Directives,  following  two  initiatives  will 
indirectly affect energy prices and energy consumption of appliances: 
·  The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)
8 aims at helping EU Member States 
achieve their commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a 
cost-effective way. Allowing participating companies to buy or sell emission 
allowances means that emission cuts can be achieved at least cost. It currently 
covers over 10,000 installations in the energy and industrial sectors which are 
collectively responsible for close to half of the EU's emissions of CO2 and 40% 
of its total greenhouse gas emissions. The reduction in the EU-wide quantity of 
allowances to be issued in the third trading period will increase scarcity in the 
allowance  market  and  hence  the  price  of  allowances  can  be  expected  to 
increase. The price of electricity can be expected to increase correspondingly 
but, taking into account today's carbon prices, the rise is expected to be limited 
to 10 to 15% by 2020 compared with business as usual. Other factors such as 
oil and gas prices may have a much bigger impact.
9 Such an increase of energy 
prices is expected to raise the awareness of energy consumption and waste, 




                                                           
8 The EU ETS is based on Directive 2003/87/EC which entered into force on 25 October 2003. 
9 European Commission, DG ENV (2008a) Answer to Question 26  
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Table 3: Status of different product groups in the EuP process (as of June 2008) 
EuP Lot  Product List  Status 
Measures planned to be adopted by the Commissions in 2008 
9  Street lighting products  completed 
8  Office lighting products  completed 
6  Stand-by and off-mode losses  completed 
7  External power supplies  completed 
0  Simple set top boxes  completed 
Measures planned to be adopted by the Commission in spring 2009 
19  Domestic lighting products I (including CFLi)  completed 
5  Televisions  completed 
Measures to be submitted for vote in the committee in 2008 and 2009 
1  Boilers  completed 
2  Water heaters  completed 
14  Washing machines, dishwashers  ongoing 
13  Domestic refrigeration, freezers  ongoing 
12  Commercial refrigeration  completed 
11 
Electric motors, water pumps, circulators, and 
industrial fans 
completed 
3  Computers  completed 
4  Imaging equipment  completed 
10  Room Air Conditioners & domestic fans  ongoing 
Other measures (preparatory studies finishing in 2009)   
18  Complex set top boxes  ongoing 
16  Laundry Driers  ongoing 
17  Vacuum Cleaners  ongoing 
19  Domestic lighting products II  ongoing 
15  Solid Fuel Boilers  ongoing 
·  The Energy Taxation Directive
10 (ETD) sets the minimum levels of taxation for 
energy products and provides a common framework for taxing energy in the 
EU Member States. The Commission intends to present a proposal for a revised 
ETD soon building on the analysis presented in the Green Paper on the use of 
market-based  instruments  for  environment  and  related  policy  purposes  of 
2007. The revision aims at ensuring the full compatibility between the ETD and 
the EU climate change package, so that the Member States can use energy 
taxation more effectively to achieve ambitious energy and climate policy goals. 
In practical terms, the revision would provide for CO2-related taxation in the 
areas  not  covered  by  the  EU  ETS,  and  would  align  the  remaining  part  of 
taxation according to the energy content of the respective energy sources. The 
purpose is to ensure that consistent price signals across all forms of energy 
would be given to incentivise energy savings in a non-distortive manner. 
In addition to regulatory measures, there are several other factors such as oil and gas 
prices may which can influence the energy price (see Figure 4). 
 
                                                           
10 Directive 2003/96/EC   
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Figure 4: Evolution of energy price and of CO2 allowance during 2005
11 
 
2.2.   ANALYSIS OF THE 4 PRODUCT GROUPS 
This study focuses on the following four product groups which are analysed in this sub-
section: 
·  Refrigerators 
·  Washing Machines 
·  Compact Fluorescent Lamps 
·  Boilers 
Each product groups is analysed under three headings: 
·  Product characteristics 
·  Market analysis 
·  Major barriers for energy efficient appliances 
Note: For each product group, the market analysis is being carried out to collect the 
basic economic and market data (sales, stock and prices). Data presented in this 
report mainly comes from the EuP preparatory studies (lot 1 for boilers, lot 13 for 
refrigerators,  lot  14  for  washing  machines,  and  lot  19  for  domestic  lighting). 
Furthermore, the CECED
12 provided us its technical database to complete the market 
picture. 
These data are also used in the cost-benefit analysis. Certain assumptions have been 
made to fill the data gaps which are presented in a transparent manner. Economic 
data used for the CBAs are presented in section 3.2.  
                                                           
11 Tiina Koljonen (2006) 
12 CECED - European Committee of Domestic Equipment Manufacturers  
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2.2.1.  REFRIGERATORS 
1.1.1.1  Product characteristics 
￿  Functional description 
·  Definition 
The European standard EN 153: 2006, “Methods of measuring the energy consumption 
of electric mains operated household refrigerators, frozen food storage cabinets, food 
freezers and their combinations, together with associated characteristics”, used for the 
conformity assessment defines refrigerators (as well as freezers) as “electric mains 
operated household refrigerating appliances”. Further, the definition of “refrigerating 
appliances” is included in the standard EN ISO 15502: 2005, “Household refrigerating 
appliances  –  Characteristics  and  test  methods”,  as  “factory-assembled  insulated 
cabinet with one or more compartments and of suitable volume and equipment for 
household  use,  cooled  by  natural  convection  or  a  frost-free  system  whereby  the 
cooling is obtained by one or more energy-consuming means”. 
Household refrigerating appliances can also be classified with the following criteria: 
·  The refrigeration technology: 
o  Absorption: refrigeration based in an absorption process using heat as 
energy source 
o  Compression: refrigeration using a motor-driven compressor 
·  The installation: 
o  Built-in: intended to be integrated in a cabinet or in a prepared recess 
in a wall 
o  Freestanding 
·  The application: 
o  Refrigerator: refrigerating appliance intended for the preservation of 
food, one of those compartments is suitable for the storage of fresh 
food 
o  Refrigerator-Freezer:  refrigerating  appliance  having  at  least  one 
compartment suitable for the storage of fresh food and at least one 
other suitable for the freezing of fresh food and the storage of frozen 
food under three-star storage conditions. 
o  Frozen-food  storage  cabinet:  refrigerating  appliance  having  one  or 
more compartments suitable for the storage of frozen food 
o  Food  freezer:  refrigerating  appliance  having  one  or  more 
compartments  suitable  for  freezing  food  stuffs  from  ambient 
temperature  down  to  a  temperature  of  –  18°C  and  which  is  also 
suitable for the storage of frozen food under the three-star storage 
conditions. 
Further classification are made by the PRODCOM list (2007) as well as by the energy 
labelling European Directive 94/2/EC, confirmed by the Directive 2003/66/EC defining 
efficiency classes A+ and A++ for cold appliances. The classification defined by the 
energy labelling Directive was also used by the Directive 96/57/EC establishing energy  
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efficiency requirements as well as by the Eco-label Decision 2000/40/EC.A comparison 
of these various classifications is presented in Table 5. 
For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  the  appliances  considered  will  be  refrigerators  (i.e. 
containing at least one compartment for the storage of fresh food), and therefore will 
exclude  categories  8  and  9  of  the  classification  of  the  energy  labelling  Directive 
described in Table 5. 
The  “star”  classification  of  the  low  temperature  compartment  is  detailed  in  the 
Directive 94/2/EC (Annex V) and presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Temperature of the low temperature compartment  
 
Figure 5 presents the share of each category defined in the energy labelling Directive 
according  to  the  number  of  models  proposed  to  consumers  within  the  European 
Union.  Two  main  categories  of  refrigerators  stand  out:  category  7  (household 
refrigerator/freezers with low temperature compartments (***)*) with approximately 
60% of the market of domestic cold appliances and category 1 (household refrigerator 
without low temperature compartment) with about 14%. 




                                                           
13 European Commission, DG TREN (2007b)  
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Table 5: Comparison of the different classifications for cold appliances in EU 
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EU Energy label 
The European Directive 94/2/EC defines what the energy label has to look like, which 
information has to be given to consumers and which information may be included. The 
aim of this energy label is to allow consumers comparing several products in a neutral 
manner by providing the main characteristic of the product. Besides, an energy rating 
using various colours is clearly visible and understandable for consumers. The energy 
label for refrigerators and combined (as well as freezers) is shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: EU Energy label for refrigerators and combined (as well as freezers) 
 
Furthermore, the Directive 2003/66/EC includes the energy efficiency classes A+ and 
A++ for domestic cold appliances in order to discriminate the more efficient products. 
Indeed, since the effectiveness of the Directive 94/2/EC technical improvement have 
been  made  by  manufacturers  aiming  at  reducing  the  electricity  consumption  of 
domestic  cold  appliances  (as  well  as  other  products).  Therefore,  this  new  energy 
labelling  scheme  allows  producers  to  pursue  their  efforts  of  manufacturing  energy 
efficient products. 
The energy class is defined based on the energy efficiency index (I). This index takes 
into  consideration  all  technical  parameters  of  a  product:  net  volume  of  each 
compartment,  electricity  consumption,  net  volume  of  each  compartment, 
temperatures of the compartments, and other factors such as whether they are frost-
free, built-in, or climate class. 
The index is calculated by dividing the electricity consumption of the product measured 
according  to  the  test  standard  EN  153:  2006  by  the  electricity  consumption  of  a 
standard product presenting the same characteristics, the “reference”. This reference 
was calculated based on products available on the European market between 1990 and 
1992. 
The correlation between the energy efficiency index and the energy class is highlighted 
in Table 6. Thus, a G-class product uses 125% or more of the electricity used by an 
average cold appliance of the same type, while an A++ product uses less than 30%. 
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Table 6: Energy efficiency classes according to the EU energy labelling scheme 
Energy Efficiency Index, I (%)  Energy Efficiency Class 
I < 30  A++ 
30 ≤ I < 42  A+ 
42 ≤ I < 55  A 
55 ≤ I < 75  B 
75 ≤ I < 90  C 
90 ≤ I < 100  D 
100 ≤ I < 110  E 
110 ≤ I < 125  F 
125 ≤ I  G 
Currently, there is a stakeholder consultation launched by the European Commission 
(DG TREN) in order to revise the Energy Labelling Framework Directive, 1992/75/EC. 
Indeed, the continuous improvement of energy efficiency of refrigerators, as well as of 
all domestic appliances, requires the revision of the current scheme for a continuous 
promotion of the most efficient products. Moreover, this revision aims at reinforcing 
the impact of energy labelling in order to help the EU to reach its 20% energy saving 
target  by  2020,  while  promoting  sustainable  production  and  consumption,  and  a 
competitive  sustainable  industrial  policy.  Further,  the  revision  of  this  Directive 
1992/75/EC was defined as priority 1 in the Energy Efficiency Action Plan adopted by 
the European Commission in October 2006. 
￿  Average lifetime and replacement patterns 
The UK Market Transformation Programme (MTP) estimated the lifetime of domestic 
cold  appliances  based  on  historical  sales  data  (provided  by  GfK).  The  figures  are 
provided in Table 7. 
Table 7: Assumed lifetime of domestic cold appliances in UK
14 
  Refrigerator  Combined Fridge-Freezer 
Lifetime (years)  12.8  17.5 
In 2004, CECED estimated that the average lifetime of refrigerators and combined was 
about  14.4  years  within  the  EU
15.  Moreover,  about  one  third  of  the  installed 
refrigerators (and freezers) are older than 10 years (88.1 million for a total of 265.4 
million in 2005
15) in the 12 major MS (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK).  
According  to  GIFAM
16,  the  equivalent  of  CECED  in  France,  about  72%  of  sales  of 
domestic cold appliances are replacement sales. Besides, most of these replacement 
sales occur when the old appliance is broken. Therefore, based on an average lifetime 
of 14 years, it will take some time to replace the whole installed stock with energy-
efficient refrigerators.  
                                                           
14 UK Market transformation Programme (2008) 
15 CECED (2007) 
16 Groupement Interprofessionnel des Fabricants d’Appareils d’Equipement Ménager  
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￿  Speed of innovation 
The manufacturing of more efficient cold appliances implied a revision of the energy 
labelling scheme and the creation of two new classes: A+ and A++. 
For the two main categories of refrigerators (categories 1 and 7), which represent 
currently about 95% of the European market, Figure 7 and Figure 8 give the share of 
products put on the EU market according to the energy class. Thus, trends are the 
same for both types of refrigerators with an increase of the share of A-class products 
(including A+ and A++) proposed by manufacturers over the years. This increase implies 
a reduction of the numbers of less efficient appliances; in 2005 the lowest efficiency 
class was B (representing about 13% for category 1 and 18% for category 7) whereas 
the majority of new models were A-class (about 63% for categories 1 and 7).  
Figure 7: Share of energy efficiency classes for refrigerators category 1
17 
 
Figure 8: Share of energy efficiency classes for refrigerators category 7 
 
This trend is still continues with the use of more and more efficient technologies. Sales 
data  by  efficiency  class  will  be  further  discussed  in  the  section  related  to  the 
refrigerators market. 
                                                           
17 European Commission, DG TREN (2007b)  
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Figure 9 shows results of the question related to the current and future manufacturers’ 
priorities from a manufacturer survey carried out in the EuP lot 13 preparatory study,. 
Therefore, the energy consumption of the refrigerator is nowadays the first priority of 
producers and will still remain in the future (5 years). However, it could be surprising 
that  the  product  price  is  currently  the  third  priority  (after  the  ‘bigger  capacity  of 
loading’) and will become the sixth in 5 years. Moreover, it is the only trend of which 
the priority will decrease in the future.  
Figure 9: Priority ranking for refrigerators manufacturers 
 
￿  Scope for environmental improvement 
Environmental impacts of a refrigerator mainly occur during the use phase of its life-
cycle  due  to  its  electricity  consumption.  As  mentioned  earlier,  manufacturers  are 
proposing more and more efficient appliances. Thus, the energy efficiency index has 
continuously decreased, and producers still aim at improving it, i.e. putting A++ and A+ 
refrigerators on the market (Figure 10). 
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1.2.1.2  Market analysis 
￿  Sales data 
No reliable sales data for the whole EU-27 is currently available. Nevertheless, GfK has 
published relevant information for major Western Europe MS as well as for 4 new MS 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia)
 19. 
Table  8  presents  sales  data  of  refrigerators  classified  according  to  their  energy 
efficiency  class  in  the  two  European  regions.  For  both  regions,  sales  increase  was 
observed between 2002 and 2004 (+7.70% in the Western Europe MS and +17.54% in 
the Eastern Europe MS). Also, as highlighted earlier, customers are choosing more and 
more energy efficient appliances and as expected market shares of A+ and A washing 
machines increased (red numbers in Table 8). Using the sales data from Table 8 and 
extrapolating it according to the number of households, the sales figures for the whole 
EU-27 were calculated and such rough estimates suggest that in the EU-27 about 13.91 
million units were sold in 2002 and 15.20 million units in 2004, i.e. an increase of 9.3%. 
Sales distributions in 2002 and 2004 according to the energy class are presented in 
Table 9. A-class products represent the major share of sales in 2002 and 2004 for West 
European MS, whereas there was a shift in Eastern Europe MS from B to A refrigerators 
(red numbers in Table 9). Figure 11 and Figure 12 present sales data between the years 
2000 and 2007 in Western Europe MS and new MS. In both regions, the trend is to buy 
more  energy  efficient  refrigerators.  Therefore,  market  share  of  A-class  or  better 
appliances  increased  by  about  64%  in  the  Western  Europe  and  about  79%  in  the 
Eastern Europe. Even if these figures show that more efficient refrigerators are sold in 
Eastern Europe, it should be noted that this data is based on only 4 MS and the sales 
distribution may be different for the 12 new MS. 
 
 
                                                           
18 Waide, Lebot and Harrington (2004) 
19 Eckl, GfK (2008)  
December 2008 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote  
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
29 
 
Table 8: Refrigerators sales data in Europe in 2002 and 2004 
Energy 
Class 
Western Europe MS 
(AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, NL, PT, SE, UK) 
Eastern Europe MS 
(CZ, HU, PL, SK) 
2002  2004 
Variation 
2004/2002  2002  2004 
Variation 
2004/2002 
A ++  5,552  20,811  274.84%  0  25  - 
A +  125,509  724,853  477.53%  282  41,140  14488.65% 
A  4,651,801  6,825,883  46.74%  345,144  932,093  170.06% 
B  4,455,311  3,730,621  -16.27%  761,130  494,211  -35.07% 
C  1,695,030  798,017  -52.92%  193,774  70,694  -63.52% 
D  106,789  40,800  -61.79%  1,692  787  -53.49% 
E  18,626  5,330  -71.38%  357  93  -73.95% 
F  10,350  1,902  -81.62%  286  1  -99.65% 
G  13,719  5,973  -56.46%  18  0  -100.00% 
Unknown  459,304  236,929  -48.42%  12,799  7,157  -44.08% 
TOTAL  11,541,989  12,431,120  7.70%  1,315,482  1,546,201  17.54% 
Table 9: Refrigerators sales evolution by energy class 
Energy Class 
Western Europe MS 
(AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, NL, 
PT, SE, UK) 
Eastern Europe MS 
(CZ, HU, PL, SK) 
2002  2004  2002  2004 
A ++  0.05%  0.17%  0.00%  0.00% 
A +  1.09%  5.83%  0.02%  2.66% 
A  40.30%  54.91%  26.24%  60.28% 
B  38.60%  30.01%  57.86%  31.96% 
C  14.69%  6.42%  14.73%  4.57% 
D  0.93%  0.33%  0.13%  0.05% 
E  0.16%  0.04%  0.03%  0.01% 
F  0.09%  0.02%  0.02%  0.00% 
G  0.12%  0.05%  0.00%  0.00% 
Unknown  3.98%  1.91%  0.97%  0.46% 
TOTAL  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00% 
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Figure 11: Sales division by energy class in Western Europe MS*  
 
Figure 12: Sales division by energy class in Eastern Europe MS*  
 
Figure 13 and Figure 14 provide sales variations between 2002 and 2004. It is clearly 
visible the global trend to purchase the most efficient refrigerators. Therefore, sales of 
B-class and C-class appliances decreased in most MS (except Greece). Moreover, in the 
Netherlands, even sales of A-class products are lower in 2004 than in 2002. 
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Figure 13: Sales variation in Western Europe MS between 2002 and 2004 
 
Figure 14: Sales variation in Eastern Europe MS between 2002 and 2004 
 
The  energy  efficiency  is  not  the  only  one  criterion  used  to  segregate  sales  of 
refrigerators. One approach could be to analyse the sales data per volume (or litre 
class). 
Table 10 presents refrigerators sales distribution according to net volume for 2002 and 
2004. In both Western and Eastern Europe MS, the 121-250 litres category dominates 
the market. However, a trend is noticeable toward bigger refrigerators as the sales of 
all classes larger than 250 litres has increased between 2002 and 2004. This trend is 
also confirmed by the results of the manufacturer survey presented in Figure 9, where 
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Table 10: Refrigerators sales evolution by litres classes 
Litres class 
Western Europe MS 
(AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, NL, 
PT, SE, UK) 
Eastern Europe MS 
(CZ, HU, PL, SK) 
2002  2004  2002  2004 
< 120 l  3.6%  5.8%  3.0%  4.9% 
121-250 l  51.0%  45.9%  56.3%  48.9% 
251-400 l  36.5%  39.8%  38.1%  44.0% 
401-500 l  1.9%  2.5%  0.3%  0.6% 
501-750 l  1.5%  2.5%  0.3%  0.4% 
> 750 l  0.1%  0.1%  0.0%  0.0% 
Unknown  5.4%  3.4%  2.0%  1.2% 
TOTAL  100.00%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00% 
Figure 15 and Figure 16 detail sales distribution from 121 litres to 400 litres, i.e. the 
two main classes highlighted in Table 10. In Western Europe MS, the main change 
between 2002 and 2004 is the important increase of the share of refrigerators with a 
volume from 351 litres to 400 litres, which was about 4% in 2002 and 16.5% in 2004. 
For this litres class, no significant change was observed between 2002 and 2004 in 
Eastern Europe MS (1% in both years). 
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Figure 16: Sales distribution by litre classes in Eastern Europe MS 
 
It could be interesting to understand the correlation between the refrigerator size and 
energy class, however, no available sales data allows analysing this aspect. 
￿  Stock data 
The stock of refrigerators in EU-25 in 2005 was about 181.6 million units, of which 
84.5% are located in EU-15 (i.e. Western Europe) and 15.5% in EU-10 (i.e. Eastern 
Europe)
20, as presented in Table 11. 
Table 11: Stock of refrigerators (in million units) 
  EU-25  EU-15  EU-10 
1995  163.6  138.5  25.1 
2000  174.2  147.5  26.7 
2005  181.6  153.4  28.2 
￿  Price data 
Average prices of refrigerators have been observed to decrease
21 between 2002 and 
2004 both in Western and Eastern Europe MS. The reduction was higher in the Eastern 
region (-13.8% compared to -5.2% in Western Europe). Moreover, refrigerators are 
more expensive in Western Europe MS and this trend increased between 2002 and 
2004 (Table 12).  
                                                           
20 European Commission, DG TREN (2007b) 
21 Source: GfK  
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Nevertheless, it can be surprising to note that A++ refrigerators prices are higher in 
Eastern MS, as well as for A+ appliances in 2002. It could be explained by the fact that 
A++ products were put on the market in 2004 in the East whereas this class existed 
since several years in the Western region. 
Table 12: Prices by energy classes between 2002 and 2004 
Energy 
Class 
Western Europe  
(AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, NL, 
PT, SE, UK)  
Eastern Europe 
(CZ, HU, PL, SK) 
Variation Western 
EU/Eastern EU 
2002  2004 
Variation 
2004/2002  2002  2004 
Variation 
2004/2002  2002  2004 
A++  444 €  516 €  +14 %  -  627 €  -  -  -17.7 % 
A+  439 €  534 €  +17.7 %  695 €  420 €  -65.5 %  -36.8 %  +27.1 % 
A  538 €  496 €  -8.4 %  394 €  342 €  -15.4 %  +36.6 %  +45.0 % 
B  450 €  392 €  -14.8 %  358 €  273 €  -31.2 %  +25.7 %  +43.6 % 
C  411 €  358 €  -14.8 %  308 €  224 €  -37.2 %  +33.4 %  +59.8 % 
Weighted 
average 
481 €  457 €  -5.2 %  360 €  316 €  -13.8 %  +33.6 %  +44.6 % 
The pricing strategies of manufacturers are often confidential in a very competitive 
white goods market. Following are some of the factors affecting the price differences 
between the various energy classes: 
·  The most efficient refrigerators usually propose also additional functionalities 
or  modern  design  which  implies  additional  production  costs  and  therefore 
higher product price. 
·  Generally, profit margins are higher for products of best quality, and not only 
in the white goods sector (e.g. in the automobile sector). Thereby, refrigerators 
manufacturers are assumed to make more profit with an A+ model than with a 
B-class model. 
·  An A+ refrigerator is more energy efficient than a B-class model and to benefit 
from such improvement, sometime a premium can be put on the price. 
·  When a new very efficient model (e.g. A++) is launched, the price hikes are 
related to not only the production costs but also the R&D costs in developing 
an innovative product. With few years of sales, this however, becomes a minor 
factor in the pricing when many competitors have developed similar models 
and a great deal of R&D expenses is recovered in the first sales. 
·  Finally,  the  price  differences  are  also  representative  of  a  kind  of  ‘market 
imperfection’. Nevertheless, due to a lack of information it is difficult to detail 
the market imperfection influence on the pricing strategy. 
A comparison of refrigerators prices in Western Europe MS is presented in Figure 17. 
Average  product  prices  are  between  401  €  in  Great-Britain  and  622  €  in  Sweden. 
Furthermore, price ranges are not similar in all MS; whereas it is about 163 € in France, 
this range is about 561 € in Sweden. 
Moreover,  as  A-class  products  represented  almost  55%  of  the  market  in  2004, 
weighted average prices are close to A-class product prices (difference of 9% for the 
whole EU-15).  
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Figure 17: Price ranges in Western Europe MS in 2004 
 
The comparison of refrigerators prices for Eastern MS in given in Figure 18. In Czech 
Republic, the maximum price of refrigerators available on the market is 627 €, high 
compared to other MS. This is explained by the fact that this price corresponds to A++ 
appliance in Czech Republic while in all other cases to A+ or A class refrigerators. 
Figure 18: Price ranges in Eastern MS in 2004 
 
Figure 19 shows prices trends in several Western Europe MS for refrigerators from the 
year 1996 up to the year 2004. As already mentioned, the highest average price is in 
Sweden. Further, while there was not a general trend until 2002, prices decreased in 
some MS and increased in other ones, it is noticeable that in every country prices 
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Figure 19: Prices trends in Western MS between 1996 and 2004 
 
Such  prices  differences  between  Western  Europe  and  Eastern  Europe  and  also 
between Member States within same region could be explained by following: 
·  Economies  of  MS  have  not  reached  the  same  level  especially  for  Eastern 
Europe MS. Indeed, the purchasing power and the labour costs are generally 
lower in these countries and obviously such difference is reflected in the price 
of refrigerators. 
·  VAT rates vary across the European Union. For instance, the VAT rate for white 
goods in Denmark is 25% whereas it is of 17.5% in United Kingdom. This partly 
results in the discrepancies of refrigerators prices. 
·  The  price  is  related  to  the  energy  class  but also  to  the  net  volume of  the 
refrigerator. As highlighted in the previous section on ‘sales data’, refrigerators 
sold in Western Europe are bigger than those sold in Eastern Europe, which 
obviously implies a higher product price.  
·   Western Europe MS are ‘wealthier’ than Eastern Europe MS and customers in 
this  region  more  and  more  require  refrigerators  with  specific  colours  or 
coatings for aesthetic reasons. Moreover, new functionalities are integrated in 
some products such as LCD flat-screens, cool water and/or ice cube dispenser, 
special shelves or baskets for cans and bottles, and no/low frost technology. In 
addition, a concern has increased about the hygiene and the quality of food 
and dairy products which motivates the manufacturers to propose hygienic 
filter,  anti-bacterial  surfaces,  and  controllers.  These  additional  features 
effectively increase the overall price. 
·  More and more white goods are manufactured in Eastern Europe MS as wages 
are lower than in the Western part. Therefore, a refrigerator sold in France or 
in  Spain  if  often  transported  from  MS  such  as  Romania  or  Poland.  This 
additional transport costs could also lead to an increase in the final price. 
·  Retailers favour “no name” white goods as well as their own brand which are 
cheaper. Further, in Eastern Europe MS, national or regional manufacturers 
have a high share of the market compared to Western Europe MS where big  
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companies  are  well  implemented  (Electrolux,  Whirpool,  BSH,  Indesit, 
FagorBrandt, etc.). For instance, the Gorenje group has absorbed most of the 
small manufacturers in Slovenia and dominates the national market
22. 
A  study  conducted  for  CECED
23  presented  the  cost  division  of  combined 
refrigerator/freezer  with  energy  class  A++  and  A  for  which  the  selling  prices  to 
consumers are 750€ and 580€ respectively (see Figure 20 and Figure 21). 
Unit sales and capacity of the production line(s) for the A++ model is assumed to be 
10,000 units/year. An upgrade to the A++ category product is assumed with a net price 
of 625€. At 20 percent, this implies a value added tax of 125€ per unit for a total 
consumer  price  of  750€.  With  the  typical  distributor/retailer  mark-up,  the 
manufacturers’ price becomes 300€. Therefore, for a combined refrigerator/freezer 
with energy class A++ sold 750 € to the final consumer, 40% (i.e. 300€) of this price 
goes to the manufacturer, 43.3% (i.e. 325€) goes to the distributor/retailer and 16.7% 
(i.e. 125€) goes to the State with the VAT. 
A detailed analysis of the shares of the various costs for the manufacturer shows that 
materials contribute to 57% to the manufacturer selling price, followed by the profit 
margin (21%) and labour costs (12%). Overhead costs and depreciation (assumed to be 
about 4.3%) complete the balance. 
Figure 20: Consumer selling price split up for an A++ combined 
 
In the case of a combined refrigerator/freezer with an energy efficiency class A, the 
production capacity  is assumed  to  be  0.990 million  units.  The split-up  of the  final 
selling is the same as for the A++ model (i.e. 40% for the manufacturer, 43.3% for the 
distributor/retailer and 16.7% of VAT). In this case, the manufacturing cost is changed 
and is more than that for A++ models (84% of price), because they have been on the 
market longer and margins have been reduced. Therefore, for an A-class combined 
refrigerator sold at 232€ to the distributor, the manufacturer’s margin is about 35€. 
Figure 21: Consumer selling price split up for an A-class combined 
                                                           
22 European Commission, DG TREN (2007b) 
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￿  Market maturity 
Figure  22  presents  the  penetration  rate  for  refrigerators  based  on  the  following 
assumptions:   
·  before the year 1950 there were no refrigerators, and 
·  the growth since then has been logarithmic. The refrigeration market is almost 
saturated and is supposed to go beyond 100% as many households now own 
more than one refrigerator 
Figure 22: Refrigerators penetration rate in EU-15 (red curve) 
 
The penetration rate of refrigerators was also estimated for Eastern Europe MS as well 
as for candidate countries in 2004 (see Figure 23) and the average ownership rate in 
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Figure 23: Penetration rate of refrigerators in new MS in 2004
24 
 
Refrigerator  is  not  a  leisure  product  like  consumer  electronics.  Consumers  buy  a 
second refrigerator for a particular need and therefore setting incentives to promote 
the  purchasing  of  energy  efficient  refrigerator  might  not  stimulate  people  to  buy 
additional products. 
1.2.1.3  Major barriers 
￿  Price  
The  low  penetration  rate  of  energy  efficient  refrigerators  (see  figures  provided  in 
market analysis, section 1.2) indicates that tax incentives could play a role to promote 
consumer purchasing of these products. Indeed, the higher purchase price of energy 
efficient refrigerators is often a barrier for consumers who do not take into account the 
life cycle cost. Therefore, the product price and product functionalities are the main 
criterion affecting the purchase decision. However, as illustrated in Figure 24, it seems 
that  more  and  more  consumers  are  aware  of  the  high  consumption  of  domestic 
refrigerators  and  83.9  %  state  that  energy  and  water  consumptions  are  of  high 
importance when purchasing a new domestic appliance. 
According to another consumer survey carried out in 2004 by Forsa in Germany (Figure 
25), the energy consumption of a refrigerator (or a combined fridge-freezer) is the 
main criterion for 62% of German consumers, followed by the purchase price (33%). 
However, consumer surveys have to be analysed with caution as they do not always 
reflect the real consumer behaviour. Indeed, most of people claim that they really take 
care of environment in their daily life but it may be over-estimated. 
￿  Repairing and maintenance 
Usually,  average  households  use  refrigerators  until  they  break  down.  It  can  be 
estimated  that  a  replacement  of  old  models  with  new  ones  happens  only  after  a 
technical failure. However, many households choose to repair their refrigerator and 
continue  to  use  it  for  several  years  and  prolonging  the  lifetime  of  old  inefficient 
models. 12.3% of total refrigerators are found to have been repaired or serviced
25 (see 
Figure 26). The repairing rate in each country covered by the study, ranges from 5% in 
Germany to 19% in Italy (Figure 27). 
                                                           
24 European Commission DG JRC (2006b) 
25 European Commission, DG TREN (2007b)  
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Figure 24: Buying criteria when purchasing a new domestic appliance
26 
 




                                                           
26 European consumer survey carried out in 10 Member States (Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and 250 households per MS, Source: European 
Commission, DG TREN (2007b)  
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Figure 26: Repairing/service rate of home appliances
27 
 
Figure 27: Repairing/service rate of cooling appliances, by country 
 
 
￿  Second-hand market 
Second-hand  appliances  are  also  chosen  by  consumers  to  replace  broken  down 
products.  The  share  of  second-hand  refrigerators  can  reach  up to  9%  in  some  MS 
(Figure 28). Besides, a refrigerator is often installed in the existent kitchen when the 
new owners move in. Some 30% of the questioned households had a kitchen with an 
installed refrigerator when they moved into their house. Few people will choose to 
change it before the model appears to be good at carrying out its freezing functions. 
With the quick development in energy performance of refrigerators in recent years, 
the use of second-hand appliances is not an energy saving behaviour
28. 
                                                           
27 European Commission, DG TREN (2007b) 
28 Lepthien K. (2000)  
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Figure 28: Cold domestic appliances purchased second-hand, per country
29 
 
￿  Food protection concerns 
The hygiene necessity of food protection is another possible barrier for energy saving 
innovations  of  refrigerators.  It  is  recognised  that  the  lower  the  refrigeration 
temperature  is  the  less  pathogenic  micro-organisms  can  survive.  According  to  the 
World Health organisation (WHO), 44% of foods borne diseases in Europe are caused 
by inappropriate temperatures including insufficient cooling
30. A temperature of 3 to 
5°C is recommended to be maintained for the conservation of perishable food. As a 
result, the further decrease of energy consumption can be realized only when the food 
security temperature is ensured.  
                                                           
29 European Commission, DG TREN (2007b) 
30 World Health organisation (2004)  
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2.2.2.  WASHING MACHINES 
1.3.2.1  Product characteristics 
￿  Functional description 
·  Definition 
The European standard EN 60456: 2005 “Clothes washing machines for household use 
–  Methods  for  measuring  the  performance  (IEC  60456:  2003,  modified)”  defines 
Washing machines as “clothes washing machines for household use with or without 
heating  devices  and  for  cold  and/or  hot  water  supply”,  and  further  specifies  the 
definition in the “Scope” section as “appliance for cleaning and rinsing of textiles using 
water which may also have a means of extracting excess water from the textiles”. 
The Energy Labelling Directive 95/12/EC (and 96/89/EC) also gives the definition of 
washing  machines,  which  is  “electric  mains  operated  household  washing  and  spin 
drying vessels (such as twin tubs), and combined washer-driers. Appliances that can 
also use other energy sources are excluded”. This definition is later adopted by the EU 
Eco-label Scheme with Commission Decision 2005/384/EC of 12 MAY 2005, prolonging 
the criteria established in Decision 2000/45/EC. 
With the emphasis on the energy sources in the definition by the Energy Labelling 
Directive, this definition will be used for the purpose of this study. Categorisation of 
different types of washing machines has been made by EN 60456: 2005 and PRODCOM 
2007, which are presented in Table 13. 
The  functional  unit,  i.e.  the  primary  product  performance  parameter,  of  washing 
machines  is  the  weight  of  the  laundry  washed  per  cycle,  when  its  functional 
performance is represented by the cleaning and spinning performance. 
·  EU Energy Label  
The energy efficiency scale for washing machines is calculated using a cotton cycle at 
60°C with a maximum declared load, which is typically 6 kg. The label provides the 
consumers with an A (most efficient) to G (least efficient) scale (Figure 29) for the 
model’s  energy  efficiency,  washing  performance  and  spin  drying  performance.  The 
energy efficiency index is in kWh per kilogramme of washing (Table 14). 
Washing performance is defined as the ratio of the water consumption of the machine 
under test compared to a reference machine. Though there are several parameters 
influencing  the  overall washing  performance,  high water  and energy consumptions 
often leads to good performance. Therefore, the relation between energy consumption 
and washing performance is a very important piece of information.   
The spin drying efficiency is correlated to maximal spin speed. The energy consumption 
of  this  process  is  even  higher  than  that  of  the  washing.  Thus,  the  technology 
improvement  of  the  spin  process  contributes  to  an  important  saving  of  energy, 
especially for those who often use electric drying after the washing process. Besides 
these three criteria, the label also contains information on total energy consumption 
per cycle, maximum spin speed, the total cotton capacity in kg, water consumption per 
cycle in litres, and noise in the washing and spinning cycles dB(A).  
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Table 13: Comparison of the different classification scheme for washing machines at European level 
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Figure 29: EU energy label for washing machines 












Table 14: Energy efficiency classes for washing machines 
  A  B  C  D  E  F  G 
Energy 
efficiency index 
I ≤ 0.19  0.19<I≤0.23  0.23<I≤0.27  0.27<I≤0.31  0.31<I≤0.35  0.35<I≤0.39  0.39 < I 
Washing 
performance 
I > 1.03  1.00<I≤1.03  0.97<I≤1.00  0.94<I≤0.97  0.91<I≤0.94  0.88<I≤0.91  I ≤ 0.88 
Spin drying 
efficiency 
I ≤ 45%  45%<I≤54%  54%<I≤63%  63%<I≤72%  72%<I≤81%  81%<I≤91%  90% ≤ I 
￿  Average lifetime and replacement patterns 
According to a customer survey conducted in several European countries
31, nearly 50% 
of the washing machines are younger than four years with 90% younger than ten years 
(Figure 30) and the calculated average age of washing machines in the interviewed 
households is 5.5 years (Figure 31), though the results vary from one MS to another. 
The actual lifetime of washing machines is much longer due to maintenance and repair 
services provided by manufacturers and the existence of a well-developed second-
hand market. It is claimed that the average lifetime of a washing machine is over ten 
years. 
Regarding  the  development  of  the  energy  efficient  washing  machines  in  the  last 
decade (further information in the “Speed of innovation” section), the difference of 
energy consumption between the old models and the new ones is more and more 
noticeable.  Use  of  over-aged  washing  machines,  therefore,  leads  to  unnecessary 
energy consumption.   
                                                           
31 European Commission, DG TREN (2007c)  
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Figure 30: Age of washing machines in different MS
31 
 
Figure 31: Average age of washing machines in different MS
31 
 
￿  Buying criteria 
Despite the price and functionality of a washing machine being the most important 
purchase criteria for most consumers, the energy and water consumption performance 
do  influence  the  final  purchase  decisions.  In  a  German  study
32,  over  23%  of  the 
consumer mentioned that energy and water consumption are the main criteria when 
they choose a washing machine, followed by the price (18%) and the performance data 
(12.2%) as shown in Figure 32. 
   
                                                           
32 Innofact AG(2005)  
December 2008 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote  
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
47 
 
Figure 32: Buying criteria for washing machine in Germany 
 
This  illustrates  that  the  availability  of  information  for  consumers  on 
environment/energy aspects at retail shops is crucial in order to increase the sales of 
efficient washing machines. 
￿  Speed of innovation 
In response to the change in the consumers’ buying attitude, the manufacturers have 
been altering their product design, by highlighting the performance of the machines in 
terms of less water and energy consumption. As a result, a continuous improvement of 
energy  efficiency  (Figure  33)  and  a  simultaneous  reduction  of  water  consumption 
(Figure 34) in EU-25 can be observed in the past decade.  
Figure 33: Evolution of washing machines’ energy efficiency index (kWh/kg) 
33 
 
                                                           
33 Waide, Lebot and Harrington (2004)  
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The average energy efficiency index of washing machines in EU-15 countries reduced 
by  23%  from  0.249  kWh/kg  in  1996  to  0.191  kWh/kg  in  2004.  A  similar  trend  is 
observed in New Member States (NMS) and candidate countries (CC)
34 from 2003.  
Figure 34: Evolution of water consumption by washing machines in EU-25
35 
 
Another indicator of the development of more efficient washing machines models is 
the reduction of average water consumption among all MS, about 31% from the initial 
14 L/kg in 1997. It should be mentioned that the EU has been enlarged from 15 MS to 
27, with a 100 million increase in the population. This increase in market size seems to 
have little impact on the average water consumption of the washing machines. 
Meanwhile,  following  innovations  corresponding  to  the  other  buying  criteria  of 
consumers have also been happening: 
·  Towards bigger machines with larger loading capacity: wider drum diameter, 
180°C door opening, inclined drum, etc. 
·  Towards  intelligent  machines  adaptable  to  consumer  habits:  changeable 
programmes according to textiles, automatic sensors, etc. 
·  Towards a higher compatibility with consumers’ daily life: time delay options, 
digital time displays, etc. 
￿  Scope for environmental improvement 
According to a ‘simplified’ life-cycle analysis (LCA)
36 of an old washing machine (2,000 
cycles  i.e.  duration  of  11.4  years),  the  energy  supply  in  the  use  phase  occupies  a 
dominant position in cumulated energy demand with a share of 76% (Figure 35) among 
other factors including manufacturing and distribution. In terms of Global Warming 
Potential, its contribution being a little lesser, the energy consumption in the use phase 
is still far beyond the overall impact of all the other three contributors (material supply, 
manufacturing and water consumption). 
                                                           
34 Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia 
35 European Commission, DG TREN (2007c) 
36 CECED (2006)   
December 2008 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote  
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
49 
 
Figure 35 : Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) and Global Warming Potential (GWP) in 
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This analysis indicates that the priority should be given to encourage the households to 
replace  their  old  inefficient  washing  machines  with  new  efficient  models.  The 
information  availability  to  consumers  on  the  energy  efficiency  aspects  can  be 
important in achieving this goal. Energy Label is one measure taken by the EU in order 
to provide the consumers with a profile of life-cycle performance of a model. Since the 
introduction of the Energy Label for washing machines in 1996, it has largely impacted 
the choices of consumers and the development of the products on the market. 
·  Impacts of the Energy Label on consumers and manufacturers 
The energy label informs consumers about relevant consumption values concerning 
energy  and  water  and  other  relevant  performance  criteria  like  capacity, 
cleaning/washing performance or noise emissions. Consumers are able to compare 
different appliances on the market based on the data provided by the label. 86% of all 
German Consumers regarded the Energy Label as a source of information when they 
choose a new appliance
37. 
In order to comply with energy consumption requirements of the energy efficiency and 
to stand in a competitive position of the market share, the manufacturers have largely 
optimised the washing machine models.  
In terms of environmental improvement, the evolution of the energy efficiency is of 
major concern. By comparing the distribution of the specific energy efficiency class 
from 1997 to 2005 in EU-25 (Figure 36), it can be concluded that about 90% of the 
machines are in class A or better
38 and no machines worse than class C existed in 2005 
resulting from a continuous improvement since 1997. 
  
                                                           
37 http://www.greenlabelspurchase.net/Licht_EU_Energie_Label.html 
38  The  introduction  of  a  new  energy  efficiency  class  “A+”  in  the  energy  labelling  scheme  for  washing 
machines  was  not  accepted  by  the  European  Commission  and  the  Member  States  in  2002.  But  the 
industry has then agreed on the creation of a commercial label “A+” to specific energy consumptions of ≤ 
0.17 kWh/kg and to require that washing performance to be in class A as well.  
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Figure 36: Distribution of washing machines by energy efficiency class in the EU-25 
39 
 
These statements are in line with the trends presented in the previous section “Speed 
of innovation”, which proves the important role of the Energy Label in environmental 
improvement as well as in consumers’ buying decision. The evolution of the other two 
parameters (washing performance and spin drying efficiency) should also be taken into 
consideration, with  their  indirect  relation with environment  impact  of the washing 
machine. The development of the spin dry efficiency is not very evident over the years 
and B-class products represent the biggest market share in 2005 in EU-25, with about 
41% (Figure 37). The least efficient classes (E, F and G) still exist in the market but with 
a continuously decreasing share (21% in 2005).  
The  washing  performance  displays  an  analogous  development  with  the  energy 
consumption. Models with a D-class or worse performance are no longer offered in the 
market in 2005 in EU-25 as shown in Figure 38. This means that manufacturers have 
been focusing their technology innovation on achieving low energy consumption and 
high washing performance. 
1.3.2.2  Market analysis 
￿  Sales data 
No reliable sales data for the whole EU-27 is currently available. Nevertheless, for the 
major Western Europe MS, GfK has published relevant information as well as for 4 
Eastern MS (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). 
Table 15 presents sales data of washing machines according to their energy efficiency 
class in the two European regions. First of all, for both regions sales increased between 
2002 and 2004 (+8.64% for Western MS and +26.04% for Eastern MS). As already 
highlighted, customers are choosing more and more energy efficient appliances and as 
expected market shares of A+ and A-class washing machines has been increasing. 
 
                                                           
39 European Commission, DG TREN (2007c)  
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Figure 37: Distribution of spin drying performance classes for washing machines in 
the EU-25  
 
Figure 38: Distribution of washing performance classes for washing machines in the 
EU-25 
 
Using total sales data presented in the table below and household population of MS 
included in this table, it is possible to extrapolate the sales data for the whole EU-27. It 
can be estimated that about 13.46 million units were sold in 2002 and 14.99 million 
units in 2004, i.e. an increase of 11.4%. 
Sales distributions in 2002 and 2004 according to the energy class are presented in 
Table 16. A-class products represent the major share of sales in 2002 and 2004 both for 
Western and Eastern MS of the EU. Table 16 can be complemented by Figure 39 which 
presents the evolution of washing machines sales by energy class in Western Europe 
(10 MS compared to 13 in Table 16) since 2000. In seven years, appliances with class A 
or A+ always increased and represented 92.2% of sales in 2007 (until October). Further, 
the energy class of 11% of washing machine sold in 2000 was unknown, this share 
decreased strongly by 2007 and represents only 0.7%.  
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Table 15: Washing machines sales data in the EU 
Energy 
Class 
Western Europe MS 
(AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, NL, PT, SE, UK) 
Eastern Europe MS 
(CZ, HU, PL, SK) 
2002  2004 
Variation 
2004/2002 
2002  2004 
Variation 
2004/2002 
A ++  0  2  -  0  0  - 
A +  9,699  929,225  9480.63 %  30  24,816  82620.00 % 
A  6,749,547  8,549,715  26.67 %  556,986  1,243,710  123.29 % 
B  2,235,786  1,441,018  -35.55 %  365,304  184,230  -49.57 % 
C  1,412,140  909,048  -35.63 %  214,610  55,020  -74.36 % 
D  150,126  88,656  -40.95 %  16,280  6,327  -61.14 % 
E  25,926  15,649  -39.64 %  2,347  296  -87.39 % 
F  52,447  56,923  8.53 %  79  13  -83.54 % 
G  5,744  1,438  -74.97 %  8  0  -100.00 % 
Unknown  557,472  174,759  -68.65 %  97,704  65,350  -33.11 % 
TOTAL  11,198,889  12,166,433  8.64 %  1,253,348  1,579,762  26.04 % 
 
Table 16: Washing machines sales distribution by energy class 
Energy Class 
Western Europe MS 
(AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, NL, PT, SE, UK) 
Eastern Europe MS 
(CZ, HU, PL, SK) 
2002  2004  2002  2004 
A +  0.09 %  7.64 %  0.00 %  1.57 % 
A  60.27 %  70.27 %  44.44 %  78.73 % 
B  19.96 %  11.84 %  29.15 %  11.66 % 
C  12.61 %  7.47 %  17.12 %  3.48 % 
D  1.34 %  0.73 %  1.30 %  0.40 % 
E  0.23%  0.13%  0.19%  0.02% 
F  0.47%  0.47%  0.01%  0.00% 
G  0.05%  0.01%  0.00%  0.00% 
Unknown  4.98%  1.44%  7.80%  4.14% 
TOTAL  100.00 %  100.00 %  100.00  100.00 % 
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Figure 39: Washing machines sales by energy class in Western EU*  
 
For each of the 13 Western Europe MS, Figure 40 presents sales variations by energy 
class between 2002 and 2004. The focus is also put on 6 major Western Europe MS in 
Figure 41 for the years 2002 and 2004. Among the Western Europe MS, Greece showed 
the lowest sales share of A+ and A class washing machines even if it was about 80% in 
2007. Nevertheless, the sales growth rate of the most efficient appliances (A+ and A-
class) was the highest (+14.9%) in Greece. 
Figure 40: Washing machines sales variation (2002 – 2004) in Western Europe MS  
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Figure 41: Sales distribution of washing machines in Western Europe MS*  
 
As for Eastern Europe MS, Figure 42 to Figure 44 show sales distribution and variation 
by energy class for several MS. It is interesting to note that while in 2000 the share of 
A+ and A-class products was 14.5% in Eastern Europe MS and 34.5% in Western Europe 
MS, this trend changed in 2007 when market share of efficient washing machines was 
higher in Eastern MS than in Western ones (94.5% compared to 92.2%). Nevertheless, 
these results are based on 4 MS (CZ, HU, PL and SK) only and the picture might be 
different for all 12 new MS. 
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Figure 43: Sales variation (2002 - 2004) of washing machines in Eastern Europe MS  
 
 
Figure 44: Sales distribution by energy class in Eastern Europe MS*  
 
￿  Stock data 
In 2005, the estimated stock of washing machines in the EU-25 was about 167.3 million 
units, of which 85.6% are located in the 15 MS of Western Europe and 14.4% in the 10 
new MS
40 (Table 17). These figures are in line with the CECED’s estimation of the stock 
in EU-25 in 2004 which is 162.9 million washing machines. 
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Table 17: EU Stock of washing machines (in million units) 
  EU-25  EU-15  EU-10 
1995  140.9  124.4  16.5 
2000  156.7  136.5  20.2 
2005  167.3  143.2  24.1 
￿  Price data 
Average  prices  of  washing  machines  decreased  between  2002  and  2004  both  in 
Western Europe MS and in Eastern Europe MS for all energy efficiency classes, and the 
higher  the  energy  class  the  higher  was  the  decrease  (see  Table  18).  The  average 
reduction  of  the  weighted  average  product  price  is  about  the  same  for  the  two 
European regions (-13.30% for Western Europe and -13.03% for Eastern Europe). 
Further, the product prices in Western Europe are higher than in Eastern Europe. The 
maximum difference occurs for B-class washing machines (48.28%) and regarding the 
average product price, the gap is still high (43.34%). 
Table 18: Prices by energy classes between 2002 and 2004 
Energy 
Class 
Western Europe MS 
(AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, NL, 
PT, SE, UK)  
Eastern Europe MS 




2002  2004 
Variation 
2004/2002 
2002  2004 
Variation 
2004/2002 
2002  2004 
A+  983 €  607 €  -38.21 %  628 €  441 €  -29.84 %  56.53 %  37.64 % 
A  598 €  473 €  -20.85 %  426 €  333 €  -21.84 %  40.38 %  42.04 % 
B  440 €  387 €  -11.95 %  329 €  261 €  -20.64 %  33.74 %  48.28 % 
C  379 €  346 €  -8.69 %  306 €  274 €  -10.56 %  23.86 %  26.28 % 
Weighted 
average 
534 €  463 €  -13.30 %  372 €  323 €  -13.03 %  43.55 %  43.34 % 
Figure 45 and Figure 46 show the prices interval of washing machines sold in the West 
and East EU markets in 2004, as well as the average price of A class products. As Figure 
45 and Figure 46 indicate, the average washing machine price is very close to the 
appliances  with  class  A.  It  is  noticeable  that  the  MS  from  Southern  Europe  (Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain) have the lowest washing machines prices, both the maximum and 
the weighted average. 
At a first glance, the closer is the yellow mark (the weighted average price) to the top 
of  the  vertical  bars  the  faster  is  the  market  transformation.  Indeed,  in  Germany, 
Austria, Denmark or Netherlands, where the weighted average price is higher than the 
A-class price, the penetration of A+ washing machines was higher in 2004 compared to 
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Figure 45: Price ranges in Western MS in 2004 
 
As mentioned earlier, washing machines prices are lower in Eastern Europe, with a 
reduction of 28% for the weighted average appliance as well as for A-class products 
compared to Western Europe in 2004 (average of 8 MS from Eastern Europe).  
Figure 46: Price ranges in Eastern Europe MS in 2004 
 
Figure 47 presents the evolution of average washing machine price between 1996 and 
2004 for some MS in the Western Europe. It is interesting to note that at the beginning 
in 1996 and until the year 2002, price trends were different among MS; in most of 
them the prices steadily decreased while a price increase was observed in Italy and 
Spain. After 2002, prices in all MS declined in coherence with the data presented in 
Table  18.  This  global  trend  is  probably  the  consequence  of  the  deep  market 
transformation occurred during the 90s in these Western Europe MS.  
58 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote  
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
December 2008 
 
Figure 47: Washing machines price trends in Western Europe MS 
 
The cost division of a typical washing machine could be assumed as for a refrigerator 
and  presented  previously  according  to  a  study  conducted  for  CECED
41.  As 
manufacturers  of  refrigerators  often  produce  also  washing  machines  and  same 
retailers distribute all white goods, the pricing strategy can be assumed to be similar. 
Therefore, the final selling price of a washing machine is split as follow: 43.3% for the 
distributor, 40% for the manufacturer and 16.7% for the government through the VAT.  
Moreover, materials costs represent about 60% of the manufacturer selling price of a 
washing  machine,  this  share  being  lower  for  the  most  efficient  models.  The 
manufacturer’s margin for the most efficient appliances (i.e. energy class A+) is higher 
than for an A-class model, due to a longer presence on the market and the recovering 
of R&D expenses for this production line. 
￿  Market maturity 
The penetration rates presented in Figure 48 are based on following assumptions:   
·  before year 1953 there were no washing machines; 
·  the growth is depicted through a linear logistic function. In the case of the 
washing machines, the stock is steadily and slowly saturating to an ownership 
rate of 90%. Probably it will never reach the 100% of saturation because of the 





                                                           
41 Mebane, B. and E. Piccinno (2006)  
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Figure 48: Washing machines penetration rate in the EU-15 (red curve) 
 
The penetration rate of washing machines was also estimated for Eastern Europe MS 
and for candidate MS in 2004 (see Figure 49) and the average ownership rate in EU-12 
(+ Croatia) is about 78%. 
Figure 49: Penetration rate of washing machines in new MS in 2004
42 
 
1.3.2.3  Major barriers 
Despite the price and functionality of a washing machine being an important purchase 
criteria  for  most  consumers,  the  energy  and  water  consumption  performance  do 
influence the final purchase decisions. In a German study
43, over 23% of the consumer 
mentioned that energy and water consumption are the main criteria when they choose 
a washing machine, followed by the price (18%) and the performance data (12.2%) as 





                                                           
42 European Commission, DG JRC (2006b) 
43 Innofact AG (2005), Purchase decision- washing machines  
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Figure 50: Buying criteria for washing machines in Germany 
 
This  illustrates  that  the  availability  of  information  for  consumers  on 
environment/energy aspects at retail shops is crucial in order to increase the sales of 
efficient washing machines. 
￿  Repairing and maintenance 
Replacement  patterns  also  affect  the  penetration  of  energy  efficient  washing 
machines. In the case of breakdown, most consumers prefer repairing the old washing 
machine instead of buying a new one.  
Figure 51: Repairing/service rate of home appliances
44 
 
Figure  51  indicates  that  about  30%  of  washing  machines  owned  by  the  European 
respondents of the survey are reported to have been repaired/serviced, ranking first 
among all home appliances (Figure 51). Repairing rate in MS ranges from 7% in Sweden 
to 48% in Spain (Figure 52). The prolonged lifetime of repaired washing machines also 
extends the time of increased energy consumption by inefficient washing machines.  
                                                           
44 European Commission, DG TREN (2007c)  
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Figure 52: Repairing/service rate of washing machines in some MS 
 
￿  Second-hand market 
Another possible choice for the replacement of washing machines is the second-hand 
models. The share of second-hand washing machines can reach up to 10% in some MS 
(Figure 53). The average age of second-hand washing machines are 7.3 years old, 1.8 
years older than the average age of all washing machines. This leads to an excess 
energy consumption of using second-hand appliances and a delay of using new models 
with efficient technology. 
Figure 53: Second-hand purchase of washing machines
45 
 
￿  Consumer training and education 
Finally, the consumer training and education is a very important for the decrease of 
energy and water consumption in real life, considering the large difference in resource 
consumption of the same model under different washing modes. 
                                                           
45 European Commission, DG TREN (2007c)  
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2.2.3.    COMPACT FLUORESCENT LAMPS (CFL) 
Compact fluorescent lamps can be grouped into two main categories
46: 
·  CFL with integrated ballast
47 (CFLi), also called ‘energy-saving lamp’ 
·  CFL without integrated ballast (CFLni) 
About  90%  of  the  lamps  in  the  first  category  are  used  for  domestic  applications 
whereas  the majority  of CFLni  lamps  are  used  in office  buildings.  Also,  the  overall 
efficiency of a CFLni also depends on the efficiency of the ballast, essential device for 
its  operation.  Finally,  in  offices  CFLni  represent  only  10%  of  the  installed  lamps, 
whereas linear fluorescent lamps (LFL), which are more efficient than CFLni represent 
about 80 %
48.  
In this study, we will focus on CFL with integrated ballast (CFLi). 
1.3.3.1  Product characteristics 
￿  Functional description 
·  Definition 
CFLi can be classified according to following criteria (see Figure 54): 
·  Form 
·  Socket type 
·  Visual appearance  
These design characteristics allow customers to replace their incandescent lamps with 
CFLi without changing the luminaires or the light fixture. 
Figure 54: Examples of CFL with integrated ballast
49 
         
Several performance parameters can be used to compare CFLi as well as to compare 
CFLi with incandescent lamps, as defined in the international test standard EN 12665 
(‘Light and lighting – Basic terms and criteria for specifying lighting requirements’): 
                                                           
46 In the context of the EuP Directive, two different preparatory studies including CFL were launched. Lot 8 
related to office lighting discus with CFLni whereas lot 19 related to domestic lighting discuss with CFLi. 
47 A ballast is a device for starting and regulating the current in a fluorescent lamp. 
48 Estimations based on expert inquiry for the EuP preparatory study on office lighting (lot 8) 
49 Source : Philips  
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·  Rated  luminous  flux  (φ)  measured  after  100  operating  hours  (expressed  in 
lumen, lm); 
·  Lamp power (expressed in Watt, W), 
·  Lamp  Survival  Factor  (LSF),  fraction  of  the  total  number  of  lamps  which 
continue to operate at a given time under defined conditions and switching 
frequency; 
·  Lamp Lumen Maintenance Factor (LLMF), ratio of the luminous flux emitted by 
the lamp at a given time in its life to the initial luminous flux; 
·  Luminous  efficacy  of  a  lamp  (ηlamp),  quotient  luminous  flux  emitted  by  the 
power consumed by the source (expressed in lm/W); 
·  Colour temperature (expressed in Kelvin, K); 
·  Colour rendering (expressed with the Colour Rendering Index, CRI), describing 
the colour appearance of the surfaces being illuminated by the lamp compared 
to illumination by daylight; 
·  Start-up time, required time to provide a continuous light output, but possibly 
at reduced light output (expressed in seconds); 
·  Run-up time, required time to provide full brightness (expressed in seconds) 
·  Lamp lifetime (expressed in hours). 
A specific characteristic of fluorescent lamps, both compact and linear, is that they 
contain mercury for their operating. According to the RoHS Directive
50 entering into 
force  from  1  July  2006,  the  maximum  mercury  content  in  CFLi  is  5mg,  due  to  its 
hazardous properties. Further, CFLi are covered by the WEEE Directive
51 (category 5) 
and must be collected and treated at their end-of-life. 
EU Energy label 
The  Directive  98/11/EC,  which  was  published  on  10
th  March  1998  and  which 
implemented the Directive 92/75/EC, applies the energy labelling requirements for 
household  electric  lamps  supplied  directly  from  the  mains  (CFLi  and  incandescent 
lamps) and to household fluorescent lamps (including linear fluorescent lamps and 
CFLni), even when marketed for non-household use. 
The label must include the following information (see Figure 55): 
·  energy efficiency class ; 
·  luminous flux in lumens; 
·  input power (wattage) ; 
·  average rated life in hours.  
 
 
                                                           
50 Directive 2002/95/EC 
51 Directive 2002/96/EC  
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Figure 55: Energy efficiency label for lamps 
 
Table 19 presents the energy efficiency class of the main lamp types: CFLi, halogen, 
and incandescent. Incandescent lamps are the least efficient bulbs, and most of them 
are E-class. Although CFLi is the best product in environmental terms, two categories 
can be defined according to their energy class: A-class and B-class. 
The main technical parameter allowing a fair comparison of several lamp types is the 
lamp efficacy. Indeed, for a defined lumen output, e.g. 500 lumen the required lamp 
power are 50W for an incandescent lamp with a lamp efficacy of 10 lm/W and 10W for 
a CFLi with a lamp efficacy of 50 lm/W. Therefore, the use of a CFLi implies a reduction 
of the electricity consumption of 80%. 
Table 19: Lamp type according to their energy efficiency class 















48 - 65  40 – 50  16 - 25  10 – 16  8 - 13 
￿  Average lifetime and replacement patterns 
Two main categories of CFLi can be defined according to their lifetime. Indeed, basic 
CFLi can operate for about 6,000 hours whereas new bulbs have a longer lifetime of 
10,000 hours or even more (up to 15,000 hours) according to manufacturers’ data. 
The  lumen  output  of  a  lamp  deteriorates  during  its  lifetime.  This  decrease  is  not 
identical for all lamp types and is expressed by the Lamp Lumen Maintenance Factor 
(LLMF) as presented in Table 20 for typical domestic lamps.  
                                                           
52 The higher the lamp power, the higher the lamp efficacy.  
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Table 20: LLMF and LSF data for some commonly used lamps
53 
 
At the end-of-life, lumen output of a basic CFLi (with a lifetime of 6,000 hours) is about 
89% of its initial flux and about 85% for a CFLi with longer lifetime (about 10,000 
hours). The lifetime of an average incandescent lamp is estimated of 1,000 hours. 
￿  Speed of innovation 
Improvements have been made by CFLi manufacturers in order to improve the lamp 
quality. These improvements also allowed reassuring a lot of consumers who had bad 
experiences with the use of CFLi due to long warm-up and run-up times as well as to 
the low light output compared to the incandescent lamps. 
Nowadays, several ‘Best Available Technologies’ available are implemented in CFLi to 
improve their efficiency (i.e. lamp efficacy) or their lifetime. Moreover, new CFLi with 
reduced mercury content (2 mg) have been put on the EU market. 
The European CFL Quality Charter 
In 1998, the European Commission developed the European Quality Charter for CFLs to 
support  the  Europe  wide  initiative  for  the  promotion  of  efficient  lighting  in  the 
residential sector. The aim of the European CFL Quality Charter is to offer a high quality 
standard to be used by utilities and other bodies in their promotion and procurement 
campaigns. The ultimate goal of the European Quality Charter for CFL is to increase 
consumer confidence in this environmentally friendly technology, which saves money 
and the environment. This will increase sales of CFLs in the EU and thus contribute to 
the goals of the EU energy and environmental policies. 
During the year 2002, the first revision of the European CFL Quality Charter took place. 
Nowadays, the European CFL Quality Charter aims at raising consumer awareness and 
confidence  in  the  CFL,  by  assuring  that  certain  quality  and  performance  levels  are 
reached. The European CFL Quality Charter is a voluntary set of criteria established by 
the  European  Commission  in  collaboration  with  a  number  of  private  and  public 
organisations, including: 
·  The European Federation of Lamp Manufacturers, ELC; 
·  The European Association of the Electricity Industry, Eurelectric; 
·  ADEME,  the  French  National  Agency  for  Energy  and  Environmental 
Management; 
                                                           
53 CIE, International Commission of Illumination (2005) 
differences 0.1 0.5 1 2 4 6 8 10
LLMF moderate 1.00 0.97 0.93
LSF big 1.00 0.98 0.50
LLMF big 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.95
LSF big 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.50
LLMF big 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.85
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·  The UK Energy Saving Trust; 
·  The Danish Electricity Saving Trust; 
·  SenterNovem (the Dutch Energy Agency). 
The above indicated organisations have agreed to support and promote the present 
European  CFL  Quality  Charter  and  recommend  to  public  and  private organisations, 
when running promotion, procurement campaigns, to prescribe/procure CFLs, which 
meet the requirements of the European CFL Quality Charter. The most recent version 
of the European CFL Quality Charter dates from February 2005 and is currently under 
revision. 
￿  Scope for environmental improvement 
Typical current lamps available on the EU market are presented in Table 21.  
Table 21: Technical parameters of typical CFLi and incandescent lamp 
 
Based on their bill of materials and electricity consumptions, life cycle assessments 
(LCA) were carried out in order to evaluate environmental impacts of the various type 
of  lamps  during  the  whole  life  cycle  (including  the  production  phase,  the 
manufacturing phase, the distribution, the use phase and the end-of-life). 
Table 22 presents the comparison of the outcomes of the LCA for the typical (frosted) 
incandescent lamp and the typical CFLi. This comparison has been made by dividing the 
environmental impacts by the lumen output and by the lamp lifetime. It is clearly 
visible that a CFLi is more efficient than an incandescent lamp with a reduction of the 
energy consumption of 77%. Moreover, the global warming potential is also reduced (-
77.85%). 
In 2007, the ELC federation
54 proposed to phase out the least efficient lamps in the 
domestic sector with a ‘step by step’ approach (see Table 23). Moreover, minimum 
lamp efficacy is defined according to the lamp power (see Table 24). Nevertheless, this 
proposal does not directly concern compact fluorescent lamps with integrated ballast 
as their lamp efficacy is already higher than the minimum values. 
 
                                                           
54  The  European  Lamp  Companies  Federation  represents  the  leading  European  lamp  manufacturers 
representing 95% of total European production. The members of ELC are: Aura, BLV, General Electric, 
Havells Sylvania, Narva, Osram and Philips. 
Incandescent lamp CFLi
Lamp power (W) 54 17
Lamp efficacy (lm/W) 11.0 48.5
Lumen output (lm) 594.0 824.5
Lamp lifetime (h) 1000 6000 
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Table 22: Comparison of environmental impacts of a CFL and an incandescent lamp 
 
Table 23: ELC proposal for phasing out inefficient lamps (in domestic lighting) 
 
Table 24: ELC proposal for minimum lamp efficacy per wattage 
 
Incandescent lamp CFLi
Environmental indicators unit value per lumen per hour value per lumen per hour
Total Energy (GER) J 0.00% -77.00%
of which, electricity J 0.00% -76.07%
Water (process) µltr 0.00% -73.95%
Waste, non-haz./ landfill µltr 0.00% -76.17%
Waste, hazardous/ incinerated µg 0.00% -77.18%
Emissions (Air)
Greenhouse Gases in GWP100 mg CO2 eq. 0.00% -77.85%
Acidifying agents µg SO2 eq. 0.00% -76.75%
Volatile Org. Compounds ng 0.00% -75.99%
Persistent Org. Pollutants 10
-3 pg i-Teq 0.00% -77.85%
Heavy Metals ng  Ni eq. 0.00% -78.73%
PAHs ng  Ni eq. 0.00% -84.37%
Particulate Matter (dust) µg 0.00% -84.27%
Emissions (Water)
Heavy Metals ng Hg/20 0.00% -59.61%
Eutrophication ng PO4 0.00% -53.97% 
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1.3.3.2  Market analysis 
￿  Sales data 
EU-27 CFLi sales in 2006 were estimated between 220 and 300 million (340-420 million 
CFL (source Eurostat) minus 120 million CFLni (estimated based on ELC CFLni sales). 
This is about 4 – 6 times lower than GLS sales (1,350 million in 2006 according to ELC). 
ELC also estimated that 186 million of CFLi were sold in EU in 2004. Further, recent 
data published by Eurostat allow estimating CFLi sales in 2007 of about 353 million 
units. Thus, the growth between 2004 and 2007 is about +185%. 
Based on ELC sales data from 2001 to 2006, estimates of CFLi sales have been made 
and are presented in Table 25. A huge increase is visible since 2005 with a variation of 
44% compared to 2004 and continued in 2006 (+60% assuming that 250 million units 
were sold) and in 2007. 
Table 25: Evolution of CFLi sales 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
CFLi sales 
(million) 
87  90  102  124  165  250  353 
￿  Stock data 
A survey carried out in 2004 in different MS aimed at estimating numbers of lamps 
used in typical national households, including CFLi. The stock could be estimated by 
multiplying the number of households by the number of CFLi per household (including 
households  without  CFLi).  Using  this  approach,  the  stock  of  CFLi  in  the  EU  was 
estimated to be 520 million units (see Table 26). According to the EuP preparatory 
study on domestic lighting, in 2006 the stock of CFLi in the EU was assumed to be 
about 750 million units, i.e. an increase of 44% compared to 2004. Further, the recent 
sales data provided by Eurostat show that the stock in CFLi in 2007 was about 1,010 
million units, 35% higher than in 2006. 
￿  Price data 
Table 27 lists the price of a typical CFLi available in IKEA shops in EU-27 (Figure 56)
55. 
The characteristics of this lamp are: 
·  Enveloped 
·  Power = 11 W 
·  Lifetime: approx. 10,000 hours 
·  Socket: E14 
·  Energy efficiency class: B 
·  The majority of these lamps are manufactured in China. 
The price of this CFLi varies from 3.50 € in the Netherlands to 5.62 € in Slovakia. 
However, in the majority of MS, the price is about 4.25 – 4.50 €. 
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BG 2.90 0.2 580
CZ 3.83 2.9 11,107
CY 0.32 2.0 640
EE 0.60 0.3 150
HU 3.75 1.0 3,750
LV 0.97 0.4 407
LT 1.29 0.3 323
MT 0.13 1.0 130
PL 11.95 0.5 5,975
RO 8.13 0.2 1,626
SK 1.67 1.0 1,670
SI 0.68 1.0 680
AT 3.08 4.0 12,320
BE 3.90 2.5 9,750
FR 22.20 2.3 50,172
DE 39.10 6.5 254,150
EI 1.44 1.5 2,160
LU 0.20 2.0 400
NL 6.73 4.0 26,920
UK 26.20 2.0 52,400
DK 2.31 4.9 11,319
FIN 2.30 1.0 2,300
SE 3.90 2.2 8,580
GR 3.66 1.0 3,660
IT 22.50 0.8 18,000
PT  4.20 1.7 7,140
ES  17.20 2.0 34,400
Number of 
households
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Figure 56: Typical CFLi (B-class) available in EU IKEA shops 
 
Table 27: IKEA price of typical CFLi (B-class) 
MS  Lamp price 
Austria  4.50 € 
Belgium  4.50 € 
Czech Republic  4.47 € 
Cyprus  4.25 € 
Denmark  3.95 € 
Finland  4.48 € 
France  4.25 € 
Germany  4.75 € 
Greece  4.25 € 
Hungary  4.63 € 
Italy  5.19 € 
Luxemburg  4.50 € 
Netherlands  3.50 € 
Poland  4.25 € 
Portugal  4.50 € 
Romania  4.50 € 
Slovakia  5.62 € 
Spain  4.50 € 
Sweden  3.69 € 
UK  3.62 € 
CFLi  prices  can  include  an  anti-dumping  tax  in  EU-27.  By  Council  Regulation  (EC) 
1470/2001, the European Commission imposed anti-dumping duties ranging from 0% 
to 66.1% on imports of CFLi originating in China. By Council Regulation (EC) 866/2005 
these duties were extended to Vietnam, Pakistan, and Philippines. In October 2007, the 
Council  adopted  a  regulation  for  a  one  year  extension  (Council  Regulation  (EC) 
13040/1/07). 
Several countries have an added 'disposal/recycling' cost that is included in the sales 
price. For example, Belgium’s transposition of WEEE Directive specifies that a cost is 
added  to  the  sales  price  for  recycling.  It  is  not  a  tax  since  it  is  not  raised  by  the 
government but a cost to take care of the recycling. The cost is at present 0.30 € and is 
added for CFL, linear fluorescent lamps (LFL) and other discharge lamps while there is 
no additional cost for incandescent and halogen lamps.   
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Even if no data is available regarding the evolution of the price of CFLi, a constant 
reduction has been observed since several years. This explains the change in demand 
and the high increase of sales, mainly since 2005. One can argue that such a decrease 
was necessary in order to promote the purchasing of CFLi after bad experiences due to 
a lack of information and a poor quality of lamps. However, the range of prices is 
important for CFLi (on average between 2.5€ and 10€) due to several factors: 
·  The  wattage  of  the  lamp  (generally  the  higher  the  wattage  the  higher  the 
purchase price) 
·  The  form  (bare  or  enveloped)  and  the  socket  of  the  lamp  (manufacturers 
propose CFLi fitting with almost all types of luminaires) 
·  The energy label (A or B) 
·  The  overall  quality  of  the  lamp,  including  the  quality  of  light,  the  colour 
temperature and the run-up time. 
Compared to other products such as refrigerators or washing-machines, there is no 
clear price difference between Western and Eastern Europe MS, as demonstrated in 
Table 27. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind that these prices are presented for the 
same lamp type sold by IKEA and manufactured by the same company in China. This 
could also explain such homogeneity. 
Unlike white goods, it is not easy to estimate the split of the final selling price of CFLi, 
especially the share of manufacturer and distributor. However, when considering a 
typical CFLi available in IKEA shops in Belgium with energy class B, Figure 57 presents 
the costs division. It was assumed that this lamp was manufactured in China and that 
the anti-dumping tax was set to the maximum available, i.e. 66.1%. Therefore, about 
46%  of  the  final  selling  price  is  distributed  between  the  manufacturer  and  the 
distributor/retailer. Further, about 30% is due to the anti-dumping tax. The phasing out 
of the anti-dumping tax could lead to a decrease of the final selling price of CFLi. 









4.50 € (final selling price)
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56 conducted for Danish Energy Association indicated that the price of A- class 
bulbs,  i.e.  CFLi,  in  the  retail  sector  has  fallen  dramatically,  especially  within  the 
supermarket segment. This is true both of ordinary A-bulbs and those recommended 
by  The  Danish  Energy  Saving  Trust.  The  average  price  of  an  Energy  “A”  bulb 
recommended  by  The  Danish  Energy  Saving  Trust has  fallen  by  approximately  two 
thirds since the spring of 2005. 
Despite  this  marked  fall  in  price  there  exist  wide  variations  between  the  price  of 
supermarket own brand and traditional branded bulbs, and this is true both of Energy 
“A” bulbs and recommended “A” bulbs. On average, branded Energy “A” bulbs are 
approximately 79% more expensive than supermarket own brand products. Similarly, 
branded recommended Energy “A” bulbs are more than twice the price of supermarket 
own brand recommended Energy “A” bulbs. In recent years these price differences 
have been on the decrease, with the exception of ordinary Energy “A” bulbs where the 
trend has been for an increased price difference. 
In terms of price differences between different types of Energy ”A” bulbs, bar shaped 
bulbs are the cheapest both amongst supermarket own brand Energy “A” Bulbs and 
branded Energy “A” Bulbs. The price difference between branded and super market 
own brand Energy “A” bulbs in 2006 was about 4€. Branded Energy “A” bulbs retailed 
for an average price of 9.1€, supermarket own brand Energy “A” bulbs on the other 
hand cost 5.1€ on average. The long term trend has been for a narrowing of the gap in 
prices between supermarket own brand and branded products. It is to be expected 
that this trend will continue to be in evidence in the future despite a broadening of the 
gap by 0.1€ between 2005 and 2006. 
The same tendency can be observed for a reduced gap in prices between supermarkets 
own  brand  bulbs  and  branded  bulbs  is  seen  with  reference  to  Energy  “A”  bulbs 
recommended by The Danish Energy Trust. 4.6€ separated the two types of products in 
the spring of 2006 – compared to a difference of 13.4€ in 2003. This narrowing of the 
price gap has been brought about primarily as a consequence of a fall in the prices of 
branded, recommended Energy “A” bulbs. 
￿  Market maturity 
National experts within EU provided in 2004 data on the penetration rate of CFLi in the 
MS  (see  Table  28).  There  are  some  huge  discrepancies  among  MS.  While  70%  of 
German or Czech households owned at least one CFLi, there are used in less than 20% 







                                                           
56 Catinet (2006)  
December 2008 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote  
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
73 
 
Table 28: Share of households with CFLi
57 
Austria  70 % 
Belgium  71 % 
Bulgaria  34 % 
Czech Republic  70 % 
Cyprus  79 % 
Denmark  65 % 
Estonia  20 % 
Finland  50 % 
France  52 % 
Germany  70 % 
Greece  50 % 
Hungary  60 % 
Ireland  38 % 
Italy  60 % 
Latvia  19 % 
Lithuania  20 % 
Luxemburg  70 % 
Malta  50 % 
Netherlands  60 % 
Poland  50 % 
Portugal  54 % 
Romania  40 % 
Slovakia  50 % 
Slovenia  70 % 
Spain  15 % 
Sweden  55 % 
UK  50 % 
EU-15 (Western EU)  55 % 
EU-12 (Eastern EU)  47.9 % 
EU-27  53 % 
1.3.3.3  Major barriers 
￿  CFLi quality and comparison with incandescent lamps (GLS) 
The quality of CFLi has been the focus of several eco-label or quality charter initiatives. 
This is also true for correctly correlated lamp power of a GLS and a CFLi. Despite several 
initiatives  for  the  sake  of  quality  very  little  up-to-date  market  surveillance  data  is 
available. Other lamp types, such as GLS, were paradoxically not often in the focus of 
such quality initiatives. 
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The  image  of  CFLi  is  not  as  good
58  mainly  due  to  the  experience  with  the  first 
generation of CFLi that came on the market twenty years ago with cold light colour, 
poor colour rendering, fairly heavy weight and large dimensions. In the meantime, 
most of these disadvantages were eliminated. Nowadays, some people also have bad 
experience with CFLi of poor quality e.g. the light output is not enough, the lifetime is 
less than declared, etc. Although the quality of an incandescent lamps is often also not 
good enough, the bad experience with CFLi can damage the image of higher quality 
products and can make people afraid of buying CFLi again. 
In some MS, lists are produced with ‘good quality’ CFLi that fulfil the requirements of 
the European CFL Quality Charter
59. These lists are based on information from the 
manufacturers as well as on independent testing. 
￿  The need for right comparison of light output between CFLi and GLS 
The user should know how to replace incandescent lamps with CFLi giving the same 
amount  of  light  (lumen).  Unfortunately,  the  manufacturers  generally  do  not  give 
correct information about this replacement. Most manufacturers admit this but have 
over the years continued to claim that it is not so important. The customers often say 
’CFLi don’t give good lighting’ while they could mean that 'they do not give enough 
light'.  For  example,  an  11  W  CFLi  lamp  with  550  lamp  lumen  can  suggest  on  the 
package to be equivalent to a 60 Watt incandescent lamp (GLS) (see Figure 58). As can 
be found in chapter 4, a 60 Watt GLS lamp has a lamp lumen output of 710 lumens, 
which is as a matter of fact about 30% more. In order to obtain the same lumen 
output, a 60 W incandescent lamp should be replaced by a 13 W but this wattage is not 
commonly available on the market.  
This has been and is still giving the CFLi a bad image and creates a barrier. Many people 
probably  have  stopped  using  the  energy  saving  CFLi  because  of  these  negative 
experiences. Users have the need to be correctly informed at the packaging of the CFLi. 
Figure 58: Example of misleading information in the product package of CFLi lamp 
 
The new version of the European Quality Charter recommends an equivalence of 4:1 
where a 60 W incandescent should be replaced by a 15 W CFL. This equivalence is 
                                                           
58 LRC, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (2003) 
59 E.g. the Danish Electricity Saving Trust list at:  
http://application.sparel.dk/asp/a-paere/query/paerewiz/liste.asp  
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decided taking into account lumen output and lower real life performance of the CFLi 
compared to GLS due to lamp position, temperature effects and faster decrease in 
lumen output during lifetime. 
￿  Run-up time 
Energy Star
60 defines run-up time (also called warm-up time) as the time needed for 
the lamp to reach 80% of its stable light output after being switched on. The new 
version of the European Quality Charter requires that the 80% level is reached within a 
minute for the ‘finger-type’ CFLi (i.e. bare CFLi) while it takes more time for the ‘look-a-
like’ CFLi (i.e. enveloped CFLi) where there are no requirements.  
To  reduce  the  influence  of  ambient  temperature  on  the  light  output  of  a  CFLi, 
manufacturers nowadays use amalgam. An adverse consequence of this use is the 
longer run-up time of the lamp. This means that either you have CFLi that produce the 
same light output at all ambient temperatures, but run-up slowly, or you have CFLi that 
run-up quickly, but give less light at some ambient temperatures. 
Nevertheless, manufacturers begin to propose CFLi with a good quality as well as with 
a shorter run-up time with the use of electronic control circuit with a good quality. 
￿  Colour temperature and colour rendering 
Various  colour  temperatures  are  available  for  the  different  types  of  lamps.  In  the 
Southern part of Europe, people prefer a higher temperature (higher content of blue 
lighting) while people in the Northern parts of Europe prefer a low temperature (higher 
content of yellow/red lighting). 
Incandescent lamps have a CRI (Colour Rendering Index) close to 100 while it is lower 
existing CFLi which is typically 82-85. At the latest Quality Charter revision meeting in 
October  2007,  several  participants  recommended  the  manufacturers  to  start 
production and sales of CFLi with higher CRI. 
￿  Alleged negative health effects due to UV radiation from CFLi 
Some stakeholder groups (Lupus UK, Eclipse Support Group, Spectrum (UK) and Lupus 
DK)  have  brought  to  the  attention  that  some  people  who  are  light-sensitive  are 
concerned that shifting to other lighting sources than low wattage incandescent lamps 
may affect their quality of life. This health effect of CFLi could be a barrier for the 
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2.2.4.  BOILERS 
1.3.4.1  Product characteristics 
￿  Functional description 
A boiler is “an appliance designed to provide hot water for space heating”. Thus, the 
primary function of a boiler is “the capability to reach and maintain the indoor climate 
of an enclosed space (building, dwelling, room) at a desired level under normal and 
extreme circumstances, in as much as is possible through heating, using hydronic heat 
emitters”. 
The (nominal) heating capacity in kW is the most obvious performance parameter of 
boilers. The other parameters like resources input, emissions, and relevant outputs 
should  also  be  included  in  the  evaluation  of  the  overall  performance  for  boilers. 
However, no existing test standards are able to qualify the above parameters in reality 
due to numerous relevant factors: load operations (full load/30% part-load/stand-by 
load), size, return (or average) boiler water temperatures, operation mode (steady-
state mode/cycling-mode) and etc.  
The main criteria for the categorisation of boilers are: 
·  Fuel type: gas, oil, coal, biomass, electricity, solar energy 
·  Condensation
61 
o  Standard boiler: a boiler for which the average water temperature can 
be restricted by design. 
o  Low-temperature boiler: a boiler which can work continuously with a 
water  supply  temperature  of  35  to  400°C,  possibly  producing 
condensation  in  certain  circumstances,  including  condensing  boilers 
using liquid fuel. 
o  Gas condensing boiler: a boiler designed to condense permanently a 
large part of the water vapour contained in the combustion gases. 
·  Mounting position: Floor-standing, wall-hung (WH) 
Power  class,  materials,  pump  type,  ignition  type,  and  other  criteria  are  used  by 
different standards, statistics and researches to define a category of boilers as well. In 
this study, which focuses on domestic sector, six categories of boilers are identified as 
follows based on multiple criteria: 
·  Gas WH non-condensing 
·  Gas WH condensing 
·  Gas floorstanding 
·  Gas jet burner 
·  Oil jet burner 
·  Electric boiler 
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￿  Average lifetime and replacement patterns 
 Considerable  differences  in  the  average  age  of  boilers  of  different  fuel  type  are 
observed as shown in Table 29. The oil-fired boilers show an age of 12.5 to 25.9 years, 
whereas gas-fired boilers have an average age of 9.5 to 14.2 years. Similar results are 
indicated by another study
62 that an average boiler age of 12.4 years for gas-fired 
boilers and 12.7 to 15 years for oil-fired boilers in Belgium.  
The overall life of a boiler depends on the respective lives of its components: burners, 
pumps,  fans,  and  other  components  which  may  fail  and  then  are  replaced  in  the 
lifetime of the boiler. The technical life of a boiler is to some extent decided by a 
comparison between the cost of repair and that of replacement. Another comparison 
between the running costs of an old system and that of a new system is also argued to 
be related to a boiler’s technical life. However, consumers would rather rely on advice 
by installers than to calculate the total cost by themselves. It is recommended by most 
installers to replace a wall hung gas boiler after a life of 15 years and 20 to 25 years for 
a floor standing gas or oil boiler. 
Table 29: Average Boiler age
63 
 
￿  Consumer behaviour 
Table 30 presents the spread of the first idea that sprung into the UK householders’ 
mind when they were asked “what motivated you to decide for the installation of a 
boiler”.  
The most important reason to install a boiler for UK consumers is the motivation of 
breakdown of an existing one (49%) or concerns related to that (14%), which together 
count  for  approximately  two-thirds  of  the  total  installation,  followed  by  other 
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Table 30: Reason for new installation
52 
 
The householders are further asked the first reason why they opted for certain brand 
or make (Table 31). The majority of respondents (from 50% to 65%) had used only the 
information  supplied  by  the  installer  for  choosing  their  boiler.  The  impact  of 
brand/make  and  price  on  the  consumers’  decisions  is  far  smaller  than  that of  the 
installer’s recommendation. The remaining some 15% to 30% people put other reasons 
in a dominant place. 
Table 31: Selection of brand or make
52 
 
In spite of the fact that only 4% households mentioned efficiency as their first criterion 
and that 5% to 7% choose a brand/make principally based on energy efficiency, the 
results do not clarify the relative importance of energy efficiency among all the factors 
influencing consumers’ choices (see Figure 59).  
A  large  majority  of  respondents  indicated  their  interest  in  energy  efficiency  and 
reducing  home  energy  using.  Furthermore,  over  80%  householders  declare  to  be 








European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote  
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
79 
 
Figure 59: Consumers’ energy concerns 
 
                                    1                                                 2                                             3 
1. Are you interested in energy efficiency? 
2. Are you interested in reducing home energy using? 
3. Are you prepared to spend significantly to heat the home in an environmentally 
friendly way? 
￿  Speed of innovation 
Since the implementation of the Boiler Efficiency Directive in 1992, boilers’ efficiency 
has gone through great improvements. Products developments have also taken place, 
of which the two major trends are: 
·  The growing share of condensing boilers, and 
·  The increases in sales of biomass boilers though in small scale. 
A great impact of newer technologies on the boiler market and on the environmental 
performance of the heating sector is predicted. The sales of biomass boilers are already 
experiencing  an  upsurge  and  are  believe  to  continue  for  years  before  its  market 
saturation. The initiatives on solar thermal boilers in Spain and the launch of a plan of 
Micro  CHP  gas  motor  systems  in  the  UK  have  also  aroused  wide  attention.  Some 
discussions are going on about the real impact of these new technologies, for example, 
regarding  the environmental  friendliness  of  the  biomass  boilers  since  they  are  still 
responsible  for  significant  polluting  emissions,  though  they  use  renewable  energy 
source. 
￿  Scope for environmental improvement 
The 1992 Boiler Efficiency Directive launched an EU wide labelling scheme. A boiler can 
be awarded from one star to four stars based on the comparison of its efficiency at 
rated output and its efficiency at part load between those values for standard boilers. 
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Table 32: Energy performance labelling in BED
64 
 
However,  this  labelling  scheme  has  not  had  a  remarkable  impact  on  consumers. 
Instead, it initiated a proliferation of a number of test standards. Nowadays, there are 
over  30  EN  product  test  standards  and  amendments  for  oil-  and  gas-fired  heating 
boilers and burners. With multiple criteria to define a category of a boiler, the related 
EN standards are also split up by: 
·  flue gas system: type C room-sealed, type B without a fan, type B with forced 
draught burner 
·  capacity class: up to 70 kW, 70-300 kW, 300-1000 kW 
·  fuel: oil, gas 
·  configuration:  boilers,  combi-boilers,  boiler-burner  assemblies  and  separate 
burners 
·  condensing: low temperature and non-condensing boilers 
The  Energy  Performance  of  Buildings  Directive  2002/91/EC  set  new  minimum 
requirements  on  boiler  efficiency,  making  condensing  boilers  an  ideal  choice.  The 
labelling Scheme for boilers is put onto the table again by the Energy-using Products 
Directive 2005/32/EC. 
Since 1992, MS have also been taking individual initiatives to improve boiler efficiency. 
For example, in UK, the “Seasonal Efficiency of Domestic Boilers in the UK” Programme 
was launched in 1999 which gives a A-G rating (Figure 60) on gas and oil-fired domestic 
boilers based on equation calculation. Another case in Denmark, it has carried out a 
one-year pilot on boiler labelling, which provides consumers with the model’s energy 
consumption, electricity consumption and emissions
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Figure 60: Boiler efficiency label in UK (Sedbuk’s energy efficiency chart) 
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1.3.4.2  Market analysis 
￿  Sales data 
The volume of EU heating boiler market reached some 6.6 million units in 2004 after a 
49% growth from 4.5 million units in 1990
66 (see Table 33). A MS wise boiler sales in 
(EU-22) in 1990 and 2004 is presented in Table 34. The forecasts for the years 2010 and 
2025  are  presented  in  Table  35  and  Figure  62.  The  annual  sales  growth  rate  is 
forecasted to be 1% between 2004 and 2010, leading to a 5.5% overall sales increase 
during the period. The annul sales growth rate is expected to reach 1.2% for the period 
2010-2025, which means about 20% increase in total sales.  
Table 33: Domestic Heating Boilers’ sales in 1990 and 2004 for EU-22 (*000 units)
 
Product 
1990  2004 
*000  %  *000  % 
Gas wall hung  
non-condensing 
2502  52.5  3986  57 
Gas wall hung 
condensing 
67  1.4  1296  18.5 
Gas floor standing  949  19.9  434  6.2 
Gas/oil jet burner  900  18.9  880  12.6 
Electric  36  0.8  39  0.6 
Total  4454    6635   
The  progression  of  market  volume  during  1990-2004  is  largely  due  to  the  rapid 
increase of sales volume of gas wall hung models, together with a slight increase of 
electric boilers. It is important to notice the significant development of condensing 
technology in terms of market share, which arrived 18.5% in 2004 from the 1990 level 
of 1.4%. By contrast, the market share of gas floor standing boilers and jet burners has 
decreased by 3.7% and 6.3% respectively.  
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Table 34: Boiler sales, by country, by type in 1990 and 2004 
  
  
GAS Wall Hung non-
condensing 
GAS Wall Hung 
condensing 
GAS Floor Standing  GAS/OIL Jet Burner  ELECTRIC  TOTAL  % of EU22 
1990  2004  1990  2004  1990  2004  1990  2004  1990  2004  1990  2004  1990  2004 
Austria  29  26  1  18,2  12  5,3  33  12,9  0  0  75  62,4  1,68%  0,94% 
Belgium  26  78,2  0  27  29  26,6  51  41,7  0  0  106  173,5  2,38%  2,62% 
Czech R.  7  76,5  0  8  25  12  0,5  1,12  2  10,8  34,5  108,42  0,77%  1,63% 
Denmark  9  6,6  0  16,65  0,7  0,65  6,5  5,8     0  16,2  29,7  0,36%  0,45% 
Estonia  0,4  2  0  0,27  0,1  0,43  0,1  0,675  0  0,2  0,6  3,575  0,01%  0,05% 
Finland  0  0  0  0  0  0  9,6  12,4  0,7  0,2  10,3  12,6  0,23%  0,19% 
France  318  505  14  32,3  62  68,8  130  198,7  0  0  524  804,8  11,76%  12,13% 
Germany  292  155  8  340  215  80  294  202  0  0  809  777  18,16%  11,71% 
Greece  0,7  11,5  0  0,2  0  0,65  58  67  0  0  58,7  79,35  1,32%  1,20% 
Hungary  43  84  0  2,05  65  20  1  1  0  0  109  107,05  2,45%  1,61% 
Ireland  12  55,3  0  2,7  1,25  2,4  26  47  0,9  1,4  40,15  108,8  0,90%  1,64% 
Italy  848  1171,3  0  59,1  160  64,9  99  46,4  0  0  1107  1341,7  24,85%  20,23% 
Latvia  0  5  0  0,5  0,1  1  0,6  0,5  0  0  0,7  7  0,02%  0,11% 
Lithuania  0  7,6  0  0,45  1  3,2  0  0,49  0  0  1  11,74  0,02%  0,18% 
Netherlands  196  44  43  364  47  7,9  1  0,8  0  0  287  416,7  6,44%  6,28% 
Poland  15  115  0  11,4  15  17,9  7  17  0  0  37  161,3  0,83%  2,43% 
Portugal  1,8  33  0  0  0,3  1,3  0,5  16  0  0  2,6  50,3  0,06%  0,76% 
Slovakia  1  20,5  0  5,8  12  17,9  0  0,39  0  0,4  13  44,99  0,29%  0,68% 
Slovenia  0,5  6,45  0  1,45  0,2  0,8  12  9,6  0  0,13  12,7  18,43  0,29%  0,28% 
Spain  160  437  0  1  4  7,6  90  100  0  0  254  545,6  5,70%  8,22% 
Sweden  0  0,25  0  0,9  0,5  0,5  12,5  3  22,5  7,5  35,5  12,15  0,80%  0,18% 
UK  543  1144,8  1  403,97  297  83,827  70  106  10  18  921  1756,6  20,67%  26,48% 
Total EU 22  2502,4  3985  67  1295,94  947,15  423,657  902  890  36  39  4454,95  6633,7  100%  100%  
84 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote  
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
December 2008 
 
Table 35: Sales outlook 1990-2005-2010-2025 (incl. solid fuel boilers & heat pumps) 
 MS  
1990  2004/'05  2010  2025 
*000  *000  *000  *000 
Austria  97  84  98  110 
Belgium  107  175  199  230 
Czech R.  63  148  158  160 
Denmark  17  34  46  55 
Estonia  1  5  11  13 
Finland  12  19  23  25 
France  541  834  882  1020 
Germany  828  810  929  1050 
Greece  62  80  104  133 
Hungary  127  111  95  150 
Ireland  46  113  110  160 
Italy  1114  1360  1403  1600 
Latvia  3  13  18  25 
Lithuania  5  22  28  30 
Netherlands  292  420  457  550 
Poland  137  237  301  350 
Portugal  5  50  59  100 
Slovakia  27  60  67  70 
Slovenia  20  27  31  40 
Spain  260  546  723  930 
Sweden  68  81  182  100 
UK  935  1762  1450  2000 
Total EU 22  4767  6991  7374  8901 
Figure 62: Sales Forecast for boilers 
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Notable difference of the sales distribution in the European market is discovered based 
on a further analysis of sales data in different MS. In the UK and the Netherlands, 
annual sales compared to the number of dwellings are 85% and 74% respectively, while 
this index is lower than 10% in some MS (Figure 63). 
Figure 63: Heating boiler units per dwelling in EU-22 (2004)
 
 
￿  Stock data 
In the period 1990-2004, during which the number of dwellings increased by 16%, the 
boiler stock per dwelling has enjoyed a 52% growth from 64 million in 1990 to 98 
million in 2004 (Figure 64). 
Figure 64: Individual wet central heating system stock in EU-22 (*000 dwelling) 
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Table 36: Park of main boiler types, by Country, in *000 dwellings 
 
GAS Wall Hung non-
condensing 
GAS Wall Hung 
condensing 
GAS Floor Standing  GAS/OIL Jet Burner  Electric boiler  Total 
Total number of 
dwellings 
1990  2004  1990  2004  1990  2004  1990  2004  1990  2004  1990  2004  1990  2004 
Austria  264  340  1  175  201  134  327  426  0  0  793  1075  3529  4020 
Belgium  318  692  0  84  386  475  841  984  0  0  1545  2235  3751  3724 
Czech R.  86  742  0  25  90  376  2  4  16  11  194  1158  4084  3994 
Denmark  124  227  0  59  10  17  607  374  0  0  741  677  2573  2800 
Estonia  1  13  0  0  1  3  19  21  1  3  22  40  602  622 
Finland  0  0  0  0  0  0  391  455  5  6  396  461  2434  2871 
France  3450  6697  120  184  1735  2026  3580  4361  0  0  8885  13268  26338  30218 
Germany  1602  4150  32  1243  2054  3577  6004  8507  0  0  9692  17477  33350  38398 
Greece  4  30  0  0  0  1  1490  1677  0  0  1494  1708  4837  5650 
Hungary  324  768  0  7  169  477  3  13  0  0  496  1265  3853  4173 
Ireland  75  435  0  6  16  29  170  460  29  37  290  967  982  1370 
Italy  4667  12022  0  223  1072  1683  3641  1150  0  0  9380  15078  24719  27941 
Latvia  0  25  0  1  9  5  1  3  0  0  10  34  1003  965 
Lithuania  0  55  0  1  1  24  6  10  0  0  7  90  1153  1304 
Netherlands  3513  1548  193  3310  155  180  0  0  0  0  3861  5038  5802  6810 
Poland  236  856  0  26  58  214  97  247  0  0  391  1343  11032  12683 
Portugal  3  179  0  0  1  7  2  37  0  0  6  223  4097  5271 
Slovakia  16  136  0  14  163  251  0  0  0  0  179  401  1757  1899 
Slovenia  1  41  0  3  0  10  190  229  0  0  191  283  639  796 
Spain  715  4094  0  3  32  69  413  1554  0  0  1160  5720  16830  22098 
Sweden  5  15  0  0  0  0  396  390  459  472  860  877  4725  5060 
UK  6381  13143  1  1150  6790  5412  937  1100  427  587  14536  21392  21710  25055 
Total EU 22  21785  46208  347  6514  12943  14970  19117  22002  937  1116  55129  90810  179800  207722 
% of total  39,5%  50,9%  0,6%  7,2%  23,5%  16,5%  34,7%  24,2%  1,7%  1,2%          
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￿  Price data 
The European market has varied prices for different types of models (Table 37). The 
average consumer price for a gas wall hung non-condensing boiler is about 1014 €, and 
the gas wall hung condensing and gas floor standing models are about 100 – 150 € 
more expensive than it.  
Table 37: Average consumer (street) price (incl. VAT) of boilers in EU-22 (2004)
67 
  
Average consumer price 
(€ incl. VAT) 
Gas wall hung non-condensing  1014 € 
Gas wall hung condensing  1115 € 
Gas floor standing  1152 € 
Price differences exist in the markets of different MS, which can be divided into five 
categories: high, higher than average, average, lower than average and low. In order to 
simplify the calculation of prices in national markets, factors are defined as follows. For 
example, in Poland (PL), the average consumer price of a gas wall hung non-condensing 
boiler is about 500 € (=1014 € * 0.5). 
·  High: SW (2.6), DK (2.2), AT (2.6) 
·  Higher than average: DE(1.65), FIN (1.55) 
·  Average: FR (1.1), UK/BE/SL (0.9), NL/IT (0.85) 
·  Lower than average: IRL/ES/GR/SK/ES/LT/LV (0.7), PT (0.65) 
·  Low: PL/CZ/HU (0.5) 
 
In the EuP preparatory study on boilers, estimates were made regarding the split up of 
the  consumer  street  price  with  a  typical  distribution  channel  as  follow: 
manufacturer/importer  →  wholesaler  →  installer.  Figure  65  presents  this  split  up 
assuming  that  the  manufacturer  selling  price  (MSP)  is  812€  (excluding  VAT),  and 
wholesale  margins  of  30%  and  installer  margins  of  20%  and  a  VAT  rate  of  19%. 
Therefore, about 54% of the consumer street price is due to the manufacturer selling 
price. 
Further, Table 38 provides a split up of the manufacturer selling price into its main 
components:  overhead,  labour,  purchases  from  OEM  (Original  Equipment 
Manufacturer) and raw materials industry. OEM purchases are assumed to represent 
50% of manufacturer’s costs and the only direct labour costs (i.e. 15%) are attributed 
to activities such as final assembly, testing and packaging. Direct purchases of raw 
materials are almost non-existing, as most of components are purchased in a finished 
and pre-assembled state. 
A fairly large share of the manufacturer selling price is made up of overhead costs, 
related to marketing, administration and margins. For the manufacturer, this is around 
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35% of the MSP, but also the primary and secondary OEMS have overhead costs. Thus, 
almost half of the manufacturer selling price is made up by overhead costs (i.e. 47%), 
and the rest is divided in a quite equal way between direct labour and raw materials 
costs. 
Figure 65: Assessment of consumer street price for boilers
68 
 
Table 38: Manufacturing selling price split up for boilers 
 
￿  Market maturity 
First time installation and displacement of central heating by individual installation 
have been a major reason for the boiler market growth in EU in the last ten years. As is 
indicated  by  the  sales  data,  the  quick  development  of  condensing  technology  has 
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introduced  a  corresponding  development  of  market  penetration  of  models 
incorporated with the very technology.  
Figure 66 shows that the market is almost saturated in some MS (Netherlands, UK and 
Denmark). In other EU MS, there exists a large potential for increasing the market 
share. Besides, the demand for replacement of the boilers installed in the past decade 
has increased in recent years (Table 39 and Table 40) and is expected to continue in the 
coming years. 
Besides, the transition from floor standing boilers to wall hung boilers in several MS 
results in a higher frequency of replacement, concerning a shorter lifetime of the new 
models. The enlargement of EU would probably create new opportunities in the boiler 
market with the improving living conditions in NMS. 
Figure 66: Market penetration of condensing technology, 2006 
 









Gas wall hung non-condensing  23,2 %  14,6 %  60,9 %  1,3 % 
Gas wall hung condensing  25,3 %  13,7 %  57,1 %  3,9 % 
Gas floor standing  12,8 %  11,1 %  66,0 %  10,0 % 
Gas/oil jet burner  15,7 %  12,5 %  61,4 %  10,5 % 
Electric  10,5 %  19,5 %  67,9 %  1,0 % 
Based on these reasons, the market penetration of efficient boilers, i.e. the condensing 
boiler, is predicted to continue to grow in the next ten years. Some companies expect 
the market penetration of condensing boilers will reach 58% in 2010 from the current 
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Table 40: Boilers market trends in 2005 
Country  Trends 2005  Explanation 
Austria  - 0.8 %  Wall hung gas growth, floor standing gas + oil decline 
Belgium  + 6.5 %  All growth from wall hung gas 
Czech R.  - 1 %  Decline for all categories except solid fuel 
Denmark  + 12 %  Most of growth in solid fuel (pellet) boilers 
Estonia  + 27%  Mostly wall hung gas boilers and solid fuel boilers 
Finland  + 3.6%  Growth almost entirely heat pumps 
France  -/+ 
Strong growth in wall hung gas, strong decline in oil boilers, 
and growth for solid, heat pumps and dry electric. 
Germany  -  10%  Decline in all categories except heat pumps and solid fuel 
Greece  + 4.4%  Growth entirely in wall hung gas 
Hungary  - 8%  Decline in all sectors except solid fuel 
Ireland  + 4.9%  For both wall hung gas and oil boilers 
Italy  +2.5%  Growth mostly from wall hung gas 
Latvia  + 7%  Growth mostly from wall hung gas 
Lithuania  + 9%  Growth in wall hung gas and solid fuel 
Netherlands  + 5.3%  Mainly replacement of wall hung gas 
Poland  + 1%  Growth in solid fuel, decline in gas/oil (even wall hung gas) 
Portugal  + 3%  Mainly jet burner boilers in non-gasified areas 
Slovakia  + 2.3%  Growth in wall hung gas and solid fuel (pellet) boilers 
Slovenia  + 2%  Mainly wall hung gas and some solid fuel 
Spain  + 8.3%  Mainly wall hung gas in new housing 
Sweden  + 20% 
Mainly electric heat pumps, electric immersion and solid fuel 
boilers 
UK  - 4%  Decline in cast iron, floor standing and back boilers. 
 
1.3.4.3  Major barriers 
￿  New installation 
Buyers of boilers for the first installation are mainly the housing developers who are 
not confronted with the energy costs (Table 41). For them, the additional costs from 
the installation of more efficient boilers cannot be directly added to the price of a new 
house. They tend to be reluctant to make energy efficiency improvements beyond the 
standards  required  by  the  legislation,  with  the  need  to  maximise  their  profit  by 
reducing the construction costs. This is especially true for the countries where the 
energy  tariffs  or  awareness  of  the  potential  house-owners  of  the  energy  bill  are 
comparatively low, resulting in a barely small impact of the energy efficiency on the 
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Table 41: Reason for new installation
69  
 
￿  Replacement 
The main decision for boiler replacement is not made by the direct user. Installers play 
a dominant role on the consumers’ decision on the type of boiler. The absence of 
energy labelling for boilers in Europe (except for several countries) makes it impossible 
for consumers to compare the energy efficiency and other performance parameters of 
boilers themselves. Thus they usually do not go against the installers’ “expert” advice. 
However, this influence of installers is not seen as positive on boiler energy efficiency 
improvement of households. Having the experience with certain brand and/or type of 
boilers, tools and spares available, the installers have a strong preference for a certain 
group of products, which they believe are steady, reliable and lower in call back rates. 
The  bound  between  installers  and  manufacturers  is  made  tighter  by  the 
manufacturers’ promoting measures like bonus, gifts and training. Moreover, there 
seems to be a low recognition among installers of the potential benefits delivered by 
energy efficient technologies to households.  
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2.3.   EXPERIENCES OF TAX INCENTIVES IN THE EU 
2.3.1.  REFRIGERATORS & WASHING MACHINES 
1.4.1.1  The Netherlands  
General description 
￿  Name of the programme: Energy Premium Regulation (EPR)  
￿  Objective: Energy efficiency 
￿  Duration: 4 years 
￿  Period: 2000 till 2003 
￿  Type of tax incentive: Subsidy provided by the Government after the purchase 
￿  ‘Target’ of the tax incentive: Consumers 





￿  Subsidy delivered for the purchase of an efficient appliance (not only in case of 
replacement) 
￿  Subsidy scheme in 2001: 
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￿  Government:  
- Deliver the subsidy to consumers within 6 weeks after receipt of the proof of 
purchase 
- The EPR programme (covering also buildings and renewable energies) was 
financing with the energy tax, Regulating Energy Levy, set in 1996 and taxing 
energy using products (electricity, oil and natural gas) sold to households and 
SMEs 
￿  Consumer: Send the Treasury the proof of purchase 
Impacts 
 
Share of A-class appliances in the Netherlands and in EU* (Source: GfK) 
 
The Energy Premium Regulation scheme was stopped in 2003 because of budgetary 
reasons  and  the  large  number  of  ‘free  riders’  (people  who  would  buy  efficient 
appliances regardless the subsidy). Indeed, a consumer survey showed that 84% of 








Costs for the Government (for 
refrigerators & combined) ~ 60 M€
Marketshare for refrigerators& 
combined
A : 23% in 1999 and 70% in 2001 (75% in 2003, at the end of the scheme)
A+ : 0% in 1999 and 6% in 2001 (23% in 2003, at the end of the scheme)
CO2reduction(for cold appliances
and washingmachines) 31,5 kt CO2 
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1.4.1.2  Spain 
General description 
￿  Name of the programme: Plan Renové Electrodomésticos, in the context of the 
Spanish Strategy of Energy Efficiency and Energy Savings  
￿  Objective: Energy efficiency + End-of-Life 
￿  Duration: 2-3 months per year, depending on the region and the year 
￿  Period: 2006 till 2010 or 2011 or 2012 
￿  Type of tax incentive: Rebate provided directly at the checkout 
￿  ‘Target’ of the tax incentive: Consumers 
￿  Initiator of the programme: The Spanish Ministry of Industry with the support of 
ANFEL




￿  Rebate delivered only in case of replacement of the old appliance 
￿  Rebate between 75€ and 105€ according to the appliance and the region, with a 
maximum amount of 25% of the initial product price 





Freezers  Dishwashers  Washing Machines 
A++  100 €  100 €  x  x 
A+  90 €  90 €  x  x 
A  80 €  80 € 
80 €  
(with washing class A 
or B) 
80 €  
(with washing class A or 
B) 
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Conditions of implementation 
 
￿  Federal  Government:  Defines  the  budget  allowance  and  divides  it  by  regions 
according to the number of inhabitants 
￿  Regional  Government:  Decides  the  conditions  of  the  programme  (duration, 
amount of the rebates) and gives retailers communication tools 
￿  Consumer:  
- Receives the rebate at the checkout 
- Receives a receipt with the initial product price and the rebate 
￿  Retailer:  
- Receives  5€  per  sale  of  appliances  with  rebate  in  compensation  of 
administrative and treasury costs 
- Takes off the old appliance when delivering the new one, and gives it to the 
eco-organisation 
- Receives the reimbursement by the Regional Government at the end of the 
campaign  for  the  rebates  delivered  and  for  the  compensation  of 
administrative and treasury costs 
￿  Surveillance: An official laboratory verifies randomly the electricity consumption 
(i.e. the energy class) of 25 appliances 
￿  Communication:  The  Regional  Energy  Agency  establishes  a  database  with  the 




                                                           




New appliance + rebate
Oldappliance
2006 2007
Costs for the Government 62 M€ 62 M€
Sales of appliances with rebate 607 103 750 000 
(estimation)
Energy savings  185 GWh(= 15.9 ktoe) Not available 
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1.4.1.3  Hungary 
General description 
￿  Name of the programme: The Forgo Morgo campaign  
￿  Objective: Energy efficiency + End-of-Life 
￿  Duration: 2-3 months depending on the appliance category 
￿  Period: 17 September 2006 – 16 December 2006 for domestic cold appliances 
22 March 2007 – 2 June 2007 for washing machines  
16  September  2007  –  24  November  2007  for  electric  cooker  (only 
advertising campaign, no rebate) 
￿  Type of tax incentive: Rebate provided directly at the checkout 
￿  ‘Target’ of the tax incentive: Consumers 





￿  Rebate delivered only in case of replacement of the old appliance 
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Freezers  Washing Machines 
A++  20 €  20 €  x 
A+  20 €  20 €  x 
A  20 €  20 €  20 €  
Conditions of implementation 
 
￿  Government: Not involved in this programme 
￿  Consumer: Receives the rebate at the checkout 
￿  Retailer:  
-  Indicates in its store which appliances can benefit of a rebate 
-  Takes off the old appliance when delivering the new one, and gives it to the 
eco-organisation 
-  Receives the reimbursement by the eco-organisation, Elektro-cord, at the end 
of the campaign for the rebates delivered  
￿  Eco-organisation (Elektro-cord):  
-  Reimburse retailers for the delivered rebates 
-  Provide communication tools to retailers 
￿  Surveillance: Carried out by Elektro-cord 
￿  Communication:  TV  spots,  dedicated  website  with  an  eco-calculator
72,  opening 
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Consumer Retailer





DomesticCold Appliances WashingMachines Electric Cookers
Sales of appliances with rebate 7 600 10 300 No significativeeffect 
on sales 
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1.4.1.4  Italy 
General description 
￿  Name of the programme: Law of 27 December 2006, Article 1, point 353  
￿  Objective: Energy efficiency + End-of-Life 
￿  Duration: initially 1 year, but extended to 4 years due to CECED’s lobbying 
￿  Period: 2007 till 2010 
￿  Type of tax incentive: Tax credit of the income tax 
￿  ‘Target’ of the tax incentive: Consumers 





￿  Tax credit delivered only in case of replacement of the old appliance 





A++  20% of the initial product price  
(maximum amount = 200 €)  A+ 
A  x  x 
Conditions of implementation 
 
￿  Government: Deducts the tax credit from the income tax 
￿  Consumer: Sends with his income tax return the proof of purchase of the new cold 
equipment (A+ or A++) and a proof of the disposal of the old appliance (certificate 






Proof of purchase and of the 
disposal of the old appliance 
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1.4.1.5  Denmark 
In 1999, the Electricity Saving Trust launched a 2-months programme to promote the 
purchase  of  energy  efficient  cold  appliances  and  laundry  dryers  (from  the  20
th  of 
September until the 5
th of December). Therefore, consumers buying a domestic cold 
appliance (refrigerator, vertical freezer and combined) with an energy class A or better 
could obtain a 100 $ rebate directly at the checkout (200 $ rebate for the purchase of a 
A-class or better laundry dryer). 
Retailers were in charge of the promotion of these efficient products in their stores. 
Stickers were used in order to allow customers identifying them as showed in Figure 
67. 
Figure 67: Example of sticker used for refrigerators with subsidy 
 
The campaign was a success as the market share of A-class sales was of 50%, whereas 
it represented only 10% before
75. 
In  2004,  the  Electricity  Saving  Trust  initiated  a  similar  programme  for  A+  and  A++ 
labelled fridges. 
1.4.1.6  Switzerland 
In the region of Zurich, customers of the local electricity supplier (EWZ) can receive a 
120€ subsidy for the purchase of an A++ domestic cold appliance from May 2007 until 
2011.  
EWZ had already initiated a similar campaign between 2003 and 2006 for the A+ and 
A++ refrigerators, freezers and their combinations. The subsidy was of 60€ for the A+ 
                                                           
74 Source: CECED Italy 
75 Source: Norden, Environmental communication to consumers, 2006 
2007 (9 first months)
Costs for the Government between 90 and 130 M€(estimations)
Sales with tax credit + 28% for A+ and A++ compared to 2006
A+ and A++ = 67% of the total sales of new models
Energy savings 43.6 GWh (9,6 ktoe)
CO2reduction 27,7 ktCO2 
100 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote  
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
December 2008 
 
product and of 120€ for the A++ product. During this period 6,500 appliances were 
sold, which represented a direct cost of 533 k€ for EWZ, but annual energy savings of 
750 MWh
76. 
2.3.2.  COMPACT FLUORESCENT LAMPS (CFLI) 
￿  International survey 
An international survey was carried out between September and December 2006 by 
the  Efficient  Lighting  Initiative  (ELI),  with  support  from  Joint  Graduate  School  for 
Energy and Environment, to lean from internationally implemented programmes to 
promote market penetration of CFLs. 26 programmes in 14 countries (see Table 42) 
answered the questionnaire. 
Table 42: List of programmes surveyed 
  Country  Programme Name 
1  Australia  Equipment Energy Efficiency Programme – Greenlight Australia 
2  Australia  Energy Australia – Energy Efficiency Campaign 
3  Canada  Switch and Save Campaign (2004) 
4  Canada (BC)  CFL Giveaway Campaign (4 phases) 
5  Canada (BC)  Lighting Rebate Campaign (2 phases) 
6  Canada (BC)  Lighting Fixture Campaign 
7  Canada (Manitoba)  Power Smart CFL Program 
8  Canada (Nova Scotia)  Lighten Up 
9  Canada (Quebec)  Programme d'éclairage Efficace Mieux Consommer 
10  Canada (Ottawa)  Project Porchlight 
11  Canada (Saint John)  Lighting the Way, Save Everyday 
12  China  China Green Lights Program 
13  Europe  Energy Efficient Residential Lighting Initiative (EnERLIn) 
14  Europe (Hungary) 
European Efficient Residential Lighting Initiative –Hungarian 
part 
15  India (Bangalore)  BESCOM Efficient Lighting Program (BELP) 
16  New Zealand  National CFL Program 
17  New Zealand  Ecobulb projects 
18  Philippines 
Philippine Efficient Lighting Market Transformation Project 
(PELMATP) 
19  Poland  Poland Efficient Lighting Program (PELP) 
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  Country  Programme Name 
20  South Africa  Efficient Lighting Initiative, (ELI) 
21  South Africa  DSM Recovery Programme 
22  Sri Lanka  CEB – CFL Program 
23  United Kingdom  Energy Saving Recommended 
24  USA  ENERGY STAR 
25  USA, China, Brazil  CFL Harmonization 
26  Vietnam  Compact Fluorescent Lamp Promotion Program 
There is a wide range of programmes depending on their implementing agency (Figure 
68), their type (Figure 69), their budget (between $ 200,000 and $ 15 million) and their 
duration (between a few months and 10 years). 
Thus, about 62% of the 26 programmes were initiated by public authorities, either 
governments or utilities. 
Figure 68: Type of implementing agency
77 
 
Figure 69: Type of programme
77 
 
                                                           
77 P. Du Pont, International survey of CFL program  experience, October 2007  
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Amongst programmes providing subsidies for the purchase of a CFL, 25% give these 
energy saving lamps for free, whereas 42% propose a rebate between 40% and 59% of 
the initial product price as highlighted in Figure 70. 
Figure 70: Level of CFL subsidy/incentive (in relation to the initial product price) 
 
Based on results of programmes which are over, in many cases CFL sales increased. 
Depending  on  the  initiative,  3,000  up  to  5  million  CFLs  were  sold.  Therefore,  the 
market penetration relative to incandescent lamps was between 5% and 33%. 
The direct and indirect energy savings were estimated respectively of 465 GWh/year 
and of 2,328 GWh/year. The relative reduction of CO2 emissions was up to 559 kt. 
Figure 71: Impact of programmes on CFL sales 
 
￿  Germany 
Germany was the Bright North Rhine Westphalia DSM action. 80 utilities participated in 
the programme. As results about 500,000 CFLs were directly delivered to customers or 
bought via vouchers
78; in addition participants were motivated by the programme to 
buy additional CFLs. Also nonparticipants increased their purchase of CFLs. Another 
interesting CFL campaign reported by Thomas was carried out by Stadwerke Hannover 
as part of a least cost planning project. Every customer could get a rebate of 5.11 € on 
                                                           
78 P. Bertoldi and B. Atanasiu, Residential lighting consumption and saving potential in the enlarged EU, June 
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every CFL bought. Most of incentive programmes in Germany by utilities for efficient 
appliances or CFLs were stopped by the end of 1999. 
￿  Denmark 
Denmark has a taxation on lighting sources added to the sales price: 
·  CFL: no tax  
·  Incandescent: 3.75 DKK (= 0.5 Euro)  
·  Fluorescent tube: 7.5 DKK (= 1 Euro)  
·  Halogen low voltage: 0.75 DKK (0.1 Euro)  
·  Halogen 230V: 3.75 DKK (= 0.5 Euro)  
·  Metalhalogen: 7.5 DKK (= 1 Euro)  
·  Emission lamp: 7.5 DKK (= 1 Euro)  
The Danish taxation is basically a tax to collect state income and could also be seen as 
an energy efficiency effort because there is no tax on CFLi but nevertheless there is a 
tax  for  fluorescent  tubes  and  metalhalide  lamps  which  are  considered  as  energy 
efficient lamps. 
￿  Portugal 
According to a decree-law of April 12, 2007, Portugal has such an added cost or 'tax' for 
low energy efficiency lamps to compensate for environmental influence from this type 
of lighting. The tax is calculated based on the following parameters: electric power and 
life cycle of the lamp compared to energy efficient lamps and the average value of CO2 
emission factor and cost for Portugal. The tax income will feed the Portuguese Fund for 
Carbon (80%) and the Energy Efficiency Fund (20%). 
2.3.3.  BOILERS 
Although  there  is  no  tax  incentives  programme  at  national  level,  several  MS  have 
launched initiatives to foster the purchase of energy efficient boilers. Table 44 lists 
these past of current schemes. 
As condensing boilers are considered as the environmental alternative to traditional 
boilers, they are in the scope of the tax incentive programmes except in Denmark 
where only natural gas and biomass boilers are eligible. 
Regarding the type of tax incentives, only France proposes a tax credit (since 2005) for 
individuals buying a condensing boiler. The other schemes deliver subsidies. 
Subsidies amounts delivered in Austria depend on the lands as shown in Table 43. 
 
 
Table 43: Overview of subsidies for gas condensing boilers in Austria in 2000
79 
                                                           
79 H. Ritter and G. Benke, Natural gas for domestic appliances in Austria – Future perspectives and the 
potential of energy efficient technologies, 2000.  
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Table 44: Summary of tax incentives programmes at national level 
MS  Programme Name  Period 
Type of tax 
incentive 
Scope  Rate  Target  Initiator 
Austria      Subsidies  Condensing boilers  Different in regions  Consumers   
Denmark    1999 - 2001  Subsidies 
Natural gas boilers 
(& biomass boilers) 
2500 DKK for natural gas boilers 
(1999-2001), about 335 € 
(10 to 30% of the investment for 
biomass boilers) 
Consumers  Government 
France 




Tax credits  Condensing boilers 
25%, or 
40% if boilers installed in a 
dwelling constructed before 
1/1/1977 
Consumers  Government 
Ireland 
National Energy Efficiency Action 
Plan 
from 2008  Subsidies  Condensing boilers  255.65 € / year for 8 years  Consumers  Government 
The 
Netherlands 
National Insulation Program  1978 - 1987 
Subsidies 
   
Consumers  Government 
Compensation of energy saving 
investments 
    Rental price increase 
Environmental Action Plan  1995 - 2000 
Condensing boilers 
(& solar boilers) 
 
The EIA (Energy Investment 
Deduction) and the EINP (Energy 





up to 15% of the investment 
costs 
EINP (Energy Investment Deduction 
for Non Profit Organisations) 
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2.4.   IMPACT OF EXISTING TAX INCENTIVES IN EUROPE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This  section  focuses  on  the  quantitative  analyses  developed  to  assess  the  existing 
policy  measures  that  aim  to  increase  production  and  consumption  of  domestic 
appliances  in  Europe  (American  studies  are  reviewed  in  section  2.5).  This  section 
reviews the literature on the quantitative assessment of policy measures that aim to 
provide  incentives  for  the  production  and  consumption  of  certain  durable  goods, 
specifically  (i)  boilers;  (ii)  refrigerators;  (iii)  washing  machines;  and  (iv)  compact 
fluorescent lamps (CFLs).  
This  section  is  organised  as  follows:  a  short  review  of  the  main  approaches  and 
methodologies used to evaluate the impact of policies are presented in section 2.4.1. 
Section 2.4.2 reviews the studies that used an economic approach to assess (i) the 
impact of policies over the consumption and production of durables in Europe; and (ii) 
the price-elasticity of the demand for energy related to the goods of interest, while 
section 2.4.3 presents the studies that used non-economic or engineering approaches 
to address the issues of interest. Conclusions and summary are presented in section 
2.4.4. 
2.4.1.  ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES  
A number of alternative approaches can be used to measure changes in the economy 
induced by a policy measure. In addition to generating direct effects, a policy measure 
can result in indirect or induced economic effects across the economy as a whole or in 
related  sectors of  the  economy.  From  the  industry  perspective, when  a  policy  has 
significant impacts on the costs of producing a particular good this may affect the 
demand  for  substitute  and  complementary  goods  and  services  produced  by  other 
sectors. When the change in demand for the substitute goods is followed by a change 
in their prices, this may lead to indirect effects on producers and consumers of the 
substitute good or service. These indirect effects may be either negative or positive, 
depending on the supply and demand relationships that are affected by the policy 
measure. A policy that leads to significant direct compliance costs for one sector may 
nevertheless generate net gains for the economy as a whole, as a result of changes in 
the demand for different goods and services. Alternatively, it may create net losses to 
the  economy  as  a  result  of  investments  being  diverted  from  activities  that  would 
increase output. 
Approaches for assessing the impacts of policy measures can focus on the supply side, 
or  the  demand  side,  or  on  both  sides  of  the  economy.  There  is  also  a  distinction 
between ‘top down’ approaches that are based on economic behavioural models and 
‘bottom  up’  approaches  that  use  a  more  engineering  framework  to  evaluate  the 
impacts of different measures.  
Economic models focussing on the supply-side of the economy use supply data (e.g. 
labour supply or energy supply) to generate estimates of the impact that might occur 
from changes in policy measures on the level of economic activities. The obvious failing 
of such models is the lack of any consideration of demand effects. Since many of the 
policies  specifically  target  the  demand  for  energy,  supply  side  approaches  are  not 
helpful in such contexts. For example, Neij et al. (2003) analysed the impact of energy-
related policy measures on production costs of renewable energy. The use of supply-
side models may be useful in providing order-of-magnitude estimates of the indirect 
effects arising from a change in the policy measure when a policy focussed on factors  
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that influence supply costs, such as R&D but is less useful in most contexts of interest 
to this study. 
The  demand-side  approach  assesses  the  economic  impacts  of  a  policy  measure 
through  a  range  of  different  models,  for  example,  input-output  models,  Keynesian 
multiplier-based  models,  and  econometric  analysis  for  estimating  the  impacts  that 
expenditure or compliance costs have on the economic variables via the demand for 
the  products  in  question.  At  the  macroeconomic  level  the  demand-side  approach 
recognises that the implementation of the policy measure by individual users of energy 
and  energy-consuming  products  is  influenced  by  a  number  of  policy  parameters, 
especially ones that influence the price of energy and that of energy-using products.  
Both  the  demand  and  supply  side  effects  can  be  evaluated  through  the  use  of 
Computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  models.  Such  models  are  the  most 
sophisticated type of top-down approach and are used to evaluate the benefits and 
costs of implementing a proposed policy measure. They are able to quantify direct and 
indirect effects of policy measures on many aspects of the economic, like its structure 
and  predicted  growth,  and  the  allocation  of  resources.  CGE  models  take  into 
consideration both demand and supply interactions, being able to deal with longer 
planning horizons, which allow analysts to examine long-term movements in a wide 
range of economic variables. Essentially, these models simulate markets with systems 
of equations specifying supply and demand behaviour across the investigated markets. 
According  to  the  pertinent  literature,  a  reasonable  general  equilibrium  model  is 
supposed to have the following elements: (a) a description of the utility functions and 
budget  constraints  of  each  household  in  the  economy;  (b)  a  description  of  the 
production functions of each company in the economy; (c) the government’s budget 
constraint;  (d)  a  description  of  the  resource  constraints  of  the  economy;  (e) 
assumptions relating to the behaviour of households and companies in the economy. 
General equilibrium models compare two distinct states of the economy, before and 
after the implementation or consideration of the policy. The difference between the 
two states represents the net economic benefit or cost of implementing the policy 
measure in question. 
Whichever approach is taken it is clear that quantitative estimates of the supply and 
demand side impacts will require information on the quantitative effects, especially the 
price and other ‘elasticities’ of demand and supply. For this purpose it is essential to 
use  econometric  models.  Such  models  statistically  relate  a  variable  of  interest 
(dependent  variable)  to  several  macroeconomic  and  policy  variables  in  order  to 
investigate which of these variables impact the dependent variable. The estimated 
coefficients  of  the  policy  variables  indicate  the  significance  and  magnitude  of  the 
impact of the policy variable(s) over the relevant variable or indicator. As can be seen 
below a common use of econometric models in policy analysis is the estimation of the 
demand function for specific goods or services in order to observe how this demand is 
affected  by  important  policy  variables.  For  example,  economists  may  estimate  the 
demand for energy and, consequently, the price-elasticity and/or income-elasticity of 
the demand for energy consumption. These statistics are important to foresee how 
policies that affect energy prices will impact the consumption of energy. This type of 
analysis is also very useful at the microeconomic level, when individual (household or 
firm) data are available.  
In order to undertake analyses using the methods described above a substantial effort 
is necessary to gather the data, which is not always available. In addition to the data  
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limitation,  the  complexity  inherent  in  modelling  this  data  and  the  econometric 
estimation of the models may add to the difficulty in undertaking policy assessment 
using economic models. An alternative approach that has been taken in the literature 
is the use of engineering models. These models are based on detailed engineering 
information  regarding  technical  aspects  of  different  technologies  (Larsen  and 
Nesbakken, 2004). Therefore they have a narrower perspective, targeting mainly the 
technological  (non-economic)  aspect  of  the  analysis.  For  example,  some  methods 
assess the impact of a policy on energy consumption and/or other energy efficiency 
indicator. Nevertheless, when making predictions of changes in energy consumptions 
even  such  models  make  implicit  assumptions  about  behavioural  responses.  The 
problem is that often such responses are not made clear in the published papers. 
An  example  of  an  engineering  based  approach  to  evaluate  the  ex-post  impact  of 
policies  in  Europe  was  developed  under  the  project  “Monitoring  Tools  for  Energy 
Efficiency in Europe – the ODYSSEE and MURE Project”
80. The methodology, named 
Backcasting, aims at the retrospective evaluation of the impact on energy efficiency 
indicators (EEI) of past policy measures. The real performance of the EEI is compared to 
simulated results of the EEI in the absence of the policy measures. The simulation tool, 
MURE
81, is a bottom-up, technology-related simulation tool that allows analysts to (a) 
choose the end-use sector for the simulation (household or transport or industry or 
tertiary); (b) identify and select the scope of the interventions (or policies) that one 
wants to simulate or at whatever combination of those; (c) describe the interventions 
in detail; (d) make assumptions on the future performance of the technologies (or 
devices,  etc.)  involved  by  the  interventions  that  has  been  selected;  (e)  make 
assumptions on the future penetration rates that can be expected for each of the 
envisaged  technologies.  The  model  produces  results  in  terms  of  technical  energy 
savings potential corresponding to the entire (and cumulated) set of interventions that 
has  been  selected.  Note  that  the  model  requires  information  on  future  adoptions 
rates, which are determined by policy factors and the information on which has to 
come from some kind of econometric or statistical assessment. 
In  summary,  the  backcasting  methodology  consists  in  backward  predicting  or 
simulating how energy efficiency indicators would have been in the absence of the 
policy package (reference scenario) and how those EE indicators would have been in 
case  the  policy  measures  were  implemented  at  full  realization  of  technical 
improvements (policy case). The predicted EE indicators are then compared to actual 
values observed and the impact of the policy measures upon the EE indicators can be 
measured. The steps followed in the backcasting methodology are as follows: 
·  Step 1: characterisation of the policy measures packages; it aims to identify the 
measures  to  be  retrospectively  simulated  and  to  analyse  their  real 
implementation processes
82; 
                                                           
80  “Backcasting:  A  methodology  for  the  Evaluation  of  Energy  Efficiency  Policies”,  available  online  at 
http://www.mure2.com/doc/MURE_Backcasting.pdf 
81 MURE – Mesures d’Utilization Rationnelle de l’Energie. 
82 In general the regulatory process has a built-in time in order to enable the market to adjust to the specific 
regulatory requirements before the implementation date (e.g. industry and consumers consultations). 
Therefore,  the  impacts  of  regulations  are  often  evident  beforehand,  as  the  market  introduces  more 
efficient products in time to meet the requirements (Ellis et al., 2007).  
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·  Step 2: parameterisation of a reference case; selection of parameters affected 
and non-affected by the policy measure. In the reference case all parameters 
not  affected  by  the  policy  measure  are  set  to  their  real  value,  whilst  all 
parameters  affected  by  the  policy  are  set  to  their  trend  before  the  policy 
implementation; 
·  Step  3:  parameterisation  of  the  policy  case;  definition  of  the  technical 
parameters  that  the measure  acts  upon  and  the  timing  of the  penetration 
rates; 
·  Step 4: selection of energy efficiency indicators (EEI);  
·  Step 5: comparison of results; the simulated results – what would have been 
the energy consumption trends without the policy measure – are compared to 
the observed figures to indicate the impact of the policy measure in terms of 
energy consumption. 
2.4.2.  ECONOMIC MODELS  
The economic literature consists of studies using computable general equilibrium as 
well  as  macro  and  micro-econometric models  to  investigate  the  effects  of  energy-
related policies in Europe. For example, Jansen and Klaassen (2000) analysed ex-ante 
the macroeconomic impacts of the EU energy tax scheme using three different models 
and concluded that a positive macroeconomic impact could be observed in all MS 
when  the  tax  revenues  are  used  to  reduce  social  security  contributions  paid  by 
employers  (double-dividend)
83.  In  this  study,  however,  we  will  focus  our  literature 
review on studies that aimed to analyse the effectiveness of energy-related policies on 
the specific sectors and appliances of interest for our study. That is, we will not review 
studies that focus on the wider macroeconomic effects of energy policies in Europe but 
those  studies  that  are  related  to  the  energy  market  and  somehow  related  to  the 
appliances we are interested in.  
The  reasons  for  this  choice  are:  (a)  CGE  models  are  not  capable  of  assessing  the 
detailed  policies  and  sectors  we  are  interested  in  and  (b)  the  models  themselves 
require as inputs information on the key supply and demand responses, which are the 
focus of our study. Hence we concentrate on micro or sectorial level studies, from 
which we summarise estimates of the income and price elasticity of the demand for 
energy. These elasticities are critical to describe future energy consumption trends and 
help  analysts  to  assess  the  impact  of  fiscal  and  financial  policy  measures  that 
potentially have an impact in energy prices. 
￿  Household sector 
Leth-Petersen and Togeby (2001) 
The impact of policy measures aiming to reduce the consumption of energy for space 
heating in Denmark was estimated by Leth-Petersen and Togeby (2001). The authors 
used  panel  data  containing  information  about  technical  characteristics  and  energy 
consumption for space heating in apartment blocks to analyse the effects of building 
regulations on energy consumption for space heating, as well as the effect of a Danish 
                                                           
83  The  reader  can  refer  to  Heady  et  al.  (2000)  for  a  review  of  other  macroeconomic  studies  on  the 
effectiveness of energy-related policies in Europe and a discussion of the double-dividend issue.  
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advisory/labelling scheme aiming to improve the level of information about energy 
efficient technologies. The scheme involved consultants giving recommendations for 
improving the energy efficiency of heating systems in order to bring them up to the 
level  of  buildings  complying  with the  building  regulation  (heat  audits).  In  case  the 
suggestions of the advisory service were implemented, the building could be ‘energy 
tested’ and granted a certificate of compliance. In addition, the authors estimated 
energy price elasticities conditional on the availability of the heating technology. 
Leth-Petersen  and  Togeby  (2001)  estimated  an  econometric  model  reflecting  the 
energy  demand  equation  at  the  building  level  conditional  on  the  type  of  heating 
system present in the building. Additional to the consumption of energy, the type of 
energy carrier and the respective prices, the model included a trend term to capture 
deterministic unobserved components of energy consumption, and dummy variables 
indicating the presence (=1) or not (=0) of the policy measures. The econometric model 
could be estimated using fixed-effect regression and a conditional demand model that 
allowed  for  correlations  between  observed  and  unobserved  components  of  the 
demand relation. The results of the conditional demand model indicated the (short-
run) price-elasticity of the demand for energy of buildings using oil was estimated to 
be -0.08, while the price elasticity for buildings using district heating was equal to -
0.02.   
Regarding the effect of policy measures, the results indicated that building regulations 
may  have  been  important  in  reducing  energy  consumption  in  new  buildings  in 
Denmark. They indicated a small short-term effect of fuel taxes on energy consumption 
in  apartment  blocks,  and  a  moderate  effect  of  the  advisory  support  scheme 
implemented with the purpose of improving knowledge about the potential or energy 
savings. As can be seen in Table 45, the effect of undertaking the heat audit was 
estimated to be between almost zero and 1.3% while the effect of energy tests was 
3.1% and 12.3%, depending on which model is used.   
Table 45: Estimated effectiveness of heat audit and energy tests in Denmark
84 
  Heat audit  Energy test 
Estimates from conditional demand model  -0.0125  -0.1233 
Estimates from fixed-effects regression model  -0.0007  -0.0310 
Nesbakken (1999) 
Nesbakken  (1999)  investigated  the  relationship  between  the  choice  of  heating 
technology and household energy consumption using cross-sectional data from the 
Norwegian consumer expenditure surveys between 1993 and 1995. The econometric 
model was formulated to take into account energy consumption and different features 
of the heating equipment – electric heaters; electric heaters combined with stoves for 
oil/kerosene;  electric  heaters  combined  with  wood  stoves;  and  electric  heaters 
combined with stoves for oil/kerosene and stoves for wood. The model assumed that 
the  utility  of  consumers  depended  on  energy  consumption  (at  a  given  price), 
consumption of other goods, observable characteristics of the household (including 
                                                           
84 Source: Leth-Petersen and Togevy, 2001.  
December 2008 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote 
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
111 
 
income)  and  the  dwelling,  unobservable  characteristics  of  the  household  and  the 
heating equipment.  
The econometric model was initially estimated separately on data for the 3 years (1993 
to 1995) to compare the estimation results along the time dimension (Table 46). The 
results  show  relatively  low  income  elasticities  but  relatively  high  short-  run  price 
elasticities.  No  estimates  were  available  for  the  long-run  price  elasticities.  In  a 
sequence, a pooled model was estimated combining all 3 years. The author claims that 
the pooled model gave more precise estimates than the results for each separate year 
because of more observations. In order to test whether income, energy prices and 
other variables have the same impact on energy consumption when the income levels 
rise,  the  author  estimated  income  and  energy  price  elasticity  for  different  income 
groups (above and below the average income level in the sample) and results are in 
Table  47,  which  shows  generally  similar  elasticities  across  all  groups,  but  lower 
elasticities for those on below average income compared to those on above average 
income.   
Table 46: Income and price elasticity of the demand for energy for household heating 
– 1993 to 1995
85 
  1993  1994  1995 
Short run income elasticity  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Long run income elasticity 
(a)  0.28  0.21  0.15 
Short  run  energy  price 
elasticity 
-0.57  -0.33  -0.53 
Note: Elasticities estimated at sample means; (a) includes the impact of income on the dwelling size, which 
has impact on energy consumption. 
Table 47: Income and price elasticity of the demand for energy for household heating 





Income < average  Income > average 
Short run income elasticity  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Long run income elasticity 
(a)  0.20  0.18  0.22 
Short run energy price elasticity  -0.50  -0.33  -0.66 
Note: Elasticities estimated at sample means; (a) includes the impact of income on the dwelling size, which 
has impact on energy consumption. 
 
 
                                                           
85 Source: Nesbakken, 1999.  
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￿  Industry sector 
Bjorner and Jensen (2000) 
Bjorner  and  Jensen  (2000)  presented  an  econometric  analysis  of  industrial 
consumption of energy and their value added in Denmark, estimating the demand for 
energy of Danish industrial companies. In addition, the authors assessed the effect of 
energy taxes, energy agreements and subsidies to investments in energy efficiency. 
The database used in this study had a panel format, where information about each of 
the companies was obtained over several years – 1983 and 1997, allowing analysts to 
observe the energy consumption before and after policy measures were implemented. 
The  model  can  be  summarised  as  follows:  total  energy  means  the  companies’ 
consumption of eight major types of energy (coal, fuel oil, heating oil, LPG, natural gas, 
city gas, electricity and district heating), and is regarded as an input in production 
together with labour and capital. Assuming that all companies treat energy price and 
other factors as exogenous and that each company minimises its production cost, the 
demand for energy was expressed as a function of factor price and level of production. 
Data  for  3762  companies  of  56  sub-sectors  were  obtained  for  years 
1983/85/88/90/93/95/96  and  97.  The  preferred  econometric  model  was  estimated 
assuming company-specific fixed-effects and demand elasticity with respect to value 
added  and  price  were  estimated.  The  overall  energy-demand  price  elasticity  with 
respect to energy price in the whole Danish industry was estimated equal to -0.44 
(Table 48). The price-elasticity of demand for energy per industrial sub-sector ranged 
between -0.21 and -0.69; with energy intensive sub-sectors responding less to changes 
in energy prices. 
Table 48: Price elasticities of the demand for energy in the Danish industry
86 
Industrial sub-sector  Price elasticity 
Extraction of gravel, clay, stone, salt  -0.43 
Food, beverages and tobacco  -0.45 
Textiles, wearing and leather  -0.35 
Wood and wood products  -0.39 
Paper, printing and publishing  -0.35 
Chemicals  -0.51 
Rubber and plastic products  -0.52 
Other non-metallic mineral products  -0.21 
Basic metals (manufacturing and processing)  -0.51 
Machinery and equipment  -0.48 
                                                           
86 Source: Bjorner and Jensen, 2000.  
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Industrial sub-sector  Price elasticity 
Electrical and optical instruments  -0.69 
Transport equipment  -0.56 
Furniture and manufacturing  -0.56 
Total industry  -0.44 
Note: Mean price elasticities weighted with share of energy consumption. 
The estimates of price-elasticity presented in Table 48 were in accordance to estimates 
found in the international literature based on time series studies and summarised by 
the  authors  in  Table  49.  Cross  section  studies  tend  to  generate  somewhat  higher 
elasticities
87. However, these estimates were higher than previously found in other 
Danish studies, which suggests that existing energy taxes may have had a larger effect 
than previously assumed. 
Table 49: Energy price elasticities from international studies
88 
  All studies  Time-series study 
Pooled cross-section 
studies 
Median  -0.47  -0.38  -0.84 
Mean  -0.66  -0.44  -1.06 
Minimum  -0.06  -0.06  -0.27 
Maximum  -2.05  -1.06  -2.05 
Number of studies  25  16  9 
Note: calculated from studies surveyed in Atkinson and Manning (1995) “A Survey of International Energy 
Elasticities” in Barker, T. P. Elkins and N. Johnstone (eds) Global warming and Energy demand, including 
studies published between 1975 and 1993. 
As to the effect of energy agreements on energy consumption, the authors concluded 
that  the  activities  carried  out  when  entering  an  energy  agreement  have  led  to 
reduction in energy consumption (the range is from -9% to -14%), after controlling for 
the discount in energy taxes to these companies. With regard to investment subsidies, 
the  parameter  obtained  was  not  significantly  different  from  zero  (the  mean  value 
ranged from -1.2% to -1.7%), which indicates that the hypothesis that subsidies had no 
effect on energy consumption could not be rejected. Finally, Bjorner and Jensen (2000) 
concluded that the energy consumption in the whole industrial sector would have been 
                                                           
87  “Time  series  studies  have  resulted  in  lower  price  elasticities  as  compared  with  studies  based  on 
aggregated cross-section data (included pooled time series)…this supports the often stated view that time 
series  studies  produce  short-run  or  medium-run  elasticities,  while  the  cross-section  studies  yield 
elasticities with a long-run nature” (Bjorner and Jensen, 2000).  
88 Source: Bjorner and Jensen, 2000.  
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10% higher in 1997 if there had been no taxes on energy used in the Danish industrial 
sector. 
Aalbers et al. (2004) 
The  effectiveness  of  subsidies  for  energy-saving  technologies  was  assessed  in  the 
Dutch industry sector. Aalbers et al. (2004) used data on investments of firms in energy 
saving technologies and measured the impact of the payback period of the technology 
on  the  probability of  adopting  the  technology  in  the  absence of tax  and  subsidies 
incentives. The data was obtained from the Dutch tax rebate scheme in the profit 
sector (EIA – Energy Investment Deduction) and a subsidy programme in the non-profit 
sector  (EINP  –  Energy  Investments  in  Non-Profit  sectors),  for  862  subsidised 
investments in 20 technologies across 57 sub-sectors. The programmes consisted of 
incentives  to  a  number  of  energy-saving  technologies,  including  energy-efficient 
lightning and acquisition of high efficient boilers. 
The model used by Aalbers et al. (2004) considered a firm having two investment 
options: investing in a standard technology with one cost and investing in an energy-
saving technology with another cost, which include a subsidy or a tax deduction which 
are associated with a pay-back period. The discrete model in which the firm invests in 
the energy-saving technology was estimated using econometric (Probit) analysis. The 
effectiveness of a programme was measured as the percentage of firms (all sectors) 
that  would  not  have  bought  the  technology  in  the  absence  of  the  subsidy,  and 
estimated to equal 45.4% for the EIA programme and 47.1% for the EINP programme. 
The authors also estimated the effectiveness of the subsidy programme per energy-
saving technology (Table 50). Aalbers et al. (2004) concluded that the decision to adopt 
energy saving technologies varies according to the type of firm – for-profit and not-for-
profit and by technology. On average, about 45.5% of firms would have bought the 
energy-saving technology without the subsidy or tax credit. 
Table 50: Effectiveness of the subsidy programme per technology – Dutch industry 
sector – by technology
89 
Technology  Subsidy scheme  Effectiveness 
Combined heat and power  EIA  45.2% 
Energy efficient lightning  EIA and EINP  52.8% 
High efficient boiler  EINP  43.4% 
2.4.3.  ENGINEERING MODELS 
MURE (2002) (Backcasting) 
MURE  (2002)  presented  earlier,  reports  several  study  cases  where  the  backcasting 
methodology  was  used  to  evaluate  specific  policy  measures  in  Europe.  Those  of 
interest  for  the  objectives  of  our  study  are  related  to  household  appliances 
(refrigerators, including fridges and freezers) in Sweden and in EU15. The first study 
case  aimed  at  assessing  how  the  measures  implemented  since  1995  impacted  the 
                                                           
89 Source: Adapted from Aalbers et al., 2004.  
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energy efficiency performance of refrigerators in Europe. The measures that apply to 
refrigerators and were assessed in this study case included:  
·  Labelling of cold appliances (Directives 92/75/EEC and 94/2/EC); 
·  Mandatory standards for cold appliances (Directive 96/57/EC); 
·  Energy tax on electricity (some EU countries only); and  
·  Other policies and measures (e.g. procurement programmes at the national 
level).  
The  parameterisation  of  the  reference  and  policy  cases  included  the  following 
assumptions, among others:  
·  The growth rates in the stock of appliances in each country were provided by 
the ODYSSEE database; 
·  Refrigerators’ lifetime was assumed to equal 15 years; 
·  The replacement rate in 4 years was assumed to equal 24%; 
·  Penetration rate of the appliances were observed in market data for A/B/C 
devices
90; 
·  For the policy case full realisation of the technical improvement was assumed 
according to the intensity ratios between efficiency classes as indicated in the 
Labelling Directive. This means that new refrigerators would have the same 
volume  as  replaced  refrigerators  (constant  structure),  and  also  that 
refrigerators/fridge-freezers  could  not  be  separated,  since  a  shift  from  the 
former to the latter would increase the energy consumption of the new unit 
and reduce the technical improvement;
 91 
·  The  set  of  energy  efficiency  indicators  concerned  the  actual  energy 
consumption for refrigerators, were disaggregated into energy efficiency (EE) 
classes was constructed by a model since energy consumption per EE classes 
was not directly observable.   
The comparison of the simulated overall energy consumption of refrigerators in Europe 
between 1995 and 1999 in the absence of the policy package with the actual figures 
observed in 1999 showed that
92: 
·  Comparison of the simulated energy consumption figures for 1999 with the 
values  observed  in  1995  shows  that  the  technical  autonomous  progress  – 
business as usual – reduced energy consumption at a rate of 1.8% per year, 
corresponding to 800TJ final energy savings between 1995 and 1999; 
                                                           
90 Energy efficiency classes for refrigerators ranging between class A (energy efficiency index < 55) and class 
G (energy efficiency index < 125). 
91 The combined assumptions about (i) the lifetime of refrigerators;  (ii) the percentage of the annual stock 
replacement; and (iii) the observed market penetration rate of new appliances (per type) are used to 
estimate the substitution of old refrigerators in the model. Hence, there is no need to obtain data about 
the age of the existing stock.    
92 The authors presented their results in terms of total energy reduction given in TJ and did not provide 
sufficient information in the paper to allow us to convert the given energy unit into percentage reduction 
of total energy consumption, which would be the relevant unit for assessing the impact of the policy 
measures.  
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·  The  results  of  the  policy  case  (simulated  scenario  with  full  realization  of 
technical improvement) were compared to the simulated reference case (no 
policy  in  place)  for  1999,  indicating  that  the  impact  of  the  policy  package 
assessed equalled 1100TJ; 
·  Comparing the actual energy consumption at constant activity with the value 
simulated in the policy case indicated that the potential reduction in energy 
consumption was not totally achieved, the difference being explained, among 
other factors like behaviour, to the fact that new appliances replacing existing 
ones did not realise the full technical potential of replacement because newer 
units  were either  larger or  because  there was a  shift  from  refrigerators to 
fridge-freezers, a structural effect that the authors could not capture in their 
model. 
The second study case of interest in MURE (2000) was similar to the previous one on 
the EU – same assumptions and policy package, excluding procurement programmes 
due to lack of data – but included an attempt to separate electricity taxation and was 
related to Sweden only. The main results were
93: 
·  Comparison of the predicted energy consumption figures (reference case) for 
1999 with the values observed in 1995 shows that the technical autonomous 
progress – business as usual – reduced energy consumption at a rate of 2.4% 
per year, corresponding to 45TJ final energy savings between 1995 and 1999; 
·  The  results  of  the  policy  case  (simulated  scenario  with  full  realization  of 
technical improvement) were compared to the predicted reference case for 
1999, indicating that the impact of the policy package assessed equalled 40TJ. 
Using estimates of price-elasticity of the demand for energy in Sweden (the 
actual  values  are  not  provided)  the  authors  estimated  that  the  impact  of 
electricity taxes could be estimated at around 5TJ, suggesting that the largest 
impact occurred from the implementation of the labelling Directive;  
·  Comparing the actual energy consumption at constant activity with the value 
simulated  in  the  policy  case  indicated  that  the  reduction  in  energy 
consumption was not totally achieved, as occurred in the EU study case. 
Eichhammer and Weidemann (1999) 
Other study cases presented in MURE (2000) included household space heating in Italy 
and France; passenger transport in Italy and France; and combined heat and power 
(CHP)  industry  in  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK.  The  study  cases  concerning  space 
heating  assessed  a  policy  package  that  included  the  establishment  of  minimum 
efficiency standards for boilers, among other measures  such as building codes and 
grants for audits and dwellings improvement. These study cases are not reviewed here 
since there was no attempt to separate the impact of policies of interest to our study. 
However, among other study cases undertaken in the MURE project, one is particularly 
interesting for our purposes and deals with the impacts of the introduction of the EU 
Boiler Directive (Eichhammer and Weidemann, 1999).  
                                                           
93  Again,  the  results  were  given  in  terms  of  total  energy  reduction  and  no  sufficient  information  were 
available in the paper to allow us to convert the given energy unit into percentage reduction of total 
energy consumption, which would be the relevant unit for assessing the impact of the policy measures.  
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Eichhammer and Weidemann (1999) used the MURE simulation tool and database to 
evaluate the impact of the boiler Directive in EU Member States (EU15). The authors 
calculated (by predicting forward) the energy savings in 2005 and 2010 due to the 
Directive. The approach used for calculation for 2005 was the static one, that is, the 
estimates were based on 1995 figures, which means that the demand for energy was 
assumed unchanged until 2005 (no change in the number of households, in the fuel 
structure, in comfort levels, and no further increase in insulation). The results of this 
particular analysis can, therefore, be seen as the upper limit of the energy savings 
obtained with the implementation of the Directive.  
Estimations for year 2005 assumed country-specific parameters which were obtained 
through questionnaires sent to experts at the national level: lifetime of boilers; fuel 
efficiency for old boilers; share of total energy consumption of new buildings. Results 
presented in Table 51 show that in total 317.2PJ or 21.3 million tCO2 could be saved in 
2005 corresponding to 3.8% of the fuels concerned by the Directive (gaseous and liquid 
fuels) or to 2.9% of the energy used for space heating and warm water in households 
and for space heating in the tertiary sector. Since this assessment looks at a Directive 
that mandates the shift to a new technology the comparison of interest is the cost of 
implementing the Directive against the savings shown. Unfortunately, there were no 
references  in  the  paper  to  the  implementation  costs  of  the  Boiler  Directive in  the 
various countries in the study. 
Table 51: Energy savings in 2005 due to the implementation of the Boiler Directive in 
EU15
94 
  PJ  Mio tCO2 
Space heating in the households  217,2  14,3 
Sanitary hot water preparation of the 
households 
33,6  2,2 
Space heating in the tertiary sector  66,8  4,8 
Total  317,2  21,3 
In order to estimate energy savings for 2010 (Table 52), Eichhammer and Weidemann 
(1999) used a different approach which included scenarios developed to investigate 
the interaction with building insulation measures that tend to decrease the savings 
from the boiler Directive. The scenarios were defined as
95: 
·  Scenario A: the static approach used in the previous analysis, based on the 
1995 demand for heating and no new regulation to improve thermal insulation 
standards (the status quo alternative); 
·  Scenario  B:  new  regulation  to  improve  thermal  insulation  of  new  buildings 
(Danish Standard); 
                                                           
94 Source: Adapted from Eichhammer and Weidemann, 1999. 
95 All scenarios are future simulations of the implementation of the Boiler Directive (plus other policies in 
scenarios B and C). The resulting energy savings are then given in comparison to the no policy (Boiler 
Directive) scenario.  
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·  Scenario C: new regulation to improve thermal insulation of new buildings plus 
intensification of insulation of old buildings. 
Table 52: Energy savings in 2010 due to the implementation of the Boiler Directive in 
EU15
96 
Households (space heating only)  PJ  Mio tCO2 
Scenario A (no other new regulation)  352,89  23,19 
Scenario B (plus Danish Standard)  334,34  21,97 
Scenario  C  (plus  Danish  Standard  and 
intensification of insulation) 
282,36  18,56 
 
Boonekamp (2007) 
Boonekamp  (2007)  investigated  whether  policy  measures  implemented  in  the 
Netherlands between 1990 and 2000 had influenced the response of households to 
changing energy prices. The author simulated the energy developments for households 
using  a  bottom-up  model  of  household  energy  consumption  (SAVE-Households 
model),  which  determined  energy  effects  of  various  policy  measures,  including 
standards for insulation; subsidies for more energy efficient appliances and energy 
taxes. The model allowed the author to separate the price elasticity effect from the 
effect of the different policy measures. 
The analysis used micro data from household surveys and  the model used divided 
household energy consumption in to seven energy functions: space heating, supply of 
hot water, cleaning, cooling, cooking, lighting and other appliances, each with specific 
demand driving factors and systems/appliances (e.g. the driving factors of the space 
heating function were the type of dwelling and central of local heating; occupation rate 
etc;  and  the  corresponding  system/appliances  were  boilers  or  heaters  and  central 
ventilation units). The energy consumption of every system or appliance was defined 
as  a  function  of  the  ownership  rate  (share  of  households  that  use  the  system  or 
appliance),  the  intensity  of  use  (yearly  number  of  hours  of  use)  and  the  energy 
efficiency (reduction in energy use of the system or appliance compared to that of the 
reference system producing the same output) of the system or appliance. For every 
conversion  system  or  appliance  a  number  of  more  efficient  alternatives  for  the 
reference system were available in the model. Costs arose from additional investments 
in the more energy efficient option, and benefits were considered as the saved energy 
times  mean  price  (costs  considered  subsidies  as  well  as  benefits  considered  taxes 
affecting prices)
97. If costs were lower than benefits for an energy-saving option then 
the model assumes that the option should always be chosen from an economic point 
of view. 
The model was used to simulate past energy consumption trends and to compare with 
actual figures (in this sense the method used by Boonekamp (2007) is similar to the 
                                                           
96 Source: Adapted from Eichhammer and Weidemann, 1999. 
97 Cost-benefit ratio = [(investment – subsidy)*annuity] / [saving*(price+tax)].  
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backcasting methodology). The model was capable of simulating energy trends, using 
inputs that departed from the fitted base case trend for the period 1990-2000. The 
effect of a number of price changes (keeping all other factors unchanged) on total 
energy  consumption  was  determined  as  the  ratio  between  the  relative  change  in 
energy consumption and the relative change in energy price (Table 53). Although the 
author refers to this ratio as the price elasticity, he remarks that the calculated ratio 
reflects  changes  over  5  years  (results  for  1995),  thus  lying  between  the  periods 
relevant  for  short-run  and  long-run  elasticities.  As  a  consequence,  the  elasticity 
estimates in Table 53 are lower than most long-term elasticity values found in the 
literature.  
Table 53: Price elasticity for household gas and electricity consumption for different 
energy price cases
98 
Total price changes 
1995  2000 
Gas  Electricity  Gas  Electricity 
Minor increase - gas and electricity (+20%)   -0.07  -0.07  -0.13  -0.11 
Major increase - gas and electricity (+100%)  -0.04  -0.05  -0.08  -0.07 
Major decrease - gas and electricity (-50%)  -0.05  -0.06  -0.10  -0.09 
Gas only (+20%)  -0.08  +0.02  -0.15  +0.03 
Electricity only (+20%)  +0.01  -0.09  +0.02  -0.13 
Boonekamp (2007) also analysed the effect of a price change with and without the 
presence of some policy measures (standards for new dwellings, which included energy 
efficient boilers; subsidies for energy efficient systems or appliances; regulatory tax on 
energy carriers). Results are in Table 54. The authors concluded that the elasticity value 
in the case without policy measures can be 30-40% higher than in the case with all 
measures in place. However, a more detailed analysis of the interaction between the 
effects of higher prices and subsidies or taxes concluded that the total influence of 
taxes  or  subsidies  on  the  elasticity  value  depends  on  the  stock  of  energy  saving 
alternatives, since in the ‘take-off’ phase of the option the presence of subsidies and 
taxes enhances the effect of higher prices, while in the phase of ‘saturation’ of the 






                                                           
98 Source: Boonekamp, 2007.  
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Table  54:  Price  elasticity  for  household  gas  and  electricity  consumption  in  the 
presence of policy measures (year 2000)
99 
Policy variants  Gas  Electricity 
No policy case  -0.138  -0.124 
Standards only  -0.113  -0.124 
Subsidies only  -0.142  -0.119 
Taxes only  -0.125  -0.100 
Taxes/subsidies/standards  -0.103  -0.091 
Note: The estimates are for a change of +20% in the price without regulatory tax. 
Lund (2007) 
A different type of engineering analysis was undertaken by Lund (2007) to assess the 
effectiveness of several public policy measures in creating energy impacts. The author 
undertook 20 policy cases related to renewable energy and efficient energy use. The 
study  cases  related to  the  EU region  are  described  in  Table  55.  The  policies  were 
grouped  in  subsidy  type  and  catalysing  measures  based  on  the  use  of  the  public 
financial resources.  
The analysis of the impacts and costs of policy measures did not consider exogenous 
factors  that  may  affect  the  impacts,  such  as  energy  prices,  cultural  aspects,  local 
innovation system etc. Instead, the methodology used by Lund (2007) measured the 
effectiveness  of  public  policies  through  the  impacts  achieved  (outputs)  for  the 
resources (inputs) used, that is, the author estimated the additional cost per energy 
effect  (€/MWh).  This  was  subsequently  translated  into  a  public  cost  of  saved  CO2 
emissions by dividing the specific costs with the specific emissions of the reference 
energy source used. The methodology used to measure the effectiveness of the public 
support (e.g. subsidy) considered not only immediate observed impacts but also the 
future  impacts.  The  energy  impacts  were  obtained  from  the  cumulative  installed 
capacity or number of installations (et) in each country, by multiplying with unit energy 
production or savings per unit (u). Public support is denoted (it) and the specific cost of 
the public measures can be given as: 






















Several  assumptions  were  necessary  to  obtain  the  energy  impacts  of  the  policy 
measures and the market development of the different technologies over time. For 
example,  the  market  development  of  the  different  technologies  over  time  was 
assumed differently in each country. These assumptions were not detailed here due to 
the large number of assumptions. The public support was assumed to last for 10 years 
                                                           
99 Source: Boonekamp, 2007.  
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and  as  most  of  the  cases  studied  by  Lund  (2007)  were  new  technologies  it  was 
assumed that natural occurring penetration would have been improbable without the 
policy measures. 
The policy cost-effectiveness was estimated including the observed effects and lifetime 
accumulated  effects  from  the  investments  made.  Lund  (2007)  concluded  that  the 
policy cost of subsidies ranged between 1€/MWh and 100€/MWh (Table 55), the feed-
in  tariffs  being  the  most  expensive  choice  of  policy  measure.  The  measures  that 
catalyse market breakthroughs ranged between 0.1 and 1€/MWh, mostly due to a 
stronger market and business sensitiveness, focusing on the end-use sector with active 
stakeholder involvement.  
 
Table 55: Impacts and costs of public policy measures
100 








Feed-in tariffs  Germany  Wind power  Volume  Fiscal  1840  60 
Investment grant  Finland  Wind power  Volume  Fiscal  14  7.25 
Investment grant, 
R&D  Finland  Biomass  Volume  Fiscal, R&D  1840  1.96 
Investment grant, 
niche 
Austria  Biomass plants  Volume  Fiscal  281  1.28 
Investment grant  Austria  Solar heating  Volume  Fiscal  99  19.71 
Green certificates  EU  Renewables  Catalysing 
Fiscal, 
legislative  61  0.30 
Feed-in tariffs  Germany  Photovoltaic  Volume  Fiscal  53  400 
Business driven, 
niche 
Finland  Photovoltaic  Catalysing  Information  0.4  0.92 
Investment grant  Norway  Heat pumps  Volume  Fiscal  94  6.41 
Technology 
procurement 
Sweden  Heat pumps  Catalysing  Portfolio  410  0.01 
Business driven  Finland  Heat pumps  Catalysing  Information  157  5.76 
Investment grant  Austria  Heat pumps  Volume  Fiscal  115  0.06 
Technology 
procurement 
Sweden  Lighting (ballast)  Catalysing  Portfolio  20  0.78 
Building auditing  Finland  Office buildings  Volume  Information,  40  1.70 
                                                           
100 Source: Adapted from Lund, 2007.  
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Energy labelling  Denmark  Buildings  Volume 
Assisting, 
legislative  19  1.11 
Energy labelling  UK  Energy efficiency  Volume 
Fiscal, 
information 
66  0.65 
Portfolio  Norway 
Electricity 
efficiency 
Catalysing  Portfolio  33  4.17 
2.4.4.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This section reviewed the literature on the quantitative assessments of energy-related 
policies  in  Europe  associated,  directly  or  indirectly,  with  the  consumption  and 
production of refrigerators, washing machines, boilers and CFLi. Not many studies were 
found,  as  summarised  in  Table  56  and  in  Table  57.  We  did  not  review  the 
macroeconomic studies (using macro-econometric or CGE models) that investigated 
the wider economic impacts of energy taxes in EU since we understand that these 
studies do not refer to the specific objective of this study. Thus, we focused on policies 
and/or effects to the specific appliances of interest. 
Table 56: Summary table – econometric analyses 
Study / 
approach 













heat audit and 
energy test 
Heat audit: 
Model 1: -1.25% 
Model 2: -0.07% 
Energy test: 
Model 1: -12.33% 






















-9% to -14% 
-1.2% to -1.7% 
-0.44 total industry 
-0.21 to -0.69 per 
sub-sector 








Note: (a) Policy effectiveness is given as a percentage reduction in energy consumption, except in Aalbers 
et al. (2004) where the policy effectiveness is given as the percentage of firms that would not have bought 
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Table 57: Summary table – engineering models 
Study / 
approach 































Space heating: 217,2PJ 
Hot water: 33,6PJ 
2010 


















Price elasticity 30 – 












0.1 – 1 €/MWh 
--- 
Note: (a) Policy effectiveness is given as total reduction in energy consumption (engineering  models). 
Except in Boonekamp (2007) where the policy effectiveness is given as the percentage impact on price 
elasticities.  
It can be concluded from the review above that assessments of energy-related policies 
are in general carried out over the consumption of energy or other energy efficiency 
indicator when engineering models are used. Instead, econometric analyses focus on 
the demand for energy and the estimation of the price-elasticity of the demand for 
energy, which is an important tool to enable analysts to predict the impact on energy 
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2.5.   IMPACT OF EXISTING TAX INCENTIVES IN THE UNITED STATES: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The policy measures that have been implemented in the United States (US) to promote 
energy efficiency as well as the impacts of energy prices on energy consumption are 
described and evaluated in this note. We divide the discussion into assessments based 
on engineering models and those based on economic models. 
Policy instruments aimed at increasing energy efficiency first appeared after the oil 
shocks in the 1970s when the price of oil increased sharply. The first policies focused 
on  the  introduction  of  efficiency  standards  for  vehicles  (Corporate  Average  Fuel 
Economy initiative) and appliances. The first federal efficiency targets for appliances 
were voluntary (Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975) and became mandatory 
from  1987  (National  Appliance  Energy  Conservation  Act).  Parallel  to  these,  various 
State appliance-efficiency standards were introduced. More recently, environmental 
issues have enhanced the importance of energy-efficiency and in fact standards have 
continued to tighten over time, independently of oil price. 
The  2005  Energy  Policy  Act  sets  national  energy  efficiency  standards  on  various 
products. In particular: 
·  CFLs  (compact  fluorescent  lamps)  must  meet  2001  ENERGY  STAR® 
specifications; 
·  Refrigerators and freezers must meet the California Energy Commission (CEC) 
standard (that is very similar to the Energy Star specification); 
·  Clothes washers must have a Modified Energy Factor (MEF)
101 of at least 1.26 
and a Water Factor (WF) lower than 9.5. 
In addition, it also sets energy efficiency tax incentives on house appliances for existing 
and non-business homes that are summarised in Table 58. 
Table 58: Summary of the financial incentives granted by the 2005 Energy Policy 
Act
102 
PRODUCT  INCENTIVE  YEARS  DESCRIPTION 
Gas and oil boilers     
Only  for  those  products  that  are 
included in the qualified product list 
High combustion efficiency 
equipment 
150 $  2006-7   
High electric efficiency 
equipment 
50 $  2006-7   
Water heaters     
Only  for  those  products  that  are 
included in the qualified product list 
                                                           
101 The Modified Energy Factor is an equation for the Energy Factor that takes into account the amount of 
dryer energy used to remove the remaining moisture content in washed items. 
102 Source: Adapted from 2005 Energy Policy Act  
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Electric with 2.0 EF
103  300 $  2006-7   
Gas and oil with 0.8 EF  300 $  2006-7   
Refrigerators     
Incentives go to manufacturer, not 
to consumer, though manufacturer 
is  expected  to  reduce  prices 
accordingly 
Save 15-19.9% energy relative 
to federal standard 
75 $  2006   
Save 20-24.9% energy relative 
to federal standard 
125 $  2006-7   
Save 25% or more energy 
relative to federal standard 
175 $  2006-7   
Clothes washers with 1.72 
MEF and 8.0 WF
104 
100 $  2006-7 
Incentives go to manufacturer, not 
to consumer, though manufacturer 
is  expected  to  reduce  prices 
accordingly 
2.5.1.  ENGINEERING MODELS 
The 2007 Energy Policy Act, whose key facts were published in December 2007, will 
require producers to: 
·  Reduce energy consumption of common light bulbs (through standards) by 
about 25-30% by 2012-14 by over 60% by 2020; aiming at large scale use of 
CFLs to meet such targets; 
·  Meet new standards for residential boilers (update current federal standard); 
·  Determine revised standards for refrigerators by 2011; 
·  Determine revised standards for clothes washers by 2012; 
·  Develop  new  standards  for  commercial  heating  and  water  heating  by  the 
American  Society  of  Heating,  Refrigerating  and  Air-Conditioning  Engineers 
(ASHRAE). 
Potential energy and carbon savings from the whole 2007 Energy Policy Act have been 
calculated by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE). Table 59 
reports such estimates. 
                                                           
103 Energy Factor (EF) 
104 These levels now correspond to the 2007 ENERGY STAR® specifications  
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Direct Natural Gas  





Annual Energy Savings Estimates 
Residential Boiler Efficiency 
Standards 
 
Estimates for 2020  N/A  7.6  N/A  0.11 
Estimates for 2030  N/A  16.5  N/A  0.24 
Energy Standards for home 
appliances 
 
Estimates for 2020  23.0  N/A  118  4.6 
Estimates for 2030  46.5  N/A  227  9.3 
Efficient Light Bulbs   
Estimates for 2020  80.96  N/A  410  16.1 
Estimates for 2030  142.8  N/A  698  1.44 
Tax Exempt Bonds   
Estimates for 2010  2.4  15.2  12.35  0.74 
Estimates for 2020  3.9  24.6  20.00  1.20 
Estimates for 2030  2.4  14.7  11.98  0.7 
Tax credits for appliances   
Estimates for 2010  0.5  16.6  2.70  0.36 
Estimates for 2020  2.6  81.0  13.16  1.74 
Estimates for 2030  1.2  39.9  5.93  0.8 
Cumulative Energy Savings Estimates 
Residential Boiler Efficiency 
Standards 
 
Estimates for 2020  N/A  38  N/A  0.56 
Estimates for 2030  N/A  163  N/A  2.39 
Energy Standards for home 
appliances 
 
Estimates for 2020  128  N/A  647  25.5 
Estimates for 2030  488  N/A  2,386  97.3 
Efficient Light Bulbs   
Estimates for 2020  601  N/A  3044  119.8 
Estimates for 2030  2,029  N/A  9,914  404.4 
Tax Exempt Bonds   
Estimates for 2010  3.7  22.9  18.7  1.1 
Estimates for 2020  50.0  310.8  253  14.5 
Estimates for 2030  80.1  498  391  23.3 
Tax credits for appliances   
Estimates for 2010  1.1  33.2  5.4  0.7 
Estimates for 2020  17.0  530  86  11.2 
Estimates for 2030  36.5  1,154  178  24.2 
 
                                                           
105 Source: Adapted from 2005 Energy Policy Act  
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The  Lawrence  Berkeley  National  Laboratory  (LBNL,  University  of  California)  has 
conducted a study to estimate the energy, environmental, and consumer economic 
impacts of federal residential energy efficiency standards that became effective in the 
period 1988-2007. The evaluation took into consideration nine products. Table 60 lists 
the products and the years considered. 
Table  60:  U.S.  DOE  energy  efficiency  standards  for  residential  appliances  and 
equipment included in the LBNL impact estimation study [Source LBNL]. 
 
The impacts of the policies are estimated
106 comparing actual data with a no-standard 
base case scenario for average energy efficiency, energy consumption, and product 
price. The base case scenario is constructed to include the increase in energy efficiency 
due to various factors other than federal energy-efficiency standards, including other 
energy efficiency policy instruments. 
Moreover, the study takes into consideration the additional consumer costs for higher 
efficiency  appliances,  by  assuming  that  prices  without  standards  would  have  been 
lower than those actually observed.  
The results of the study indicate that: 
·  Standards will reduce energy consumption in 2020 by 8%, with refrigerators as 
the biggest savers, followed by clothes washers. Cumulative savings are 54 
quads (quadrillion British thermal units) in 2030, and 67 quads in 2045. 
·  Standards have made U.S. consumers save approximately $30 billion by 2005; 
while present value of projected net savings over the entire 1987-2045 period 
is $141 billion. In particular, the ratio of consumer savings ($239 billion) to 
additional consumer expenditures ($98 billion) is 2.45 to 1 (see Figure 72). 
                                                           
106  The  study  is  based  on  a  spreadsheet  accounting  model  that  calculates  national  energy  savings  and 
consumer benefits for each product standard. The variables used for the estimation are: (i) the average 
annual energy efficiency and energy consumption of the product sold in each year; (ii) the average product 
price in each year; calculated for each product, using actual data and projections of future trends.  
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Again, the greatest net savings are associated with standards for refrigerators 
and clothes washers. 
·  Standards are expected to reduce, by 2020, CO2 emissions by 8% and NOx by 
0.2  million  ton/year,  considering  both  savings  in  electricity  production  and 
primary natural gas consumption. To get an idea of the scale of these effects, 
the estimated reduction of 8% of CO2 emissions in 2020 corresponds to 36 MtC 
that  are  equivalent  to  the  annual  CO2  emissions  by  28  million  of  today’s 
average cars. Moreover, 0.2 million ton corresponds to about 5% of current 
NOx emissions from U.S. electric utilities. 
The economic value of such reductions, estimated using National Research Council 
estimates of values of avoided tons
107, amounts to $2.8-5.1 billion for avoided CO2 
emissions and $7-14 billion for avoided NOx emissions
108. 
Figure 72: Net present value
109 of costs and benefits from DOE standards, over the 
expected  lifetime  of  products,  measured in  Billion  of  2005US$  [Source 
LBNL] 
 
A  quantitative  analysis  of  the  energy  market  impacts  of  different  potential  energy 
efficiency policies has also been undertaken by the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA). 
                                                           
107 In particular they took between 6-11$ for a metric ton of carbon and $2,300 to $11,000 for a metric ton 
of NOx. For NOx, the LBNL research used a range of $2,300-$4,600 to account for the fact that emissions 
from power plants are less damaging than those from motor vehicles in urban areas. 
108 The estimates presented in this study are subject to a certain degree of uncertainty, arising from: (a) the 
estimation  of  the  baseline  scenarios,  (b)  the  average  efficiency  of  new  appliances,  (c)  the  impact  of 
standards on the market outcome, (d) incremental costs for consumers, and (e) the interest and discount 
rate used to determine net present values of past and future costs and benefits. Nevertheless the authors 
believe  these  results  to  be  a  reasonable  approximation  of  the  national  benefits  resulting  from  DOE’s 
appliance efficiency standards. 
109 Using a real discount rate of 7% for future costs (in line with DOE’s analysis of appliance standards) and 
an annual 3% interest rate for the past costs (average return on long-term government bonds).  
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The study compares various potential policies to a reference case where all current 
regulations remain enacted and no additional instruments are introduced. The policies 
more closely related to our analysis are described in Table 61. 
Table 61: Description of the policies analysed in the EIA study
110 
POLICY  DESCRIPTION 
Tax credit on Residential 
Equipment, 2006-2010: 
boilers 
Based on EFFECTER, homeowners receive tax credits of $50 for “Tier 1” 
appliances and $150 for “Tier 2” appliances
111. The credits apply from 2006 to 
2007 for Tier 1 appliances and from 2006 to 2010 for Tier 2 appliances.  
Tax credit on Commercial 
Equipment, 2006-2010: 
boilers 
Based on EFFECTER, businesses receive a tax deduction of $150 or $450 for “Tier 
1” equipment and $900 for “Tier 2” equipment The credits apply from 2006 to 
2007 for Tier 1 appliances and from 2006 to 2010 for Tier 2 appliances.  
The  policy  impacts  on  energy  use,  measured  in  quads  (Quadrillion  British  Thermal 
Units) with respect to the reference case, are reported in Table 62. 
Table 62: Impacts on energy use of 4 different policies analysed in the EIA study 
measured in Quadrillion British Thermal Units
110 
POLICY  2010  2015  2020  2025 
Cumulative 
2006-2025 
Residential l Equipment Tax credit  -0.011  -0.011  -0.008  -0.005  -0.166 
Commercial Equipment Tax credit  -0.005  -0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.053 
The percentage effects on energy use of these policies, with respect to the energy 
consumption projections up to 2025 of the reference case, are reported in Table 63. 
The reference case values of primary energy use by sector and by year are reported in 
Table 63. 
Table 63: Reference case values of primary energy use considered in the EIA study, 
expressed in Quadrillion British Thermal Units
112 
SECTOR 
2010  2015  2020  2025 
Cumulative 
2006-2025 
Residential  23.47  24.58  25.56  26.62  491.5 
Commercial  20.29  22.18  24.24  26.74  449.6 
 
                                                           
110 Source: Adapted from EIA 
111 Tier 1 appliances tend to be the in the middle of the range of efficiency available for that product class.   
Tier 2 appliances tend to be near the upper limit of efficiency available. 
112 Source: Adapted from 2005 Energy Policy Act  
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Table 64: Impacts on energy use of 4 different policies analysed in the EIA study, 
expressed in percentage change with respect to the reference case 





-0.05%  -0.04%  -0.03%  -0.02%  -0.03% 
Commercial Equipment 
Tax credit 
-0.025%  -0.014%  -0.008%  -0.004%  -0.012% 
Notice that these percentages are calculated against total primary energy use of the 
residential and commercial sector. 
￿  State policies 
At present, the effort to increase appliance energy efficiency is also strongly guided by 
State policies. 
The main categories in which it is possible to divide all the main initiatives are: 
·  Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Labels 
·  Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards 
·  Building  Energy  Codes  (that  might  include  requirements  for  installed 
appliances) 
·  Financial Incentives  
·  Information/Education Campaigns 
In particular, the financial incentives that have been introduced by single States can be 
further divided in the following categories: 
·  Bond Programs  
·  Corporate Tax Incentives  
·  Grant Programs  
·  Loan Programs  
·  Personal Income Tax Incentives  
·  Property Tax Incentives  
·  Rebate Programs  
·  Sales Tax Incentives  
All current financial policies by single US State initiatives are listed in the following 
tables.  These tables  report  the  main  characteristics  of  the schemes:  State,  type of 
instrument, targeted product and qualified beneficiaries. 
In particular, two States, New Mexico and Montana, have set up bond programs of 
several million dollars ($20 million in New Mexico and variable amounts depending on  
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technology in Montana) to fund energy efficiency and renewable energy improvement 
projects in State government and school buildings (Table 65). 
Table 65: Existing State Bond Programs in the US 
Bond Programs  
Montana 
State Buildings Energy Conservation 
Bond Program 
Boilers, Lighting  State buildings  
New Mexico 






Corporate tax incentives are built to give corporations tax credits or deductions to 
promote energy efficient equipment. More in detail, the two federal incentives listed in 
Table 66, are quite different:  
·  the  first  one  gives  tax  credits  to  U.S.  manufacturers  that  produce  high 
efficiency residential appliances. Credits are calculated as fixed amounts for 
each extra unit produced, varying with the type of appliance; calculations are 
made over a three-year baseline; 
·  the second tax incentive establishes a tax deduction to owners of commercial 
buildings  for  the  installation  of  certain  energy  efficient  equipment.  The 
incentive is in the form of a tax deduction of $1.80 for square foot if the energy 
saving reached are of at least 50% compared to a minimum standard building. 
Table 66: Existing State Corporate Tax Incentives in the US 
Corporate Tax Incentives  
Federal 
Energy Efficient Appliance 






Energy Efficient Commercial 





As Table 67 shows, many States offer grant programs to support the diffusion of energy 
efficient  appliances.  Many  of  these  programs  are  utility  funded  and  are  aimed  at 
helping their residential and/or commercial customers improve their overall energy 
efficiency by the installation of high standard equipment. The amount of the grant can 
either be calculated as a percentage of the cost of the installation or as a fixed amount 
for each type of appliance.  
·  For  example  the  New  York  State  program,  “Assisted  home  performance 
grants”, funds up to 50% of the cost of the improvements; giving also the 
chance to home owners to cover the remaining costs with a low-interest loan. 
·  While  the  Delaware  program  “Energy  An$wers  for  Home  Appliances”,  for 
example,  offers  $100  for  Delaware  residents  who  replace  inefficient 
refrigerators and washing machines with selected high efficiency products ($50 
for freezers and $25 for electric water heaters).  
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Table 67: Existing State Grant Programs in the US 
State  Program  Products  Eligibility 
California 
Energy Efficiency Grant 
Program 
CFL, Energy efficient equipment 
Commercial customers of 
Alameda Power & Telecom 
 
Weatherization Cash 
Grant Energy Efficiency 
Program 
CFL, Energy efficient appliances 
Residential customers of 
Alameda Power & Telecom 
 
Residential Energy 
Efficiency Grant Program 
Heating and lighting retrofits; 
Anaheim Public Utilities low-
income residential customers 
 
Business Bucks Energy 
Efficiency Grant Program 
Refrigeration, lighting and water 
heating energy-efficient retrofits 
Small and mid-sized business 




Program for State 
Facilities 
Boilers  State facilities 
 
Energy Conscious 
Blueprint Grant Program 
Lighting, Commercial 
Refrigeration, Boilers 
New commercial or industrial 
buildings 
Delaware 
State program: Energy 






State program: Energy 
An$wers for Home 
Appliances 
Refrigerators/Freezers, Lighting, 






replacement, CFL installation 




Industrial Custom Energy 
Grant Program 
Energy-efficient products which 
exceed conventional models 
Dakota Electric's customers 
 
Commercial and 
Industrial Grant Program 
Energy-efficient lighting 
Minnesota Valley Electric 
Cooperative commercial and 
industrial customers 
  Utility Grant Program   Refrigeration, lighting 
Otter Tail Power residential 
customers 
  Utility Grant Program 
Refrigerators/Freezers, Water 
Heaters, 









New Hampshire Electric Co-
Op low-Income residential 
customers  
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State  Program  Products  Eligibility 




Low-income home owners 
  State Grant Program  Refrigerators/Freezers, Lighting 
Multi-Family and Low-
Income Residents 
Ohio  State Grant Program  Lighting, Boilers, Refrigeration  Manufacturing facilities 
Oregon  Utility Grant Program  Boilers  Natural gas users 
Another policy instrument that has been used by states is that of personal income tax 
deductions or credits (Table 68).  
·  In  some  cases,  like  for  the  District  of  Colombia,  Montana  and  Oregon 
initiatives, the credit is calculated as a percentage of the expenses incurred 
with the purchase. 
·  The Californian program instead offers a tax deduction of the interest (100%) 
paid on loans used to purchase energy efficient appliances. 
·  The federal incentive has been to legislate that energy conservation subsidies 
are not taxable. 
Table 68: Existing State Personal Income Tax Incentives in the US 
Personal Income Tax Incentives  
Federal 
Exemption of Residential 
Energy Conservation Subsidy 
(non taxable) 




Tax Deduction for Interest on 
Loans for Energy Efficiency 











Installation Tax Credit 
Boilers  Taxpayers 





The  State  of  New  York  is  the  only  U.S.  state  that  has  introduced  a  property  tax 
exemption  for  energy  efficiency  measures  (Table  69).  Under  this  scheme,  energy 
efficiency  improvements  to  homes  are  exempt  from  real  property  taxation  to  the 
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Table 69: Existing State Property Tax Incentives in the US 
Property Tax Incentives 
New York 
Energy  Conservation  Improvements 
Property Tax Exemption 
Boilers    Taxpayers 
Sales tax reduction or exemptions reduce the final cost to the buyer at the time of the 
purchase. Four States have implemented this kind of instrument that exempt certain 
products from the regular tax rate (Table 70). Exemptions can be permanent or take 
the form of “tax holidays” for which the tax is lifted only for a few days in the year. 
Table 70: Existing State Sales Tax Incentives in the US 
Sales Tax Incentives 
Connecticut 
Sales and Use Tax Exemption for Energy-Efficient 
Products 
CFL, Natural gas boilers 
Georgia 
Four-Day Sales Tax Exemption for Energy-Efficient 
Products 
Clothes Washers, 
Refrigerators/Freezers, Water Heaters, 
Lighting 
Texas 
Memorial Day Weekend Sales Tax Holiday for Energy-
Efficient Products 
CFL, Clothes Washers, 
Refrigerators/Freezers 
Virginia  Sales Tax Exemptions for Energy-Efficient Products 
CFL, Clothes Washers, 
Refrigerators/Freezers 
It is not possible to list all of the existing loan and rebate programs promoted by single 
states, because there are over 800 programs. Loan programs offer low-interest loans to 
households or businesses that invest in energy efficiency improvements while rebate 
programs offer rebates on the purchase of energy efficient appliances. Many of these 
programs  are  not  promoted  by  government  agencies  but  by  utilities,  as  a  form  of 
demand side management. 
Demand-Side  Management  programs  (DMS)  can  be  enacted  by  public  utilities  and 
companies as an answer to agreements with public authorities or to the introduction of 
Energy Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS) that set efficiency and saving targets to 
the  utilities  themselves.  These  are  market  based  mechanisms  that  are  currently 
attracting interest in the U.S. and are aimed at encouraging more efficient generation, 
transmission  and  use  of  electricity  and  natural  gas.  Demand  Side  Management 
programs  can  include  individual  billing  systems,  the  provision  of  information  and 
technical assistance to customers and supplemental financial incentives to favour the 
upgrade of appliances. 
It is estimated, by the ACEEE, that a national EERS target that was to start at modest 
levels, such as savings of 0.25% of annual sales, and then increase to 0.75% would 
reduce by about one quarter the currently projected growth in electricity sales over the 
2007-2020 period and about one half of the projected growth in natural gas sales. The 
detailed results are represented in Table 71. 
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Table 71: Summary of estimated savings from a National EERS programme
113 
EFFECTS  2010  2020 
Annual electricity savings (TWh)   87  386 
Estimated peak demand savings (MW)  28,100  124,200 
Annual direct gas savings (TBtu)  355  1,570 
Total savings, all fuels (quads)  1.29  5.59 
Cumulative net benefits (billions $)  -13.7  64.0 
CO2 emissions savings from an EERS (MMT)  76  320 
Benefit/cost ratio  2.6  2.6 
Notice that a national EERS of this kind would reduce energy use in 2020 by about 5.6 
quads that are equivalent to 4.6% of the projected U.S. energy use for that year. 
Notice also that these savings are significantly greater than those generated by the 
combined energy efficiency measures of the 2005 Energy Policy Act. 
2.5.2.  ECONOMIC MODELS 
￿  Effectiveness of tax incentives and the so-called “Energy Paradox” 
It is widely accepted that the stock of household appliances is less energy efficient than 
it would be economically optimal at current prices. This has lead to the discussion 
regarding the inadequate diffusion of apparently cost-effective energy-conservation 
technologies. 
Indeed, investment tax credits that in various markets have proved to be effective tools 
for inducing investments seem to have not been so successful in the energy-efficiency 
context.  Many  empirical  studies  find  that  tax  incentives  are  not  influential  (i.e. 
coefficient  estimates  statistically  not  different  from  zero)  or  that  they  can,  even, 
decrease investments. 
Hassett and Metcalf (1995) investigate the effectiveness of tax incentives and find that 
they are statistically significant and increase the probability of investing in energy-
efficient  technology  when  accounting  for  fixed  effects.  More  precisely,  their  work 
reaches the same results as the previously cited literature when not controlling for 
individual  specific  effects  -  that  are  likely  to  be  correlated  with  some  explanatory 
variables - and opposite ones when controlling for the latter. This result is noteworthy 
because it implies that consumers do indeed respond rationally to energy-efficiency 
incentives,  so  that  both  energy  prices  and  tax-incentives  influence  consumer’s 
purchasing behaviour. 
                                                           
113 Source: 2005 ACEEE  
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The study investigates the effectiveness of tax incentives on the log odds ratio of the 
probability of investment in conservation measures in the U.S. in 1978-1985, when 
incentives were present at both the federal and single state level. The U.S. federal 
Energy  Tax  Act  of  1978  that  provided  homeowners  with  tax  credits  to  encourage 
conservation investments, such as: insulation, boiler replacements, weather stripping, 
storm  and  thermal  door/window  installation.  The  credit  covered  15  %  of  the 
expenditure with a 300$ cap and was valid only for houses built prior to 1977. Along 
with the federal tax credit - that remained the same during all the years considered in 
the study - nine states offered energy efficiency incentives. These programs are what 
provide the authors with the variation in the tax price of the conservation investments 
that allows them to evaluate the relevance of tax incentives on such investments. 
Hassett and Metcalf (1995) use an econometric model that analyses a panel dataset 
containing federal returns by taxpayers – that include details about federal residential 
tax credit claims – plus additional information on the household characteristics. The 
fraction of returns taking the credit is reported in Table 72. 
Table 72: Federal returns and fraction that took the US federal residential energy 
credit
114 
YEAR  NUMBER of RETURNS  RETURNS WITH CREDIT  % 
1978  89,772  5,843  6.51 
1979  92,694  4,775  5.15 
1980  93,902  4,670  4.97 
1981  95,396  3,870  4.06 
1982  95,337  3,136  3.29 
1983  96,321  NA  NA 
1984  99,439  NA  NA 
1985  101,660  2,979  2.93 
Mean conservation expenditure range from 257$ up to 1,202$ across states, while 
average credit received ranges from 38$ up to 156$ 
The authors use the variable “filed a tax-credit claim”/not as a proxy of the variable 
“have invested”/not in home conservation measures. 
The theoretical setting is that of an investment model with exponentially raising energy 
prices,  where  each  individual  wants  to  minimize  the  lifetime  costs  of  energy 
expenditure for a given level of heating comfort, taking into consideration any tax 
incentive that may be available. Each consumer has to choose when (if ever) to invest 
in  some  energy-saving  capital  that  will  reduce  its  future  energy  expenditure  by  a 
certain percentage. The first order conditions of this minimization problem indicate the 
threshold (for a quantity depending on the following: discount rate, a variable that 
determines  if  energy  savings  accrue  to  the  investor  or  not,  percentage  of  energy 
savings from investments, energy price at the final period, available tax incentives and 
investment amount) for which it is optimal to invest. It is not possible to measure this 
                                                           
114 Source: Hassett and Metcalf (1995)  
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quantity  directly  but  only  perturbations  of  it.  This  leads  to  the  need  of  using 
econometric techniques to estimate its real value. Actually, as the focal point is not the 
value itself but, rather, its sign, the authors set up a discrete choice model. 
The relationship of the regressors with the dependent variable is defined by the sign 
with  which  they  appear  in  the  first  order  condition.  Because  of  the  difficulty  in 
measuring  certain  parameters  (discount  rate,  a  variable  that  determines  if  energy 
savings accrue to the investor or not, percentage of energy savings from investments), 
the  regressions  actually  performed  by  the  authors include  other  variables  that  are 
likely to be a function of the former. In particular,  the new variables included are 
(certain) household characteristics. 
The innovation brought by this paper is, in fact, the inclusion of individual specific 
effects that account for conservation “taste” and unobservable characteristics of the 
housing stock that individuals choose. Such effects are likely to be correlated with the 
explanatory variables, including the tax incentive. Failing to take into account these 
effects produces an omitted variable bias that will affect the tax incentive coefficient. 
Controlling for these factors has instead shed light on some paradoxical results existing 
in literature. 
As the setting is that of a discrete choice model, the analysis does not answer the 
question on how do changes in the regressors change  the probability of making a 
conservation investment. It instead indicates by what proportion such a probability will 
change, because we are considering the ratio of the probability to invest and not invest 
(log odds ratio). 
The authors perform five different regressions on a random sample of returns for the 
years 1979-1986. The results of each regression are reported on the different columns 
of Table 73. Within this sample 5.7 of tax payers take a credit for residential energy 
conservation; their conservation expenditures and credit range between [0; 16,970]$ 
and [0; 301]$, respectively. 
Table  73:  Results  from  the  five  regressions  performed  by  Hassett  and  Metcalf 
(1995)
115 
VARIABLE  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Tax price  0.978  -2.428  -2.271  - 2.081  -2.552 
Energy price  - 5.111  11.541  26.434  0.255  10.454 
AGI (x $1000)  0.0006  0.0110  0.0109  0.792  0.0111 
Homeowner  1.508  0.948  -  0.917  0.947 
HDD  0.144  0.201  0.079  0.200  0.204 
Change in employment rate  - 0.037  - 0.017  - 0.026  - 0.016  - 0.016 
Trend  - 0.162  - 0.186  - 0.291  - 0.170  - 0.182 
Fixed effects  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sample size  74,792  12,915  8,496  12,915  12,915 
                                                           
115 Source: Adapted from Hassett and Metcalf (1995)  
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The  first  regression  is  on  the  pooled  sample.  The  dependent  variable  is  a  dummy 
variable indicating the presence/absence of a credit due to conservation expenditures. 
The  authors  find,  as  expected,  that  the  probability  of  investment  decreases  with 
unemployment and increases with income, ownership and location in colder climates. 
Nevertheless, such specification produces, in the level regression, wrong sign estimates 
of the energy price and tax-price coefficients.  
The second regression introduces fixed effects and is conditional on individuals making 
investments in at least one year (conditional logit fixed effects). With the addition the 
fixed  effects  that  control  for  specific  characteristics  the  sign  of  the  estimated 
coefficients are all coherent with what is expected. More precisely, the values of the 
tax price and energy price coefficients are –2.4 and 11.5 respectively. This means that 
for example a 10 percentage point decrease in the tax price of conservation capital will 
increase the probability of investing by 24 percent. 
The third regression restricts the sample further, to consider only homeowners. This 
leaves  the  tax-price  coefficient  essentially  unchanged  with  respect  to  the  second 
regression. 
In the fourth regression the authors include the log of the tax price, energy price and 
income  variables.  This  allows  them  to  compare  the  effectiveness  of  tax  incentives 
programs  against  energy  prices  effects.  From  theory  the  effects  of  a  10  percent 
increase in energy prices should equate those of a 10% cut in the cost of conservation 
capital. Contrary to such theoretical predictions, the coefficients of energy price and 
tax price are not similar, in absolute values. In fact, the tax price coefficient is about 
eight  times  the  size  of  the  energy  price  one.  This  indicates  that  the  energy  price 
changes are perceived as temporary. Results that go in same direction will be discussed 
with the Jaffe and Stavins (1995) paper. 
The final regression tests if the tax-price effect is a spurious result. It does this by 
including  in  the  model  a  dummy  variable  that  indicates  if  the  state  had  a  credit 
program the following year or not. The estimate of the future tax variable is positive, 
though statistically not significant. Therefore, tax timing is not driving the result of this 
analysis that indicates that indeed tax incentives can increase the probability at the 
margin of making conservation investments. 
 
Jaffe and Stavins (1995) empirically address the long-standing debate on the most 
effective policy instruments, comparing market-based approaches with command-and-
control ones. In the literature, economists favour market-based mechanisms (emission 
taxes, subsidies and tradable permits), in particular, for their capability of stimulating 
only the most cost-effective actions and because of their dynamic efficiency, i.e. the 
fact  that  they  generate  a  continuous  incentive  to  improve  performances.  On  the 
contrary, command-and-control approaches, such as standards, tend to drive emission 
reductions to the level required – at whatever cost is necessary- and not stimulate any 
further improvement. Although the economic argument is quite clear and generally 
accepted, policy-makers often prefer command-and-control regulations. This supports 
the need for analyses that compare the effectiveness of alternative policy instruments 
in addressing energy efficiency goals. 
In  their  paper,  Jaffe  and  Stavins  make  the  comparison  between  market-based 
mechanisms with performance and technological standards by analysing their relative 
cost-effectiveness and dynamic efficiency.  
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The theoretical setting is based on two models. The first is a pollution-abatement-
technology choice problem with a firm having to choose both whether or not and 
when to adopt an already available environmental protection technology. The model is 
based on an optimization problem where the firm chooses the time of adoption in 
order to minimize the sum of the present discounted values of: 
·  regular variable costs prior to adoption plus any pollution tax payment; 
·  variable  costs  subsequent  to  technology  adoptions  plus  any  pollution  tax 
payment; 
·  costs of adoption; 
·  implicit costs of violating any performance or technology standard prior and 
subsequent to adoption. 
The  introduction  in  the  model  of  the  costs of  violating  the  two  types of  standard 
provides  the  means  to  compare  such  quantity  instruments  with  price  ones
116.  The 
second  model  focuses  on  new  sources  of  emissions:  new  plants  or  expansions  of 
existing facilities
117. The setting is now of an optimisation model where the firm only 
chooses if to incorporate the already available environmental protection technology. 
For  data  availability  reasons,  the  authors  apply  this  second  model  to  real  data 
regarding thermal insulation decisions by builders in the presence of varying economic 
incentives and command-and-control regulations. In this context, the firm not only has 
to decide whether or not to incorporate the technology, but also its level of efficiency. 
The timeframe considered is that of the 1970’s -80’s
118; during this period the large oil 
price fluctuations generate, according to the authors, a “natural experiment”. Indeed, 
the increase in oil prices gave rise to a variety of regulatory efforts aimed at reducing 
energy consumption. The higher energy cost generated also economic incentives for 
conservation that diminished when oil prices dropped. This setting allows the authors 
to analyse the use of energy-saving practices across geographic areas and time wise. 
Indeed, citizen’s responses to these “natural” variations in costs can be used to infer 
the likely response to economic incentives set up by governments. 
More precisely, the study focuses on thermal insulation measures for ceilings, walls or 
floors of newly constructed single-family homes. The authors use the available real 
data to estimate the dependency of the prevailing level of efficiency in each jurisdiction 
on: 
·  costs of adoption; 
·  previous period prevailing state efficiency level; 
·  lagged average price of energy; 
·  presence of relevant mandatory building provisions; 
·  presence of relevant voluntary heating building provisions; 
                                                           
116 Note that the probability of a sanction being imposed is modelled as a function of the level of excess 
pollutant emissions.  
117 The first model is suitable for already operating facilities as it splits the optimization problem in the two 
intervals before and after T (time of adoption). 
118 More precisely, the National Association of Home Builders’ annual survey between 1979 and 1988, for 48 
states.  
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·  heating degree days; 
·  cooling degree days; 
·  mean education of heads of households; 
·  fraction of state population resident in urban areas; 
·  median household income. 
The results are reported in Table 74. 
Table 74: Estimated values of the partial effects of each independent variable of the 
model on the average value of the prevailing efficiency practice for the 
year 1979
119 
VARIABLE  Ceilings  Walls  Floors 
Adoption costs  -10.08  -10.77  -25.15 
Energy price  6.74  5.14  11.00 
lagged 
efficiency 
0.302  0.391  0.428 
Mandatory 
code 
0.925  -0.450  -1.433 
Voluntary code  -0.409  -0.560  -0.835 
Heating DD  23.895  - 3.89  7.939 
HDD
2  -1.013  0.521  -0.129 
Cooling DD  -11.95  -9.90  7.24 
CDD
2  1.17  0.859  - 0.316 
Education  123.44  41.87  134.02 
Percentage 
Urban 
-2.97  0.281  1.35 
Income  -18.23  -9.208  -29.45 
The authors find that the adoption cost coefficients have, as expected, a negative sign 
and have large magnitude in all three cases. Also energy price coefficients show the 
expected (positive) sign, but they are lower than the coefficients relative to the costs 
for installing the technology, as in Hassett and Metcalf (1995). The lagged prevailing-
state-efficiency  level  is  generally  significant  but  with  small  magnitude  coefficient. 
Interestingly, the building code variable coefficients are consistently not significant. 
This means that there is no evidence, among the used data, that building standards 
have any effect on average state-efficiency levels. Also the climate variables are found 
to be not statistically significant; while income and education are, with a positive and 
negative sign, respectively. 
The estimated coefficients are then used to perform dynamic simulations of the model 
using variations of the present values of the energy price and adoption cost regressors. 
                                                           
119 Source: Jaffe and Stavins (1995)  
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In this way, the authors aim at comparing the effects of taxes versus subsidies. More 
precisely, they are able to compare the effects of a tax on energy with a technology 
subsidy  that  decreases  adoption  costs.  The  results  are  reported  in  Table  75.  The 
simulations are performed on all three datasets - regarding ceilings, walls, and floors 
respectively - and compare the effectiveness of a 10% tax on energy in all years (energy 
tax case) with a 10% subsidy on the cost of adoption in all years (cost subsidy case). 
The values reported are the national average level of efficiency practice in the initial 
and final year of the study for the three cases: base case (values at time of study), 
energy tax case and cost subsidy case. 
Table  75:  Simulation  results:  effects  of  energy  prices  (tax)  and  adoption  costs 
(technology subsidy)
120 




















1979  24.7  24.7  24.7  12.2  12.2  12.2  14.4  14.4  14.4 
1988  29.3  30.0  30.4  14.2  14.7  15.3  18.3  19.4  21.1 
(%) 
increase 
18.6%  21.5%  23.1%  16.4%  20.5%  25.4%  27.1%  34.7%  46.5% 
The most interesting simulation to comment is that of floors. In this simulation, the 
average level of efficiency went from 14.4 to 18.3 between 1979 (initial year) and 1988 
(end of period); the model simulation suggests that the efficiency level that would have 
been reached in 1988 with an energy tax and with a technology subsidy would have 
been 19.4 and 21.1 respectively. This indicates that a 10% energy price increase due to 
a tax, in place throughout the period, would have increased adoption in 1988 by 6% 
relative to the base case, while a 10% decrease in adoption cost due to a subsidy, in 
place throughout the period, would have increased adoption in 1988 by about 15%
121. 
Therefore the authors find that, for what concerns floors, both tax and subsidies are 
important  incentives  for  conservation  technology  adoption;  but  that  the  effects  of 
technology costs are nearly three times as large as the energy price ones. This is an 
interesting result because economic theory would instead predict such effects to be of 
the same magnitude. Similar results are found in Hassett and Metcalf (1995) and, as 
indicated  by  the  authors,  they  are  in  line  with  conventional  beliefs  among  non-
economists. 
The other two simulations - ceilings and walls - confirm the stronger effects of the 
subsidy with respect to the tax, but these policies are not as effective on conservation 
decisions as in the floor insulation case, nor are the difference in the size of the effects 
of the two policies as large.  
                                                           
120 Source: Jaffe and Stavins (1995) 
121 The value reported by the author in the original paper is 17%, this though is calculated disreguarding the 
decimal figures of the simulated effects of taxes and subsidies on adoption reported in Table 75. The 
values reported in this work are instead evaluated using the available extra decimal figure.  
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Table 76 indicates the additional percentage increases due to the two policies with 
respect  to  the  base  case;  while  Table  77  the  percentage  increase  in  technology 
adoption due to cost subsidies with respect to the energy tax case. 
Table  76:  Simulation  results:  percentage  increase  in  technology  adoption  due  to 
energy tax and cost subsidy with respect to the base case
122 
Ceilings  Walls  Floors 
ENERGY TAX  COST SUBSIDY  ENERGY TAX  COST SUBSIDY  ENERGY TAX  COST SUBSIDY 
2.4%  3.7%  3.5%  7.7%  6.0%  15.3 
Table 77: Simulation results: percentage increase in technology adoption due to cost 
subsidies with respect to the energy tax case
122 
Ceilings  Walls  Floors 
1.3%  4.0%  8.8% 
These results indicate that both kind of market-based policies are effective. Because of 
the  stronger  effects  ascribed  to  subsidies,  the  model  simulation  results  seem  to 
indicate that consumers are more concerned with initial costs than with energy savings 
over the life of the investment. Though, it must be specified that in this model relevant 
parameters - such as consumer discount rates and the parameter that accounts for the 
market failure to reflect the full value of the investments - affect only the intercept 
term and not the regressor’s coefficients. 
￿  Evidence on the Rebound effect 
The  literature  highlights  that  the  potential  reductions  in  energy  use  that  can  be 
induced by energy efficiency improvements may be deflated by the so-called “rebound 
effect”.  
This effect refers to the fact that an increase in energy efficiency, due to technological 
improvements, can generate an increase energy demand because more services can be 
obtained using the same quantity of energy. This effect can be regarded as analogous 
to a reduction in price that produces an increase in demand that, from our point of 
view,  could  erode  the  technological  efficiency  savings.  It must  be  noticed  that  the 
effects of price reduction on consumers are not completely transformed in an increase 
of the good’s demand but can be decomposed in two components:  
·  a substitution effect: whereby consumption of the now cheaper energy service 
substitutes for the consumption of other goods and services, keeping utility 
constant. 
·  an income effect: whereby there is an increase in real income that allows an 
increased consumption of all goods and services, leading to a higher level of 
utility. 
                                                           
122 Calculated using Jaffe and Stavins (1995) results  
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Especially for the case analysed in this report, concerning four appliances, consumer 
satiation issues are expected to be relevant. Although there are no specific studies 
dedicated to the analysis of the income effect, we can expect that a decrease in the 
price of services will not result in an indefinite increase in the number of appliances of 
the same type, but more likely in a certain increase of consumption of appliances 
attributes, i.e. bigger appliances. 
It  is  therefore very  important  to consider the  rebound  effect  when evaluating  the 
potentials of any policy aimed at increasing energy efficiency. 
Greening, Greene and Difiglio (2000) study the relationship between energy efficiency 
and  consumption.  The  authors  have  analysed  over  75  literature  estimates  of  the 
rebound  effect  that  derive  from  direct  measurements  (surveys)  or  econometric 
studies. They found that although estimates vary, all studies report that for all end-uses 
taken  into  consideration  (space-heating,  space  cooling,  water  heating,  residential 
lighting,  appliances  and  automotive  transport)  a  1%  increase  in  energy  efficiency 
produces  a  lower  than  unit  increase  in  energy  consumption.  Detailed  results  are 
reported in the Table 78. 
Table 78: Empirical estimates for the rebound effect at the consumer level for a 100% 








Space heating  10-30% 
These measures don’t include space cooling which is 
best  for  our  analysis  that  takes  into  consideration 





Increased  shower  lengths  or  purchase  of  bigger 






An indirect effect on increase in working hours was 
reported. 
4 
Appliances  0% 
Indirect effects in terms of purchase of larger units 
with more features were reported. 
2 
Conditional demand surveys have shown that residential space heating is responsible 
for about 53% of household fuel (electricity and natural gas) use. This implies that any 
rebound effect on this kind of energy use can be significant.  
Table 78 shows that, for space heating, the rebound effect is estimated between 10 
and 30% of the total increase in energy efficiency. This means that any improvement in 
energy efficiency will be effective at 70 to 90% of its potential. 
Efficiency improvements for residential hot water heating will be effective between 60-
90% in reducing energy consumption, while lighting upgrades will be 88-95% effective. 
From this review of various studies it seems that the rebound effect for appliances 
such as refrigerators and washing machines is irrelevant, so policies targeting such 
products are expected to be 100% effective. 
                                                           
123 Source: Adapted from Greening, Greene and Difiglio, 2000.  
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The  UK  Energy  Research  Centre  (UKERC)  has  recently  published  a  report  on  the 
rebound effect, whose aim is that of extending the literature review of Greening et al. 
and also of placing greater emphasis on indirect rebound and economy-wide effects. 
The  report,  in  fact,  distinguishes  between  direct  and  indirect  rebound  effects.  In 
addition to the already defined matter - i.e. that many energy efficiency policies may 
not  be  as  effective  as  calculated  by  engineering  models  due  to  the  fact  energy 
efficiency  improvements  make  energy  services  cheaper  and  therefore  stimulate 
consumption  -  (direct  rebound  effect),  there  are  other  reasons  for  which  the 
effectiveness of energy efficiency improvements might be smaller than predicted, even 
if consumption of energy services remains the same (indirect rebound effect). 
The indirect rebound effects reported in the paper are the following: 
·  The equipment used to improve energy efficiency will itself require energy to 
manufacture and install and this “embodied” energy consumption will offset 
some of the energy savings achieved; 
·  Consumers may use the cost savings from energy efficiency improvements to 
purchase other energy-intensive goods and services; 
·  Producers may use the cost savings from energy efficiency improvements to 
increase  output,  thereby  increasing  consumption  of  capital,  labour  and 
materials inputs which themselves require energy to provide. If the energy 
efficiency improvements are sector wide, they may lead to lower; 
·  Cost-effective  energy  efficiency  improvements  will  increase  the  overall 
productivity  of  the  economy,  thereby  encouraging  economic  growth.  The 
increased  consumption  of  goods  and  services  may  in  turn  drive  up  energy 
consumption.  
·  Large-scale  reductions  in  energy  demand  may  translate  into  lower  energy 
prices which will encourage energy consumption to increase. The reduction in 
energy prices will also increase real income, thereby encouraging investment 
and generating an extra stimulus to aggregate output and energy use.  
·  Both  the  energy  efficiency  improvements  and  the  associated  reductions  in 
energy prices will reduce the price of energy intensive goods and services to a 
greater  extent  than  non-energy  intensive  goods  and  services,  thereby 
encouraging consumer demand to shift towards the former.  
Taking into account quantitatively all these economy-wide issues is a complex matter 
and different studies may use different definitions of rebound effects and also of the 
notion  of  energy  efficiency  improvements;  this  has  led  to  vary  sparse  empirical 
evidence that is currently sustaining the strong dispute over the importance of the 
rebound effects. This uncertainty over the relevance of such effects has been often 
translated into the exclusion of the rebound effect matter in official policy analysis, but 
this UKERC report shows that its effects are sufficiently important to merit explicit 
treatment when assessing the contribution that energy efficiency improvements can 
make to the reduction of energy consumption and CO2 emissions.  
More in detail, the report produces the following results: 
·  When analysing rebound effect evaluation studies, that aim at measuring the 
change in the demand for the targeted energy service, evidence of a shortfall  
December 2008 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote 
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
145 
 
in  energy  savings  by  space  heating  efficiency  measures  is  found.  The 
magnitude of the effect varies across studies but ranges between 10% and 50% 
of  the  expected  energy  savings.  A  positive  temperature  take-back  was 
observed in most studies, on average between 0.4-0.8°C, though not always 
statistically significant. The author, reasoning on the fact that energy savings 
may be overestimated up to 50% and that temperature take back only account 
for  a  portion  of  the  shortfall,  concludes  that  the  rebound  effect  for  space 
heating efficiency improvements should typically be less than 30%. 
·  When analysing rebound effect econometric studies, the author reports that 
the  meta-analytical  work  of  Espey  and  Espey  suggests  an  upper  bound  of 
rebound effect for household electricity services in the short and long run of 
20-35% and 80-85%, respectively. 
·  More specifically, the results of studies that use data on energy efficiency (or 
capital cost) of household appliances estimate the direct rebound effect for 
household heating between 10-58% in the short run and 1.4 to 60% in the long 
run. The author concludes that a reasonable figure is again 30%. For household 
cooling the estimates range between 1-26%, while for water heating estimates 
are 34-38%. The details of some of the studies that explicitly target appliances 
have been summarised in Table. 
·  For what concerns secondary effects from energy efficiency improvements in 
consumer  technology,  a  number  of  analysts  have  claimed  that  they  are 
relatively  small  because  energy  constitutes  a  small  part  of  consumer 
expenditure and because the energy content of most other consumer goods 
and services is low. This though is in contrast with other quantitative studies 
that consider a broader range of effects in addition to that of reducing energy 
expenditure. 
CGE models seem to find high values of high values of rebound effects (all studies > 
37% and most studies >50%) or even backfire effects. These results depend on a wide 
range  of  variables,  such  as  elasticities  of  substitution  between  inputs,  or  between 
capital and labour, own price or income elasticities, and other factors. 
The author states repeatedly that these results are not very reliable, as they come from 
different studies that have different methods, scope and methodological quality, and 
therefore the only conclusion that can be made relates to a “best-guess” on the value 
of the rebound effect. The final conclusion of the UKERC is that the rebound effect is 
significant,  although  not  enough  to  make  energy  efficiency  policies  ineffective  in 
reducing energy demand. Quantitatively, the direct rebound effect is unlikely to exceed 
30%, while  it  is  difficult  to  give estimates of  the  indirect  rebound  effect,  although 
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Figure 73: Empirical estimates for the rebound effect at the consumer level for a 
100% increase in energy efficiency. 
Study  Data  Direct Rebound Effect  Specifications 
Hseuch  and 
Gerner (1993) 
appliances – 1281 US households 
58% (gas heated homes)         
35% (electrically heated 
homes)  
Short-run R.E. 
Klein (1988)  capital cost equipment – 2000+ US household  25-29%   Short-run R.E. 
Guertin  et  al. 
(2003) 
Energy efficiency appliances – 440 Canadian 
households 
29-47%   Long-run R.E. 
Source: UKERC (2007) 
￿  Consumer discount rates in energy efficiency decisions 
In order to evaluate the potential impact of policy measures aimed at promoting the 
purchase of energy efficient appliances, it is important to study consumer’s discount 
rates relative to these appliances.  
This discount rate is a measure of how much consumers discount the saving from less 
energy use against the higher costs of a consumer durable that uses energy. If the 
discount rate is high, they will tend to buy the cheaper, less energy efficient, item, 
whereas if the discount rate is low they will tend to go for the more energy efficient 
item. Hence this parameter is important in determining the effects of any policy to 
subsidize energy efficient durables.  
Train (1985) analysed several studies present in the literature, regarding consumer 
discount rates for space heating systems, refrigerators and water heaters and other 
appliances. Various authors have used different methods to estimate these discount 
rates, such as: 
·  Logit/Probit Models: these are econometric models that describe consumer 
choices. These models  aim  at  calculating  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for 
reduced energy costs observing their choices. The consumer is assumed to be 
choosing  among  several  alternatives  and  the  desirability  of  each  good  is 
assumed to be related to the capital and operating costs of each alternative; 
·  Stated preference models: these models are based on surveys that ask direct 
questions to consumers and discount rates are calculated from the answers; 
·  Observed points along a continuum: these models infer implicit discount rates 
observing  which  investments  consumers  make,  among  the  broad  range  of 
available choices; 
·  Ranges for discount rates: these methods compare nearly identical models of 
the same appliance that only differ in energy efficiency and price. From sales 
data they estimate consumers’ average discount rate; 
·  Hedonic price analysis: these models are constructed on the assumption that 
consumer’s  willingness  to  pay  (WTP)  for  a  certain  good  depends  on  its 
attributes.  Hedonic  price  analysis  models  estimate  consumers’  WTP  by 
regressing the sales prices of the goods against the consumer’s valuation of the 
attributes of such goods.  
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The results and the characteristics of each study are reported in Table 79, divided by 
type of product. Notice that refrigerators have the highest values of discount rate; the 
author justifies this peculiarity with the fact that it is difficult for consumers to detect 
differences in energy uses among different models of refrigerators. 
An interesting result is that of McRae (1980) that in his stated preference study asked 
respondents: “Suppose you were buying a new refrigerator and could get one that cost 
$100 more but saved on electricity bills. How much would you have to save per month 
to spend the extra $100 for the refrigerator? The savings require to induce this extra 
$100 are reported in Table 80. 
Table 79: Consumer discount rates in choice of energy efficient appliances
124 
Author  Estimated average discount rate  Estimation model 
Space heating system 
Goett (1978)  36 %  Logit 
Dubin   2 - 10 %  Logit 
Goett and McFadden (1982)  6.5 - 16 %  Logit 
Goett (1983)  4.4 % with central air conditioning  Logit 
  21% without central air conditioning  Logit 




Lin, Hirst, and Cohn   7 - 31 %  Logit 
Refrigerators 
Cole and Fuller  6 l - 108 % 
Continuum  of  efficiency 
levels and prices 
Gately  45 - 300 %,  Ranger for discount rates 
Meier and Whittier  34 -58 % depending on region  Ranger for discount rates 
McRae  53 %  Stated preferences 
Water heating and other appliances 
Goett (1983)  36 %  Logit 
Dubin   24 %  Logit 
                                                           
124 Source: Train, 1985.  
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Author  Estimated average discount rate  Estimation model 
Goett and McFadden (1982)  67 %  Logit 





Lin, Hirst, and Cohn  23.5 %  Logit 
Table  80:  Required  savings  to  induce  a  $100  investment  when  purchasing  a 




Implicit discount rate  Proportion of respondents 
1  12 %  0.045 
2  24 %  0.485 
3  36 %  0.061 
4  48 %  0.152 
5  60 %  0.136 
6+  72 %  0.121 
Other interesting studies have investigated consumer’s discount rates for energy-cost 
savings  without  specifying  the  measure  that  could  produce  them.  This  has  been 
achieved by asking for example: “how much would you be willing to pay in order to 
reduce your annual heating bills by $20?” Table 81 reports the results. 







McRae  16.67 %  Stated preferences 
Houston  22.5 %  Stated preferences 
Johnson  3.7 %  Hedonic price analysis 
To summarise, consumers’ average discount rates for the purchase of efficient models 
of energy using appliances are reported in Table 82. 
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Table 82: Average consumers discount rate for energy efficient appliance purchase 
Appliance  Average consumer discount rate 
Space heating system  4.4 – 36 % 
Refrigerators  39 – 100 % 
Water heaters  18 – 67 % 
Unspecified actions  3.7 – 22.5 % 
The  authors  of  the  various  studies  have  also  analysed  the  relationship  between 
discount rates and socioeconomic characteristics, finding that income is a significant 
explanatory variable. In particular, lower income households are not always able to 
invest  in  energy  efficient  measures  even  when  the  return  on  the  investment  is 
perceived, because of liquid capital restrictions. This makes the role of incentives and, 
in particular, of subsidies crucial. 
Education and age have not been found to be statistically significant as explanatory 
variables,  while  ownership  status  has  an  ambiguous  effect:  with  more  structural 
improvements owners are found, as it would be expected, to have lower discount rates 
than renters; while with appliances such as fridges discount rates are similar. 
All above studies date back to the 1980’s; their results might, therefore, not precisely 
approximate current discount rates, but could constitute a good baseline against which 
evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  consumer  sensitisation  measures  toward  appliance 
energy efficiency. This is reasonable if it is possible to assume that preferences over 
other (non-energy efficient related) attributes have remained similar. Energy efficiency 
information campaigns and labelling programs to promote energy efficiency measures 
among consumers were, in fact, introduced later on. 
￿  Price-Elasticities of Demand for Energy  
Mark  A.  Bernstein  and  James  Griffin  (2005)  investigate  the  relationship  between 
energy demand and energy prices in the United States. In particular they are interested 
in finding if there are regional differences. This is an important issue when you have to 
compare performances and cost-effectiveness of different policies in different regions. 
The authors analyse three energy demand components: 
·  Electricity use in the residential sector; 
·  Electricity use in the commercial sector; 
·  Natural gas use in the residential sector. 
They find that the relationship between energy price and energy demand is small, that 
means that demand is relatively inelastic to price. 
In addition, their study shows that demand price elasticity in the U.S. has not changed 
significantly  over  the  past  20  years.  This  result  is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that 
consumers do not have many alternative options available. The authors notice that in 
the  past  few  years,  in  which  energy  prices  have  risen  briskly,  there  are  signs  of a  
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slowdown in demand growth. They ascribe this trend to the increasing prices but also 
to economic slowdown. 
Short-run and long-run price elasticities of demand for energy, at the national level, are 
reported in Table 83. 
Table 83: Short-run and long-run price elasticity of demand for energy in the U.S., at 
the national level
126 
  Residential electricity  Commercial electricity  Residential natural gas 
Short-run elasticity  -0.24  -0.21  -0.12 
Long-run elasticity  -0.32  -0.97  -0.36 




Figure 75: Estimates of short-run elasticity in electricity intensity in the commercial 
sector for each state (1977-1999)
126 
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Figure 76: Estimates of short-run residential price elasticity for natural gas at the 
state level (1977-2004) 
 
The results, reported in Figure 74 to Figure 76, show that indeed there are regional and 
state differences in price demand relationship; and it is therefore important to value 
impacts of policies at a disaggregate level, in particular for residential electricity use. 
A  detailed  list  of  all  short-run  and  long-run  price  elasticity  for  each  State  and  its 
variance  are  reported  in  the  original  paper,  available  at 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/index3.html 
Economists  have  also  attempted  to  analyse  the  determinants  of  consumers’  price 
elasticity.  Research  has  been  carried out  following  different models  and measures. 
Tellis (1998) conducted the first important meta-analysis that analyses and summarises 
the econometric studies on price sensitivity of demand up to 1986. The work is based 
on 367 price elasticities published between 1961 and 1986. Major findings are that: 
·  price elasticity is significantly negative; 
·  the distribution of the price elasticity estimates is very peaked ( –1.76 mean 
and –1.5 mode); 
·  the absolute mean value of price elasticity found is eight times larger than 
what  literature  indicates  as  the  advertising  elasticity,  indicating  a  high 
sensitivity of markets to advertising; 
·  the omission of quality from the models positively biases price elasticity;  
·  there is greater sensitivity to prices in the latter stages of the product’s life 
cycle; 
·  price elasticities are found to be homogeneous across some research settings, 
such  as  data  sources,  functional  forms,  number  of  observations  and 
parameters; but model specifications can bias the values. The type of dataset, 
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More  recently  Bijmolt,  Van  Heerde  and  Pieters  (2005)  have  built  on  this  work  to 
update and extend its findings. They have conducted a new meta-analysis to examine 
which extrapolations still hold and which need to be revised.  
This  work  is  based  on  1851  values  of  price  elasticity  taken  from  81  different 
publications, dating from 1961 to 2004. The overall mean from these studies is -2.62, 
with a 2.21 standard deviation. The median is –2.22 and the distribution, reported in 
Figure 77, is strongly peaked. 50% of observations lay between the values [-3; -1], and 
81% between [-4; 0]. The mean value confirms the negative sign of price elasticity but 
is quite higher than the average value found by Tellis, that was -1.76. 
Figure 77: Frequency distribution of observed price elasticities
127 
 
Price  elasticities  are  modelled  as  a  linear  function  of  their  determinants  and 
estimations are performed with iterative generalized least squares. The factors that 
may affect the estimated value of price elasticity considered in the study are reported 
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Figure 78: Factors influencing observed price elasticity
128 
 
For what concerns the analysis of the determinants of price elasticity, i.e. the factors 
that systematically affect the estimate, some results are similar to those of Tellis (1988) 
while others are quite different. In particular, the authors find that: 
·  Consumers are more price elastic for durables than for other products; 
·  price elasticities are homogeneous across data sources and functional forms; 
·  no  significant  differences  in  price  elasticities  are  found  between  models 
including  or  excluding  quality,  nor  across  countries,  levels  of  temporal 
aggregation or estimation models; 
·  price elasticity is higher in the initial stages of the life cycle of the product, i.e. 
at  the  time  of  introduction  into  the  market.  This  would  suggest  that 
penetration pricing strategies (from low to high) are more effective than a 
skimming price strategy (high to low); 
·  no significant income effect, contrary to what might be expected; 
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·  inflation leads to higher price elasticity, probably because consumers become 
more aware and sensitive to price changes; 
·  price elasticities are stronger if endogeneity issues are considered; 
·  omitted variable are also a source of correlation between price and the error 
term that leads to biased results. Omitting advertising and sales promotions 
from the predictors decreases the estimated value of price elasticity; 
·  promotional-price elasticity is larger, in absolute values, than the actual price 
elasticity; 
·  no significant overall trend in the price elasticity across the data sample period. 
Sales elasticities in the last forty years have increased significantly, while share 
and choice elasticities have remained fairly constant. 
The authors explain the differences from Tellis (1988) findings as being driven by the 
considerable changes in the relative frequency of the various determinants level that 
has occurred, more than by methodological differences. 
 
Green Marketing 
An  interesting  study  on  green  marketing  strategies  and  product  design  has  been 
conducted  by  Ab  Stevels  at  Delft  University  of  Technology.  This  study  analyses 
consumer behaviour in the field of consumer electronics and finds new strategies to 
promote “green appliances” that could be also applied for the household appliances 
considered in this review. 
Eco-design was introduced in the early nineties, but it was mainly a defensive measure 
and aimed at compliance with laws and regulations. It was only later that firms realised 
that many environmental measures could create significant cost savings and also raise 
their environmental profile. However, the latter effect has been relatively unsuccessful 
in changing consumer decisions. Analyses of consumer behaviour indicate that about 
25% of consumers are sensitive to the green performance of products, even though 
interviews show higher levels of environmental awareness. This situation motivated 
the author to carry out a more in depth analysis of consumers green behaviour. This 
has lead to the definition of the seven archetypes of consumers reported in Table 84. 
Table 84: Environmental attitude archetypes
129 
ARCHETYPES  CHARACTERISTICS 




Strong  interest  in  environmental  issues;  has  adapted  its  lifestyle. 
Strong  support  for  green  organizations,  little  trust  in  governments 
and technology. This group has strong information needs, is prepared 
more for green but will not buy from big multinationals. 
15 
Environmental optimist 
Interest  in  environmental  issues  but  more  positive  about  future 
solutions than EE group; high trust in governments and technology. 
Their education and income level is clearly above average. 
15 
Disorientated consumer  Recognizes that there is an environmental problem but is not capable 
of  handling  it.  There  is  both  ‘fear’  and  trust  in  government  and 
13 
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ARCHETYPES  CHARACTERISTICS 
AVERAGE % in NORTH 
EUROPE 
technology. Below average education and income. Information needs 




Neutrality towards environmental issues; "Yes, there are green issues 
but  stakeholders  like  governments,  industry  and  scientific  world 




Doubt  strongly  then  effectiveness  of  environmental  programs, 
although they have a more positive attitude “In the end we will be all 
swamped by the population increase" 
15 
Growth optimist 
Basic  negative  attitude  towards  environment;  advocate  that 
economic  growth  is  necessary  to  pay  for  environmental  measures 
and  reproach  environmental  proponents  that  they  want  to  block 
growth and go “back to pre-industrialization";   
10 
Enjoy life 
Deny  environmental  problems  :  “if  there  is  a  problem  will  be  in 
future, however each generation has to solve its own problems’ 
17 
Analysing and comparing these attitudes the author concludes that “there is sympathy 
for green”, but that environmental issues alone play a minor role in buying decisions. In 
fact,  often  “green”  products  are  perceived  to  be  more  expensive  and/or  less 
performing.  
The main contribution of this paper is the suggestion to link environmental benefits to 
other  benefits  that  directly  affect  the  consumer.  These  can  be  divided  into  three 
categories (Table 85). 
Table 85: Types of consumer benefits
130 
TYPE OF BENEFIT  EXAMPLES 
Material benefits  as lower price or lower cost of ownership; 
Emotional benefits  feeling good, quality of life and reduced fear for environmental disasters. 
Immaterial benefits  Convenience, simplicity and fun; 
This  suggestion  has  been  applied  by  Philips  Consumer  Electronics.  In  this  trial,  the 
environmental attributes of products have been split into five focal areas: 
·  Energy Consumption; 
·  Materials application; 
·  Packaging and transport; 
·  Chemical content; 
·  Durability and recyclability.  
These attributes have been coupled with the direct benefits to the consumer listed in 
Table 85. The results are reported in Table 86 and show that the linkage suggested by 
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Stevels (2000) makes the majority of buyers interested. In this way, environmental 
attributes can be considered a positive force for marketing.  
Table 86: Link between environmental effects and consumer benefits for the five 
focal areas
131 
ATTRIBUTE  ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECT  CONSUMER BENEFIT  % of BUYERS ATTRACTED 
Energy 
Consumption 









Less resources, less emissions  Immaterial = convenient  75 




Emotion-al = quality, feel 
good 
75 
The principles that should be followed during the product creation process, suggested 
in the paper, are: 
·  Eco-design should not only bring benefits for the environment but also for the 
consumer; 
·  Customers  benefits  should  be  a  mix of material,  immaterial  and emotional 
benefits; 
·  The benefit issue has to be addressed during the idea generating phase, i.e. at 
the very beginning; 
·  Benefits are perceived by consumers on a relative scale, i.e. comparing with 
the competition. 
Following the papers findings now Philips Consumer Electronics considers the following 
five issues when designing its products: 
·  Environmental benefits; 
·  Business benefits; 
·  Customer benefits; 
·  Societal benefits; 
·  Technical and financial feasibility. 
Although  it  is  difficult  to  separate  the  market  effects  of  the  consumer  and 
environmental  benefits,  a  preliminary  analysis  indicates  that  margins  for  green 
products are about 3% higher than other products. 
 
In a subsequent paper Stevels, Agema and Hoedemaker investigate the role of gender 
and the role of trade by sales staff in the sales process.  
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In the last years, the segmentation of consumer electronics purchasers has changed 
and, in particular, women are taking a more active role in such buying decisions. Up to 
the mid nineties, in Europe, men accounted for 70% of buying decisions, 20% were 
taken jointly and only 10% by women alone. More recently men account for 50%, 
partner decisions for 25% and women for 25% of the purchasing decisions. Because of 
differences in the on average tastes – for example, women on average attach more 
value to environmental attributes than men – these percentage changes influence the 
product mix that should to be supplied and, in particular, it offers more opportunities 
to increase the sale of green products and therefore encourage the development of 
green attributes. 
The paper focuses on Audio products and confirms that there is indeed a difference in 
the ranking of product aspects with respect to the average consumer. 
The authors also find that sales staff has an important influence on buying decisions: 
approximately on 50% of the purchases. This figure may increase up to 80% when 
considering low price goods. The research shows that for expensive items a higher 
percentage of people (about 50%) make the purchasing decision before going to the 
retailer, by means of outside information.  
The  authors  find  that  price,  reliability/durability/quality  are  the  most  important 
attributes that can be linked with the environmental issues. 
Although the case study reported in the paper focuses on audio products, it is still 
interesting to report the ranking of the environmental aspects that interest consumers 
the most, according to sales staff
132. This is reported in Table 87.  
Table 87: Relative importance of environmental aspects according to sales staff
133 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECT   % of sales staff that included such aspect 
Energy Consumption  100 
Hazardous substances  53 
Material application  37 
Recyclability  23 
Life cycle impact   37 
Packaging  30 
The authors continue their analysis and propose a market-based criterion for firms to 
evaluate  and  prioritise  possible  environmental  design  improvements  of  their 
appliances.  This  criterion  is  very  subjective  and  the  application  relates  to  audio 
products, but the suggestion is that eco-design should focus more on energy efficiency. 
                                                           
132 More precisely, the question to the sales staff was on the environmental aspects that consumer inquire 
about. 
133 Source: Stevels, Agema and Hoedemaker  
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2.5.3.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There are hundreds of measures in place to promote energy efficiency in the US. Not 
all have been analysed but quite a lot has been done to look at various aspects of the 
policies that exist. The research follows into two camps: the first that directly assesses 
the energy efficiency gains of adopting stricter energy standards and that looks at 
some tax incentives at the individual item level; and the second that evaluates and 
compares  the  impacts  of  energy  prices,  tax  mechanisms  and  other  incentives  by 
studying the impacts they have on various parameters that determine the demand for 
energy.  
The first set – loosely referred to as engineering studies – focus mostly on standards. 
They  provide  estimates  of  savings  that  have  been  or  can  be  achieved  from  the 
adoptions of stricter standards for boilers, home appliances, light bulbs etc.; as well as 
the  savings  from  tax  exemptions  and  tax  credits  related  to  these  items.  Since  the 
published results do not provide a detailed methodology it is difficult to assess the 
validity of the findings. It is certain that some assumptions have been made regarding 
(a) the impacts of the standards on prices, (b) the impacts of the prices and energy 
savings on consumer decisions to acquire the new items and (c) the ‘rebound’ effect, 
by which consumers may use more energy if an item has an increased level of energy 
efficiency. The latter is discussed further below. 
Recognizing the above limitations we report in Table 88 the results obtain that could be 
useful for the present study. From these we note the following: 
·  The impact of all federal standards from 1988 to 2007 has been to reduce 
energy  use  from  9  appliances  covered  (refrigerators,  freezers,  room  air 
conditioners, central air conditioners and heat pumps, clothes washers, clothes 
dryers, dishwashers, water heaters and gas furnaces) by about 8 percent in 
2020. The study accounts for the higher costs these items and concludes that 
over the period 1987-2045 the savings in energy are worth nearly 2.5 times the 
additional cost to the consumers. [The LBNL study]. 
·  A  much  smaller  level  of  reduction  is  reported  by  the  Energy  Information 
Administration  [EIA].  It  looks  at  federal  standards  for  ceiling  fans  and 
commercial  refrigerators,  and  tax  credits  on  residential  equipment  and  on 
commercial boilers, starting from 2006. As Table 25 shows, the savings are of 
the  order  of  0.01  to  0.6  percent  over  the  period  2006-2025  relative  to  a 
baseline level of consumption over that period. 
·  A third study of interest is an estimate of the national program for Energy 
Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS) that sets efficiency and saving standards 
to the utilities themselves. This program starts with modest standards in 2007, 
progressively  becoming  stricter  over time.  The  expected  savings  are  of the 
order of 5 percent in 2020.  
·  The  above  are  estimates  for  federal  programs.  Policies  at  the  state  level 
include  a  number  of  tax  incentives  as  well  as  awareness  and  promotional 
campaigns.  Evaluations  of  these  programs  have  not  been  accessible  in  the 
publicly available literature. One exception is the Northwest region program 
for  CFL  bulbs,  which  included  a  combination  of  financial  incentives  (lower 
prices) and aggressive promotion from 2000 to 2003. The impact is to have 
increased the market share of these bulbs from almost zero to about 9 percent 
of the bulb market.     
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Table 88: Summary Table – engineering models 








-7.6 TBTU/YEAR GAS (DIRECT 
SAVINGS) 






- 23 TWH/YEAR ELECTRICITY 
-118 TBTU/YEAR GAS (INDIRECT 
SAVINGS) 
-16.6 MMT/YEAR CO2 
HOUSEHOLD 
EFFICIENT LIGHT BULB 
PROGRAM 
- 81.0 TWH/YEAR ELECTRICITY 
-410 TBTU/YEAR GAS (INDIRECT 
SAVINGS) 
-58,0 MMT/YEAR CO2 
HOUSEHOLD  TAX EXEMPT BONDS 
- 3.9 TWH/YEAR ELECTRICITY 
-24.6 TBTU/YEAR GAS (DIRECT 
SAVINGS) 
-20.0 TBTU/YEAR GAS (INDIRECT 
SAVINGS) 
-4,3 MMT/YEAR CO2 
HOUSEHOLD 
TAX CREDITS FOR 
APPLIANCES 
- 2.6 TWH/YEAR ELECTRICITY 
-13.2 TBTU/YEAR GAS (DIRECT 
SAVINGS) 
-20.0 TBTU/YEAR GAS (INDIRECT 
SAVINGS) 
-6.3 MMT/YEAR CO2 




- 386 TWH/YEAR ELECTRICITY 
-1,570 TBTU GAS (DIRECT SAVINGS) 
-5.59 QUADS (TOTAL FUEL SAVINGS) 
-320 MMT CO2 
+$64 BILLION CUMULATIVE SAVINGS 
BENEFIT/COST RATIO = 2.6 
REFERRED 
TO 2020 




-8% ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
(QUADS) 
-8% PROJECTED CO2 EMISSIONS 
(2020) 
-5% CURRENT NOX EMISSIONS 
+$141 BILLION NET SAVINGS (1987-
2045) 
SAVINGS/COST RATIO = 2.45 
SEE 
BRACKETS 
EIA   HOUSEHOLD 
CEILING LIGHT FAN 
STANDARDS 
-0.6% OF ENERGY USE (QUADS)   CUMULATI
VE SAVINGS 
OVER 2006-
2025    HOUSEHOLD 
TAX CREDITS ON 
APPLIANCES 
-0.013% of energy use (quads)   
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STUDY  SECTOR  POLICY MEASURE  RESULTS  YEARS 
  COMMERCIAL 
REACH-IN REFRIGERATORS 
STANDARDS 
-0.03% of energy use (quads)  
  COMMERCIAL 
TAX CREDITS ON 
APPLIANCES 
-0.012% of energy use (quads)  
The  economic  models  generate  a  number  of  interesting  findings.  These  are 
summarized in Table 89. Key features are the following: 
·  The  effectiveness  of  tax  credits  in  the  energy  efficiency  context  has  been 
analysed. Many empirical studies do not find significant relations between tax 
incentive and the adoption of energy efficient technology. Hassett and Metcalf 
find that if fixed effects are accounted for then tax incentives indeed increase 
the probability of investing in such technologies, confirming the rationality of 
consumers in responding to market-based incentives and disproving the so-
called  energy  paradox.  The  effects  can  be  significant,  for  example  it  is 
estimated that a 10 percentage point decrease in tax price of conservation 
measures will increase the probability of investment by 24%. Tax incentives 
that  lower  up-front  costs  have  been  compared  to  “natural”  energy  price 
changes and their effectiveness has been shown to be greater, mainly due to 
the fact that changes in energy prices are perceived to be more transitory.  
Tax incentives have also been compared to Command & Control mechanisms, 
such as technology and performance standards. In particular, in the context of 
thermal insulation building codes have been found to not have affected the 
average level of energy efficiency adopted by builders. 
·  In the context of technology adoption by firms, two market-based mechanisms 
have  been  compared  to  each  other:  energy  taxes  with  subsidies  aimed  at 
lowering implementation costs. It has been found that these two instruments 
do not have similar effects, in absolute values, but that subsidies are more 
effective in increasing technology adoption by consumers: 1.3%, 4% up to 8.8% 
more  effective  than  energy  taxes  for  ceiling,  wall  and  roof  insulation, 
respectively. 
·  When  energy  efficiency  is  improved,  the  cost  of  energy  services  declines. 
Consequently consumers will use them more intensively. This ‘rebound effect’ 
can be significant, although it varies from practically zero for small appliances, 
to 5-12 percent for residential lighting, 10-40 percent for water heating and 10-
30 percent for space heating. The above figures are the increase in energy 
consumption per 100 percent increase in energy efficiency. The implication is 
that policies and measures that increase efficiency will not necessarily result in 
a reduction in energy consumption equal to that predicted by models that 
measure the rate of adoption of the new equipment: account must be taken of 
the rebound effect. There are also indirect rebound and economy-wide effects 
that need to be considered, though quantitative estimates are difficult to make 
as the range of elements to consider is very broad; CGE models indicate that 
their potential effect may be above 50%. 
·  The second important parameter estimated in the literature is the discount 
rate.  As  explained  earlier,  the  higher  this  rate,  the  less  likely  it  is  that  a  
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consumer will buy an item that is more energy efficient and the greater the 
subsidy that will be needed to encourage him or her to purchase it. The studies 
carried out indicate quite a wide range of discount rates. In general they tend 
to  be  rather  high,  although  some  studies  have  found  figures  as  low  as  4 
percent for space heating systems and ‘unspecified actions’. It is important to 
note  that  the  rates  vary  considerably  across  the  population,  with  poorer 
households having much higher rates than richer ones. One study has found 
rates to range from 12 to 72 percent for refrigerators. 
·  In  addition  economic  models  have  estimated  household  and  commercial 
demand for energy. As expected the short run price elasticities are lower in 
absolute value than the long run elasticities. For household electricity they go 
from  -0.24  to  -0.32  and  for  household  gas  they  go  from  -0.12  to  -0.36. 
Commercial use is more price elastic in the long run – going from -0.21 to -0.97 
for electricity. When analyzing durable goods the price elasticity raises: the 
most updated meta-analysis study - that summarizes all research findings from 
1961 to 2004 - finds an overall mean of –2.62. Such value is based on over 
1800  published  price  elasticity  estimates.  The  review  also  includes 
generalizations on the main determinants of price elasticities. 
·  Finally,  the  last  part  focuses  on  new  green  marketing  strategies  and  their 
growing relation with energy efficiency. To overcome past failures of some 
labelling schemes, the suggestion is to link the environmental performances 
and attributes of “green” products with direct benefits to the consumer. 
Table 89: Summary Table – economic models 
STUDY  SECTOR  OBJECT  Further Specification  RESULT 
HASSETT AND 
METCALF 
HOUSEHOLD  MARGINAL EFFECT 
Tax-price  -2.428 
Energy-price  11.541 





Adoption costs  [-25.15; -10.08] 
Energy price  [5.44; 11,00] 
Income  [-29.45; -9.21] 
 




Cost-subsidies vs. no policy  2.4 –6,0 % 




HOUSEHOLD  SIZE OF REBOUND EFFECT 
Space heating  10 - 30% 
Water heating  10 - 40% 
Residential lighting  5 -12% 









”best guess”: 30% 
Household cooling  1-26%  
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STUDY  SECTOR  OBJECT  Further Specification  RESULT 
Water heating  34-38% 
SIZE OF INDIRECT REBOUND 
EFFECT 
  >37% 
TRAIN  HOUSEHOLD 
AVERAGE CONSUMER 
DISCOUNT RATE 
Space heating system  4.4 – 36 % 
Refrigerators  39 – 100 % 
Water heaters  18 – 67 % 





DEMAND ELASTICITY FOR 
ENERGY 
ELECTRICITY  -0.24 
HOUSEHOLD  NATURAL GAS  -0.12 
COMMERCIAL  ELECTRICITY  -0.21 
HOUSEHOLD 
LONG-RUN PRICE DEMAND 
ELASTICITY FOR ENERGY 
ELECTRICITY  -0.32 
HOUSEHOLD  NATURAL GAS  -0.36 
COMMERCIAL  ELECTRICITY  -0.97 
TELLIS  HOUSEHOLD 
MEAN PRICE ELASTICITY OF 
DEMAND 





MEAN PRICE ELASTICITY OF 
DEMAND 
across studies  -2.62 
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3.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS  
3.1.   DEFINITION OF TAX INCENTIVES OPTIONS 
In discussion with the steering committee for this study, several tax incentives options 
and  scenarios  have  been  identified  for  the  execution  of  the  cost-benefit  analysis. 
Following issues were taken into consideration when elaborating this list: 
·  The effectiveness of tax incentives is expected to vary between Member States 
due to price differences, market penetration of ‘green’ products. Therefore, it 
is  relevant  for  a  same  tax  incentive  option  and  for  a  same  appliance  to 
compare effects  for  two MS  representative  of  various  European  regions or 
usage patterns. Thus, 4 MS have been chosen in this regards, and also based on 
available economic data: France, Italy, Denmark, and Poland. 
·  Various types of tax incentives exist and should be analysed. Three options, 
already used in some countries, have been chosen: subsidy for consumers, tax 
credit for consumers and tax credit for manufacturers. 
·  The natural increase of energy prices due to the EU Emission Trading Scheme 
will serve as baseline. Therefore, 3 scenarios have been suggested: (a) baseline, 
which includes a 12% energy price increase; (b) policy 1 – subsidies/tax credits 
on ‘green’ products; and (c) policy 2 - energy tax equivalent to additional 10% 
energy  price  increase.  For  washing  machines,  policy  2  is  replaced  by  the 
remove from the market of B-class and C-class appliances. This policy could be 
a  potential  implementing  measure  following  the  EuP  preparatory  study  on 
washing machines (lot 14). 
Eight case-studies which were assessed with a CBA are summarised in Table 90.  
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Baseline scenario  Policy option 1 (parameters)*  Policy option 2 (parameters)* 
1 
Refrigerator 
France  Increase in 
electricity price 
(12%) 
Subsidy for consumers (€50 class A+ 
only) 
Energy tax: further increase in 
electricity price (10%) 
2  Denmark 
3 
Washing-machine 
Italy  Increase in 
electricity price 
(12%) 
Tax credit for manufacturers (€100 
per appliance cl. A+; sold above 
historical levels - 3 years average) 
B-class and lower removed from the 
market (market share of classes B 




Increase in gas price 
(15%) 
Tax credit for consumers (deducted 
from income tax; 25% of the 
appliance price for condensing 
boiler) 
Energy tax: further increase in gas 
price (10%) 
6  Italy 
7 
CFLi 
Poland  Increase in 
electricity price 
(12%) 
Subsidy for consumers 
(€1 classes A and B) 
Energy tax: further increase in 
electricity price (10%) 
8  France 
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3.2.   SYNTHESIS OF ECONOMIC DATA USED FOR CBA 
3.2.1.  ECONOMIC DATA FOR REFRIGERATORS 
In order to carry out the CBAs, economic data is required, namely: 
·  Sales data 
·  Prices data 
·  VAT rate 
·  Average electricity consumption 
When data was not available, estimates or mathematical extrapolations were made in 
order  to  fill  the  gaps. Obviously,  the more  assumptions  have  been made,  the  less 
reliable are the outcomes of the CBAs although the order of magnitude is correct. 
For the product group “refrigerator”, Table 91 presents economic data that will be 
used in the case-studies 1 (France) and 2 (Denmark). 
Legend  
In black = data from published sources (EuP lot 13, Gfk, DG JRC, CECED) 
In red = estimates 
In orange = extrapolation from data from CECED 
In green = linear extrapolation 
In purple = benchmark on websites 
In pink = data from the VAT differentiation study (DG ENV)  
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Table 91: Economic data used for case-studies 1 & 2 





Energy class  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007   
 
France 
A++  0  0  0  0  0  2  2  -  -  -  -  -  816  816 
19.6 
114 
A+  0  0  125  190  289  445  488  -  -  850  527  536  519  527  192 
A  819  846  1,219  1,280  1,407  1,622  1,780  560  560  550  504  492  476  476  271 
B  1,241  930  1,021  744  569  363  194  450  440  430  371  362  341  346  279 
C & others*  80  444  120  104  63  38  54  395  390  390  364  356  300  304  300 
TOTAL  2,140  2,220  2,485  2,319  2,330  2,469  2,519  490  510  510  500  462  462  473  - 
Denmark 
A++  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  738 
25.0 
114 
A+  0  0  5  43  64  76  84        680  642  602  565  192 
A  109  152  166  182  173  190  198        518  510  501  495  271 
B  119  90  77  42  25  17  15        485  457  446  436  279 
C & others*  15  11  8  4  4  2  2        459  424  399  384  300 
TOTAL  243  253  248  271  266  285  301        519  535  524  516  - 
(*): “others” mainly include not-labelled appliances but were considered in the CBAs as C-class products  
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3.2.2.  ECONOMIC DATA FOR WASHING-MACHINES 
Economic data used for carrying out CBAs in Poland and Italy is presented in Table 92. 
Prices  data  for  the  years  2005  and  2006  were  neither  available  from  source  nor 
estimated due to a lack of reliability as no particular trend was visible between 2002 
and 2004. 
Legend  
In black = data from sources (EuP lot 14, GfK, DG JRC, CECED) 
In red = estimates 
In brown = market shares for each energy class known 
In green = linear extrapolation 
In orange = extrapolation from prices variations known for Western Europe MS 
In grey = extrapolation from prices variations known for 4 Eastern Europe MS including 
Poland 
In blue = extrapolation from sales variations known for 4 Eastern Europe MS including 
Poland 
In purple = benchmark on websites 
In pink = data from the VAT differentiation study (DG ENV)  
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Table 92: Economic data used for case-studies 3 & 4 









A+    0  1  5  10  16  23    597  508  419      550 
22.0 
201 
A    373  500  666  610  775  839    418  373  327      535  210 
B    245  170  95  16  14  11    355  319  282      450  238 
C & others*    222  130  84  188  100  90    281  266  251      380  250 
TOTAL  850  840  802  850  824  905  963    362  339  315        - 
Italy 
A+  185  202  210  222  45  210  175    714  678  441      520 
20.0 
201 
A  705  862  940  1,121  984  1,402  1,536    528  502  418      451  210 
B  230  170  145  125  43  68  65    435  413  383      400  238 
C & others*  630  450  344  322  789  24  68    273  259  249      230  250 
TOTAL  1,750  2,001  1,679  1,790  1,860  1,704  1,844  470  550  520  388        - 
(*): “others” mainly include not-labelled appliances but were considered in the CBAs as C-class products  
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3.2.3.  ECONOMIC DATA FOR BOILERS 
Few economic data was available for boilers in EU. Regarding sales data, quite reliable 
assumptions have been done for 2005 and 2007 based on market data for 2004 and 
2010 provided by the EuP preparatory study (lot 1) as well as from market data for 
2006 from the BBT
134 market report in 2006. For prices data, the EuP preparatory study 
only provided figures for the year 2004. Prices for 2007 have been assumed based on 
prices used in the “VAT differentiation” study carried out by DG ENV. 
Legend  
In black = data from sources (EuP lot 1, BBT Marker report 2006) 
In red = estimates 
In green = linear extrapolation 
In blue = based on prices from UK and NL used in the study on VAT differentiation (DG 
ENV) and on 'prices factors' defined in EuP lot 1 and mentioned in the 1
st interim report 
(page 74) 
In pink = data from the VAT differentiation study (DG ENV) 
 
                                                           
134 BBT Thermotechnik GmbH is company of the Bosch group.  
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Table 93: Economic data used for case-studies 5 & 6 






Boiler type  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007     
Denmark 
Condensing Boiler        17  20  24  28        2453      3168 
25.0 
1726 
Other Boiler*        13  11  9  7        2383      2396  2000 
Italy 
Condensing Boiler        59  86  112  138        948      1,224 
20.0 
1726 
Other Boiler*        1,283  1191  1,100  1009        921      926  2000 
(*): “other boiler” mainly include non-condensing gas boiler  
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3.2.4.  ECONOMIC DATA FOR CFLI 
For the product group “CFLi”, it was complicated to obtain sales data for Poland and 
France as no detailed market report is available. Thus, the EuP preparatory study on 
domestic lighting (lot 19) was the main source of information even if sales data is not 
clearly  divided  by  Member  States.  Further,  prices  data  was  not  found  for  these 
countries and IKEA prices were used both for CFLi and for GLS (i.e. incandescent lamp). 
This data is provided in Table 94. 
Legend  
In black = data from sources (EuP lot 19, ELC, DG JRC) 
In red = estimates 
In blue = estimates based on Eurostat data including both incandescent lamps (GLS) 
which can be replaced by CFLi and others 
In grey = using variations of ELC sales 
In purple = extrapolation order 2 
In orange = extrapolation order 3 
In green = prices from national IKEA website (see Table 27)  
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Table 94: Economic data used for case-studies 7 & 8 





Lamp type  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007     
Poland 
CFLi        4.2  5.0  8.5  14.7              4.25 
22.0 
10.9 
GLS*        79.6  81.3  85.4  91.9              0.5  21.6 
France 
CFLi  6.8  7.4  8.3  10.1  13.7  18.4  23.0              4.25 
19.6 
10.9 
GLS*  135.6      173.6  164.1  152.0  142.5              0.4  21.6 
(*): A GLS (General Lighting Service) is a typical incandescent filament lamp. 
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3.3.   CBA OF TAX INCENTIVES OPTIONS 
3.3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Previous internal reports prepared by the consultants presented a methodology to 
undertake cost-benefit analyses of selected tax incentives for electrical appliances in 
EU-27. The potential and limitations of the proposed methodology were demonstrated 
by  using  a  case-study  developed  for  refrigerators  in  France.  After  comments  and 
suggestions received from the EC team and other colleagues the parameters and policy 
options to be investigated in further studies of data we agreed upon. The coverage was 
to  include  data  from  France,  Denmark,  Italy  and  Poland  for  four  appliances  – 
refrigerators, washing machines,  boilers  and  compact  fluorescent  lamps  (CFLi).  The 
initial results of these eight case studies were discussed during the second Interim 
meeting that took place in Brussels in June and further improvements in the model 
were suggested. 
This  final  report  presents  the  results  of  the  cost-benefit  analysis  undertaken  for 
different  policy  options  that  could  potentially  increase  sales  of  energy-efficient 
appliances in Europe. The objective is to assess the effects of these policy options on 
sales of energy efficient appliances, estimate the energy savings and CO2 reductions 
resulting  from  the  observed  changes  in  sales  of  different  kinds  of  appliances.  The 
benefits are then compared to some costs of the selected policy options. This report 
differs from our previous report in regard to: 
·  Country-specific parameters have now been used for tCO2/kWh; 
·  Estimation  of  the  welfare  gain  associated  with  producers  profit  has  been 
included; 
·  The model imposes the assumption that changes in sales due to energy price 
increases are made up of shifts from adjacent energy classes so that the total 
numbers of sales are constant; 
·  The formula to estimate the welfare cost associated with equipment has been 
corrected; 
·  The content of the summary tables has been simplified;  
·  Changes in units of energy consumption for lamps have  been made and a 
revised calibration of the model for that appliance has been undertaken; 
·  A sensitivity analysis of key parameters has been carried; 
·  Lifetime of boilers assumed to be equal to 15 years in all countries instead of 
different values in different countries; 
·  Benefits from reduced energy use in the form of lower non-GHG emissions 
have been included. 
·  A set of responses to further queries sent to the consultants on 14th October 
on the last draft has been added. 
This section is organised as follows: section 3.3.2.  summarises the methodology used; 
each case-study is presented in a separate section, starting by describing the data 
available, the main assumptions and the results for a baseline scenario (an increase in 
energy prices due to the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)). Results for policy options 1  
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(subsidy or tax credit) and 2 (energy tax) are presented in sequence in sections 3.3.3. to 
3.3.10.  ,  as  well  as  a  comparison  between  the  policy  alternatives.  Section  3.3.11.  
presents a sensitivity analysis of some parameters of our analysis. 
3.3.2.  METHODOLOGY – ECONOMIC MODEL 
The  approach  used  to  evaluate  how  sales  of  energy  efficient  appliances  would  be 
affected by tax incentives involves an economic model of consumer behaviour towards 
the provision of services of appliances. We assume that consumers compare the net 
present value (NPV) of the operational costs of services provided by appliances, during 
its lifetime (T), and choose the cheapest alternative. In mathematical terms: 
      [ ] i i i P e s NPV - - = . . p l  










      and      






NPVi   Net present value from equipment of type (i); 
i    Energy class of appliance; 
s
j  Service provided by appliances in period (j), (j = 1,…,T) assumed to be 
constant in each period and equal to s; 
T    Lifetime of appliance; 
p    Price per unit of energy; 
ei    Amount of energy used per energy class type (i);  
Pi    Price of appliance of type (i); 
r    Discount rate; 
l    Discount factor; 
In deriving the above it is assumed that (i) each consumer buys one product only; (ii) 
the products have a fixed lifetime; and (iii) products are identical in terms of service 
provided (s) but vary in terms of energy efficiency. Thus, for each preferred choice (i
*) it 
must be true that:    
  [ ] [ ] k k i i P e s P e s - - > - - . . . . * * p l p l ,    for all (k ¹ i
*) 
 
From assumption (iii) above we have: 
  k k i i P e P e - - > - - . . . . * * p l p l ,     for all (k ¹ i
*) 
 
Or      k k i i P e P e + < + . . . . * * p l p l ,     for all (k ¹ i
*)    (1) 
 
We estimate choices based on inequality (1) using the market data for the most recent 
year available and assuming discount rates ranging between 0% and 50%. The results 
would show us, for each type of product (energy class), the range of the discount rates  
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for which inequality (1) holds; i.e. the discount rates that make the NPV of appliances 
of each type the cheapest, and then preferable for consumers. The interpretation of 
the expected results is as follows: buyers of the most efficient (and expensive) types 
should  have  lower  personal  discount  rates,  while  consumers  of  cheaper  types  of 
appliances should present higher personal discount rates. 
In general, further adjustments in the real data are necessary to fit the data to the 
model; otherwise the most inefficient type of appliance often turns out to be the one 
with lowest NPV for all discount rates. Note that the model above considers appliances 
of all types as having the same characteristics, i.e. products of the same quality, which 
may not be true. Furthermore, the model does not consider consumers’ satisfaction 
associated to the consumption of more efficient appliances. For example, it may be the 
case that consumers who buy more efficient appliances are willing to pay an extra 
premium for the public good of ‘saving the planet’, which is not included in our simple 
analysis of operational costs only. Again we introduce this aspect in the modelling 
where necessary to explain observed patterns of purchases. 
We based our assumptions of personal satisfaction on a similar study developed by 
Revelt and Train (1998)
135, who estimated WTP for more efficient refrigerators ranging 
between 22% and 25.5% of market prices in the U.S. We also benefited from other 
results in Revelt and Train (1998), namely that the observed WTP for more efficient 
refrigerators  implied  consumers’  discount  rate  of  39%  with  a  normal  distribution 
around that mean, and standard deviation of 18.7
136. 
Market prices were adjusted to account for differences in quality among the appliances 
of different energy classes and for WTP for more efficient appliances so that prices 
reflect purely differences in energy classes (standardised prices). Once inequality (1) is 
satisfied for all energy classes (i), then we can estimate the maximum discount rate at 
which equation (1) holds. For example, assume that the actual number of refrigerators 
of energy class ‘A+’ – 488,250 in 2007; the shaded area under the probability density 
function in Figure 80– implies a maximum discount rate equal to 13% in our model (i.e. 
at higher discount rates other energy types of appliances are cheaper and preferred by 
consumers) for this class of refrigerators. The same procedure is undertaken for new 
prices corresponding to the tax incentive (Figure 80) and the difference between the 







                                                           
135 Revelt and Train (1998), "Mixed Logit with replaced choices: households' choices of appliance efficiency 
level", The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(4). 
136 The choice of the quality adjustment and the adjustment for the WTP for public good reasons is, we 
agree, somewhat arbitrary. We did the calculations using only a quality adjustment and not making any 
adjustment for WTP for the case of those countries where two adjustments are reported (e.g. France) and 
found the result were substantially the same as those presented here.  
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 Figure  79:  Discount  rates  normally  distributed  with  mean  39%  and  standard 
deviation 18.7% - business as usual prices 
 
Figure  80:  Discount  rates  normally  distributed  with  mean  39%  and  standard 
deviation 18.7% - after price changes due to tax incentive 
 
Note: Red line indicates the cumulative density function. 
Once we have estimated the change in sales of each type of appliance given a 
change in electricity and/or the price of the appliance, as described above, we can 
estimate the gains and losses, for consumers, the government and industry, derived 
from the observed change in sales of the appliances.  
Subsidies and Tax Credits 
In the case of subsidies and tax credits we calculate the following:  
·  The outflow of funds from the government equal to the total number of sales 
predicted times the subsidy or tax credit per unit;  
·  The potential administrative and welfare costs (we further discuss these costs 
below);  
·  The change in energy use (energy savings) by multiplying the change in the 
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·  The change in GHG emissions137 by multiplying the total energy consumption 
by a country-specific parameter indicating the average tons of CO2 generated 
to produce one kWh of electricity; 
·  The  financial  gains  for  manufacturers  with  extra  sales  of  more  expensive 
equipments.  
Energy Taxes 
In the case of energy taxes we calculate the following: 
·  The gain in tax revenue for the government equal to the energy consumed 
times the increase in tax rate; 
·  The potential administrative and welfare costs (we further discuss these costs 
below); 
·  The energy use (energy savings) by calculating energy consumption under the 
new tax regime compared with that under the previous tax regime; 
·  The  change  in  GHG  emissions  by  multiplying  the  change  in  total  energy 
consumption by a country-specific parameter indicating the average tons of 
CO2 generated to produce one kWh of electricity;  
·  The  financial  gains  for  manufacturers  with  extra  sales  of  more  expensive 
equipments.  
 
We present below the detailed calculations of the different components described 
above, in the context of carrying out a cost effectiveness estimation: 
1) Welfare Costs  
Based on the above, we calculate the welfare costs for subsidies and tax credits as 
follows: 
a.1) Welfare cost – marginal cost of public funding (MCPF): assumed as 26% of 
the revenue gained with the policy; 
a.2)  Welfare  gain  –  profit  of  producers:  assumed  product-specific  margins 
based on market data collected by the consultants, varying between 6% (CFLi) and 
8.5% (boilers) – 8% for refrigerators and washing machines; 
a.3) Welfare gain – reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants: the average non-
GHG external cost of one unit of kWh generated per country; it is based on (a) the unit 
values  of  external  costs  of  each  type  of  fuel  cycle  from  the  CASES  Project 
(http://www.feem-project.net/cases) and (b) the fuel mix used for power generation in 
the country in 2008, as provided by EUROSTAT. 
 
Based on the above, we calculate the welfare costs of energy taxes as follows: 
b.1) Welfare cost – dead-weight loss of consumers: the inefficiency caused by 
the imposition of a tax;  
                                                           
137 We use the term GHG in this report but all our estimates refer to CO2.  
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b.2)  Welfare  cost  –  more  expensive  equipments:  the  difference  in  quality-
adjusted prices of equipments bought with and without the imposition of the tax; 
b.3) Welfare gain – profit of producers: defined as in (a.2); 
b.4)  Welfare  gain  –  savings  in  costs  of  raising  funds  from  other  taxes:  tax 
policies generate revenue for the government and reduce the cost of raising similar 
amounts from other sources. We use the same MCPF (26%) as in (a.1); 
b.5) Welfare gain – reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants: defined as in 
(a.3); 
 
2)  Administrative costs 
We  reviewed  the  pertinent  literature  in  order  to  identify  empirical  estimates  of 
administrative costs of different economic incentives. Sandford et al. (“Administrative 
and Compliance Costs of Taxation”, Perrymead: Fiscal Publications, 1999) estimated 
administrative costs of different types of taxes in the US in terms of percentage of the 
total tax revenue, a metric that is convenient for our purposes. Administrative costs 
ranged between 0.12% (petroleum tax revenue) and 1.53% (income tax). Electricity 
taxes were not included in Sandford’s study. Given that an energy tax is more complex 
than a petroleum tax, but still relatively simple, we will assume administrative costs of 
energy taxes in our case studies to be equal to 0.20% of the tax revenue. 
No data could be obtained regarding administrative costs of subsidies and tax credits. It 
is understood that administrative costs of subsidies are potentially much higher than 
those for taxes, given the extra personnel and procedures in place to administrate the 
scheme. Regarding tax credits, we understand that administrative costs are potentially 
low given the existing structures in place to administrate existing taxes. Therefore, we 
will roughly assume that the administrative costs of subsidies correspond to 5% of the 
revenue cost of the subsidy, while the additional administrative costs of tax credits (for 
consumer and for producers) are negligible (equal to zero). 
3)  GHG savings 
We benefit from recent EU projects (e.g. CASES) that estimated the average emission 
per unit of kWh generated in several EU countries, based on the typical technology 
(ies) adopted in each country. 
Cost Effectiveness Analysis and Other Indicators 
We consider that the best way of presenting the results of the welfare analysis is in 
terms of the welfare costs per ton of CO2 removed as a result of the measure. These 
costs  include  losses  or  gains  in  welfare,  including  those  arising  from  non  GHG 
emissions. We then divide these by the change in CO2 removed or by the reduction in 
energy used in kWh, to get a cost per ton of CO2 removed or per kWh of energy saved. 
These are widely used measures of the cost effectiveness of the policies, which can be 
compared with many other interventions that seek to promote energy efficiency or 
carbon efficiency. 
A number of other indicators that are of interest to policy makers are also reported. 
These include: 
·  Revenue costs to government or revenue gains to government  
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·  Energy savings in total (GWh) 
·  CO2 savings in total (tons) 
·  Financial gains to producers (i.e. revenue gain in Euros) 
·  Welfare cost divided by tax revenue of the policy (Euros). This gives an idea of 
the  cost  in  terms  of  welfare  of  each  unit  of  subsidy  provided  by  the 
programme.  
 
Commentators from the Commission on the report have asked two other questions, 
which we answer below: 
1)   “Why the consultant only looks at purchase price and not to use phase cost in his 
policy decision rule?”  
Answer:  We  have  estimated  changes  in  the  energy  use  during  the  lifetime  of  the 
equipment, and the associated costs and benefits. We have not included the energy 
costs of producing the equipment and the disposal of the equipment. This is standard 
analysis of a partial equilibrium nature in which one looks as the commodity subject to 
a tax or subsidy and calculates the welfare costs in terms of changes in consumer and 
producer surplus. To go further into the inter linkages between the inputs and outputs 
of the commodity in question would entail a full input-output type of analysis that was 
never envisaged or promised in this exercise. Such an analysis would require an order of 
magnitude more resources than we have had at our disposal. Moreover we believe that 
in  comparing  the  options  of  taxes  versus  subsidies  the  results  would  not  change 
materially compared to what we have produced.   
 
2)  “Why welfare gains don’t include savings of energy bill for consumers?”  
 Answer: When a consumer is taxed, he or she reduces the consumption of the good in 
question.  That  generates  a  loss  of  consumer  surplus.  It  also  generates  a  gain  in 
government revenue. The two almost cancel each other out, but not entirely: the loss of 
consumer surplus is slightly greater than the gain in revenue and the difference is a 
deadweight loss that we measure.  
In the case of a tax consumers’ spending on energy actually increases so there is no 
saving in energy bills as such. But that is not relevant to the welfare estimation. What 
matters is only the change in consumer surplus and we have measured that already.  
In the case of the subsidy we should treat the changes in energy expenditure similarly 
and  not  include  them  in  the  welfare  measure,  otherwise  there  is  a  lack  of 
comparability. Also, if we consider the savings in energy expenditure as a gain, then we 
should also consider the increase in spending on more expensive appliances as a cost 
and take only the net gain. Such a position may be defensible, but not in our view if we 
are to maintain comparability with the tax case.   
 
The next eight sections (i.e. sections 3.3.3. to 3.3.10. ) provide detailed analysis for the 
different cases considered. 
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3.3.3.  CASE-STUDY 1: REFRIGERATORS IN FRANCE 
2.3.3.1  Data report and baseline scenario 
Table 95: Sales and prices of refrigerators in France per energy classes 
  A++  A+  A  B  C and others 
Sales
(a) (2007)  2,072  488,250  1,779,871  194,367  54,263 
Prices
(b) (2007)  816.20 €  527.22 €  476.40 €  346.30 €  304.18 € 
Consumption 
(kWh/year) 




 Summary of main assumptions 
(i)  Each consumer buys one product only;  
(ii)  Refrigerators have a fixed lifetime (12.8 years); 
(iii)  Refrigerators are identical in terms of service provided but vary in terms of 
energy efficiency and quality; 
(iv)  Refrigerators classes ‘C’ and ‘B’ have inferior quality and had their market 
prices adjusted upwards by +11%; 
(v)  Refrigerators class ‘A’ have superior quality and had their market price 
adjusted downwards by 15.96%;  
(vi)  WTP for more efficient refrigerators: class ‘A++’ = 40%; class ‘A+’ = 25%; class 
‘A’ = 18%; class ‘B’ = 7.5% and class ‘C’ = 0; 
(vii)  The personal discount rate of consumers is normally distributed with mean 
equal to 39% and standard deviation equal to 18.7%; 
(viii)  When  energy  use  is  reduced  this  also  reduces  emissions  of  non-GHG 
pollutants. The average value per kWh of the reduction is taken as €cent 
0.254 for France. This is based on (a) the unit values of external costs of each 
type  of  fuel  cycle  from  the  CASES  Project  (http://www.feem-
project.net/cases)  and  (b)  the  fuel  mix  used  for  power  generation  in  the 
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Table 96: Refrigerators; France – Baseline scenario - increase in 12% of electricity 
prices due to ETS 
2007  BAU  Baseline scenario 
Class  Sales  Price (€)  mkt share 
Revised 
sales 
mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
C  54,263  337.97  0.022  50,706  0.020  -3,557  -0.0014 
B  194,367  384.78  0.077  243,176  0.097  48,808  0.0194 
A  1,779,871  400.34  0.707  1,611,634  0.640  -168,237  -0.0668 
A+  488,250  527.22  0.194  610,856  0.243  122,606  0.0487 
A++  2,072  816.20  0.001  2,452  0.001  380  0.0002 
Total  2,518,824  422.73  1.000  2,518,824  1.000     
2.3.3.2  Policy option 1: Subsidy for consumers (€50 for class A+) 
Table 97: Refrigerators; France: Subsidy for more energy efficient refrigerators: €50 
for energy class ‘A+’ 
2007  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share 
Revised 
sales 
Price  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt shr 
C  54,263  337.97  0.022  18,518  337.97  0.007  -35,745  -0.0142 
B  194,367  384.78  0.077  64,041  384.78  0.025  -130,326  -0.0517 
A  1,779,871  400.34  0.707  553,148  400.34  0.220  -1,226,724  -0.4870 
A+  488,250  527.22  0.194  1,882,673  477.22  0.747  1,394,423  0.5536 
A++  2,072  816.20  0.001  443  816.20  0.000  -1,629  -0.0006 
Total  2,518,824  422.73  1.000  2,518,824  457.02  1.000     
 
￿  Costs of policy option 1 
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Table 98: Refrigerators; France: Revenue costs of a subsidy for more energy efficient 
refrigerators (€50 for energy class ‘A+’) – total number of refrigerators held 
constant 
2007  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Revised sales  Tax incentive (€)  Revenue cost (€) 
C  52,651  0  0 
B  188,564  0  0 
A  1,726,465  0  0 
A+  549,106  50  94,133,658 
A++  2,038  0  0 
Total  2,518,824    94,133,658 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
Table 99: Refrigerators; France: Administrative costs of a subsidy for more energy 
efficient  refrigerators  (€50  for  energy  class  ‘A+’)  –  total  number  of 
refrigerators held constant 
Parameter:  5% of total revenue cost 
Administrative costs  4,706,683 € 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
These are made up of (a) the marginal cost of public funds, estimated at 26% of 
the amount of revenue raised; (b) gains in producers’ profits at 8% of the extra 
sales revenue, which is based on information provided by the consultants by 
drawing  on  direct  data  collection;  and  (c)  the  gain  from  reduced  non-GHG 
emissions. 
Table 100: Refrigerators; France: Welfare costs of a subsidy for more energy efficient 
refrigerators (€50 for energy class ‘A+’) – total number of refrigerators held 
constant 
1  Welfare cost (marginal cost of public funds = 26% of the revenue cost) (€)  24,474,751 
2  Welfare gain (profit of producers = 8% of sales revenue) (€) (0.08*[14])  14,440,930 
2a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  3,640,789 
3  Net welfare cost (€) [1-2-2a]  6,393,033 
3a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([3]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  60.27  
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￿  Benefits of policy 1 
These  are  summarised  in  the  following  four  tables  giving  energy  savings,  GHG 
emissions, and financial gains to producers and net changes in welfare: 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table  101:  Refrigerators;  France:  Estimates  of  energy  savings  after  the 
implementation  of  policy  option  1  –  total  number  of  refrigerators  held 
constant 




 (a)  Sales 
Energy 
consumption




C  300  54,263  16,279,009  18,518  5,555,515 
B  279  194,367  54,228,485  64,041  17,867,528 
A  271  1,779,871  482,345,069  553,148  149,903,000 
A+  192  488,250  93,743,945  1,882,673  361,473,246 
A++  114  2,072  236,210  443  50,509 
Total  ---  2,518,824  646,832,719  2,518,824  534,849,799 
Energy savings (GWh) / year  112.0 
Savings on expenditure on energy (€)  15,188,467 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  1,433.4 
Lifetime revenue savings (€)  194,412,381 
Note: (a) kWh/year;  
(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table  102:  Refrigerators;  France:  GHG  emissions  of  a  subsidy  for  more  energy 
efficient  refrigerators  (€50  for  energy  class  ‘A+’)  –  total  number  of 
refrigerators held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000074 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  8,287 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  106,070  
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Lifetime savings (€)  2,121,404 
Revenue cost to Government/ tCO2 (€)  887.47 
(iii)  Financial gains for manufacturers with extra sales 
Table 103: Refrigerators; France: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 1 
  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price (€)  Revenue  Revised sales  Price (€)  Revenue 
C  54,263  337.97  18,339,521  18,518  337.97  6,258,704 
B  194,367  384.78  74,787,732  64,041  384.78  24,641,512 
A  1,779,871  400.34  712,546,710  553,148  400.34  221,444,971 
A+  488,250  527.22  257,415,721  1,882,673  527.22  992,585,672 
A++  2,072  816.20  1,691,181  443  816.20  361,630 
Total  2,518,824    1,064,780,866  2,518,824    1,245,292,489 
Financial gains for manufacturers  180,511,623 
￿  Summary of policy 1 
Table 104: Refrigerators; France: summary of policy option 1 (€50 subsidy to class 
‘A+’) 
Summary  Policy 1 + baseline 
Revenue cost to government (€)  94,133,658 
Net welfare cost to society (€)  6,393,033 
GHG reductions   
Revenue cost / tCO2 (€)  887.47 







European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote 
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
185 
 
2.3.3.3  Policy option 2: Energy tax - additional increase in electricity price (10%) 
Table 105: Refrigerators; France – additional increase in 10% of electricity prices 
2007  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 











C  54,263  337.97  0.022  45,149  337.97  0.018  -9,115  -0.0036 
B  194,367  384.78  0.077  289,879  384.78  0.115  95,511  0.0379 
A  1,779,871  400.34  0.707  1,453,393  400.34  0.577  -326,478  -0.1296 
A+  488,250  527.22  0.194  728,173  527.22  0.289  239,924  0.0953 
A++  2,072  816.20  0.001  2,230  816.20  0.001  158  0.0001 
Total  2,518,824  422.73  1.000  2,518,824  434.48  1.000     
 
￿  Costs of policy option 2 
(i)  Revenue gains 
Table 106: Refrigerators; France: Tax revenue with policy option 2 – energy price 
increase (10%); total number of refrigerators held constant 
Tax revenue (lifetime)  109,087,826 € 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
Table 107: Refrigerators; France: Administrative costs of policy option 2 – energy 
price increase (10%); total number of refrigerators held constant 
Parameter:  0.20% of total tax revenue 
Administrative costs  218,176 € 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
The welfare changes from the tax are made up of the following. First, we have 
the deadweight loss from the imposition of the tax, based on the consumption of 
energy. Second, we have a welfare cost arising from the fact that consumers are 
made to buy more expensive equipment than they would if there were no tax. 
This  cost  is  simply  the  difference  in  price  (adjusted  for  quality)  between  the 
appliance bought without a tax and the one bought with a tax. Third, we have a 
welfare gain arising from the fact that the policy generates tax revenue and 
therefore reduces the cost of raising a similar amount of tax from other sources. 
This gain is calculated using the marginal cost of public funds. Fourth, we have 
the welfare gain to producers from the sale of more profitable equipment. This is  
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calculated as in the case of the subsidy (see Table 100). Finally, there are gains 
from the reduction in the generation of electricity, calculated at the average 
external cost per kWh for France (see section 2.3.3.2). 
Table  108: Refrigerators; France:  Welfare costs  of policy  option 2  –  energy  price 
increase (10%); total number of refrigerators held constant 
4  Dead-weight loss  (∆Q x ∆P) / 2 
5  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – energy (€)  3,322,706 
6  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – equipments (€)  24,768,306 
6a 
Welfare gain from savings in costs of raising funds from other taxes (€) 
(0.26*[17]) 
28,362,835 
7  Welfare gain (profit of producers = 8% of sales revenue) (€) (0.08*[14])  2,367,264 
7a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  600,791 
8  Net welfare cost (€) [5+6-6a-7-7a]  -3,239,878 
9  Marginal cost of policy (welfare cost/tax revenue) (€) [5+6]/[17]  3.88 
9a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([8]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  -185.10 
￿  Benefits of policy 2 
These are summarised in four tables below giving energy savings, GHG emissions, and 
financial gains to producers and net changes in welfare: 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table  109:  Refrigerators;  France:  Estimates  of  energy  savings  after  the 
implementation  of  policy  option  2  –  holding  the  total  number  of 
refrigerators constant 













C  300  54,263  16,279,009  45,149  13,544,603 
B  279  194,367  54,228,485  289,879  80,876,113 
A  271  1,779,871  482,345,069  1,453,393  393,869,402 
A+  192  488,250  93,743,945  728,173  139,809,287 
A++  114  2,072  236,210  2,230  254,256  
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Total  ---  2,518,824  646,832,719  2,518,824  628,353,661 
Energy savings (GWh) / year  18.5 
HH expenditure change per year (€)  -6,016,135 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  236.5 
Lifetime expenditures with energy (€)  -77,006,526 
Note: (a) kWh/year  
(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table  110:  Refrigerators;  France:  GHG  emissions  of  policy  option  2  –  additional 
electricity  price  increase  (10%)  –  total  number  of  refrigerators  held 
constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000074 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  1,367 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  17,503 
Lifetime savings (€)  350,067 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2 (€)  6,232.39 
(iii)  Financial gain with extra sales 
Table 111: Refrigerators; France: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 2: 
additional energy price increase (10%) 
BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price (€)  Revenue  Revised sales  Price (€)  Revenue 
C  54,263  337.97  18,339,521  45,149  337.97  15,259,008 
B  194,367  384.78  74,787,732  289,879  384.78  111,538,080 
A  1,779,871  400.34  712,546,710  1,453,393  400.34  581,845,580 
A+  488,250  527.22  257,415,721  728,173  527.22  383,908,621 
A++  2,072  816.20  1,691,181  2,230  816.20  1,820,381 
Total  2,518,824    1,064,780,866  2,518,824    1,094,371,669 
Financial gains for manufacturers  29,590,803 €  
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￿  Summary of policy 2 
Table 112: Refrigerators; France: summary of policy option 2(10% electricity price 
increase) 
Summary  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Revenue raised in tax (€)  109,087,826 
Revenue gains to producers (€)  29,590,803 
Higher costs to consumers in capital exp. (€)  24,768,306 
Higher costs to consumers in energy exp. (€)  77,006,526 
GHG reductions   
Net welfare cost (€)  -3,239,878 
Welfare cost/tCO2 (€)  -185.10 
2.3.3.4  Comparison of policy options 
Table 113: Refrigerators; France: Cost-benefit summary 
 
   
Policy option 1 
+ baseline 




Net welfare costs  6,393,033  -3,239,878 
11  Administrative costs  4,706,683  218,176 
12  Benefits  GHG  2,121,404  350,067 
13  Benefit – costs  -8,978,311  3,371,769 
14  Revenue gain to producers (€)  180,511,623  29,590,803 
15  Energy savings (GWh)  1,433.4  236.5 
15a  Lifetime GHG Savings (t/CO2)  106,070.2  17,503.4 
16  Expenditure in energy by households (€)  194,412,381  -77,006,526 
17  Revenue cost to government (€)  94,133,658  -109,087,826 
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2.3.3.5  Conclusions  
The subsidy policy has a welfare cost of about €6.4 million while the energy tax has a 
gain of €3.2 million. The subsidy generates a bigger saving in GHGs than the energy tax, 
almost six times greater. In terms of the welfare costs per ton of CO2, the subsidy has a 
cost of €60/ton while the tax option has a welfare benefit of €185/ton. The admin cost 
of the subsidy option is almost 22 times higher than the energy tax option. Finally, the 
producers’ revenue gains are €180 million with the subsidies, while they only gain €30 
million in higher value sales with an energy tax. 
3.3.4.  CASE-STUDY 2: REFRIGERATORS IN DENMARK 
2.3.4.1  Data report and baseline scenario 
Table 114: Sales and prices of refrigerators in Denmark per energy classes 
  A++  A+  A  B  C and others 
Sales
(a) (2007)  2,000  84,000  198,000  15,000  2,000 
Prices
(b) (2007)  737.58 €  565.00 €  495.00 €  436.45 €  383.56 € 
Consumption 
(kWh/year) 
114  192  271  279  300 
Energy price (€/kWh)  0.2579 
 Summary of main assumptions 
(i)  Each consumer buys one product only;  
(ii)  Refrigerators have a fixed lifetime (12.8 years); 
(iii)  Refrigerators are identical in terms of service provided but vary in terms of 
energy efficiency and quality; 
(iv)  Refrigerators classes ‘A’ and ‘B’ have superior quality and had their market 
price adjusted downwards by -17.17 % (class ‘A’) and –8.25% (class ‘B’);  
(v)  No adjustment for WTP for more efficient refrigerators was necessary; 
(vi)  The personal discount rate of consumers is normally distributed with mean 
equal to 39% and standard deviation equal to 18.7%; 
(vii) When  energy  use  is  reduced  this  also  reduces  emissions  of  non-GHG 
pollutants. The average value per kWh of the reduction is taken as €cent 1.048 
for Denmark. This is based on (a) the unit values of external costs of each type 
of fuel cycle from the CASES Project (http://www.feem-project.net/cases) and 
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Table 115: Refrigerators; Denmark – Baseline scenario - increase in 12% of electricity 
prices due to ETS 
2007  BAU  Baseline scenario 
Class  Sales  Price (€)  mkt share 
Revised 
sales 
mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt shr 
C  2,000  383.56  0.007  382  0.001  -1,618  -0.0054 
B  15,000  400.45  0.050  9,976  0.033  -5,024  -0.0167 
A  198,000  410.00  0.658  176,815  0.587  -21,185  -0.0704 
A+  84,000  565.00  0.279  111,122  0.369  27,122  0.0901 
A++  2,000  737.58  0.007  2,705  0.009  705  0.0023 
Total  301,000  454.78  1.000  301,000  1.000     
2.3.4.2  Policy option 1: Subsidy for consumers (€50 for class A+) 
Table 116: Refrigerators; Denmark: Subsidy for more energy efficient refrigerators: 
€50 for energy class ‘A+’ 
2007  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 





Price (€)  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt shr 
C  2,000  383.56  0.007  246  383.56  0.001  -1,754  -0.0058 
B  15,000  400.45  0.050  6,437  400.45  0.021  -8,563  -0.0284 




A+  84,000  565.00  0.279  197,462  515.00  0.656  113,462  0.3770 
A++  2,000  737.58  0.007  885  737.58  0.003  -1,115  -0.0037 
Total  301,000  454.78  1.000  301,000  479.62  1.000     
￿  Costs of policy option 1 
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Table  117:  Refrigerators;  Denmark:  Revenue  costs  of  a  subsidy  for  more  energy 
efficient refrigerators – total number of refrigerators held constant 
2007  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Revised sales  Tax incentive (€)  Revenue cost (€) 
C  246  0  0 
B  6,437  0  0 
A  95,969  0  0 
A+  197,462  50  9,873,109 
A++  885  0  0 
Total  301,000    9,873,109 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
Table 118: Refrigerators; Denmark: Administrative costs of a subsidy for more energy 
efficient refrigerators – total number of refrigerators held constant 
Parameter:  5% of total revenue cost 
Administrative costs  493,655 € 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
These are made up of (a) the marginal cost of public funds, estimated at 26% of 
the amount of revenue raised; (b) gains in producers’ profits at 8% of the extra 
sales  revenue,  which  is  based  on  information  provided  by  the  consultants  by 
drawing  on  direct  data  collection;  and  (c)  the  gain  from  reduced  non-GHG 
emissions. 
Table  119:  Refrigerators;  Denmark:  Welfare  costs  of  a  subsidy  for  more  energy 
efficient refrigerators – total number of refrigerators held constant 
1  Welfare cost (marginal cost of public funds = 26% of the revenue 
cost) (€) 
2,567,008 
2  Welfare gain (profit of producers = 8% of sales revenue) (€) 
(0.08*[14]) 
1,387,966 
2a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  1,194,932 
3  Net welfare cost (€) [1-2-2a]  -15,890 
3a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([3]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  -0.41 
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￿  Benefits of policy 1 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table  120:  Refrigerators;  Denmark:  Estimates  of  energy  savings  after  the 
implementation of policy option 1 – total number of refrigerators held 
constant 













C  300  2,000  600,000  246  73,936 
B  279  15,000  4,185,000  6,437  1,795,935 
A  271  198,000  53,658,000  95,969  26,007,660 
A+  192  84,000  16,128,000  197,462  37,912,740 
A++  114  2,000  228,000  885  100,901 
Total  ---  301,000  74,799,000  301,000  65,891,171 
Energy savings (GWh) / year  8.9 
Reductions in Expenditure on Energy (€)  2,573,009 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  114.0 
Lifetime expenditure savings on energy (€)  32,934,510 
Note: (a) kWh/year;  
(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table  121:  Refrigerators; Denmark:  GHG  emissions  of  a  subsidy  for  more  energy 
efficient  refrigerators  (€50  for  energy  class  ‘A+’)  –  total  number  of 
refrigerators held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000336 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  2,993 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  38,311 
Lifetime savings (€)  766,216 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2  257.71  
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(iii)  Financial gains for manufacturers with extra sales 
Table 122: Refrigerators; Denmark: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 1 
  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price (€)  Revenue  Revised sales  Price (€)  Revenue 
C  2,000  383.56  767,123  246  383.56  94,529 
B  15,000  400.45  6,006,705  6,437  400.45  2,577,695 
A  198,000  410.00  81,180,000  95,969  410.00  39,347,382 
A+  84,000  565.00  47,460,000  197,462  565.00  111,566,134 
A++  2,000  737.58  1,475,168  885  737.58  652,831 
Total  301,000    136,888,996  301,000    154,238,573 
Financial gains for manufacturers  17,349,576 € 
 
￿  Summary of policy 1 
Table 123: Refrigerators; Denmark: summary of policy 1 (€50 subsidy to class ‘A+’) 
Summary  Policy 1 + baseline 
Revenue cost to government (€)  9,873,109 
Net welfare cost to society (€)  -15,890 
GHG reductions   
Revenue cost / tCO2 (€)  257.71 
Net welfare cost / tCO2 (€)  -0.41 
2.3.4.3  Policy option 2: Energy tax - additional increase in electricity price (10%) 
Table 124: Refrigerators; Denmark – additional increase in 10% of electricity prices 
2007  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price (€)  mkt share  Revised sales  Price (€)  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt shr 
C  2,000  383.56  0.007  151  381.96  0.001  -1,849  -0.0061 
B  15,000  400.45  0.050  8,003  400.45  0.027  -6,997  -0.0232  
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A  198,000  410.00  0.658  163,084  410.00  0.542  -34,916  -0.1160 
A+  84,000  565.00  0.279  126,635  565.00  0.421  42,635  0.1416 
A++  2,000  737.58  0.007  3,127  737.58  0.010  1,127  0.0037 
Total  301,000  454.78  1.000  301,000  478.35  1.000     
 
￿  Costs of policy option 2 
(i)  Revenue costs 
Table 125: Refrigerators; Denmark: Tax revenue with policy option 2 – energy price 
increase (10%); total number of refrigerators held constant 
Tax revenue (lifetime)  26,303,840 € 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
Table 126: Refrigerators; Denmark: Administrative costs of policy option 2 – energy 
price increase (10%); total number of refrigerators held constant 
Parameter:  0.20% of total tax revenue 
Administrative costs  52,608 € 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
The welfare changes from the tax are made up of the following. First, we have 
the deadweight loss from the imposition of the tax, based on the consumption of 
energy. Second, we have a welfare cost arising from the fact that consumers are 
made to buy more expensive equipment than they would if there were no tax. 
This  cost  is  simply  the  difference  in  price  (adjusted  for  quality)  between  the 
appliance bought without a tax and the one bought with a tax. Third, we have a 
welfare gain arising from the fact that the policy generates tax revenue and 
therefore reduces the cost of raising a similar amount of tax from other sources. 
This gain is calculated using the marginal cost of public funds. Fourth, we have 
the welfare gain to producers from the sale of more profitable equipment. This is 
calculated as in the case of the subsidy (see Table 119). Finally, there are gains 
from the reduction in the generation of electricity, calculated at the average 
external cost per kWh for Denmark (see section 2.3.4.2). 
Table 127: Refrigerators; Denmark: Welfare costs of policy option 2 – energy price 
increase (10%); total number of refrigerators held constant 
4  Dead-weight loss  (∆Q x ∆P) / 2 
5  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – energy (€)  1,399,512 
6  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – equipments (€)  6,340,073  
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Welfare gain from savings in costs of raising funds from other taxes (€) 
(0.26*[17]) 
6,838,999 
7  Welfare gain (profit of producers = 8% of sales revenue) (€) (0.08*[14])  567,454 
7a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  490,262 
8  Net welfare cost (€) [5+6-6a-7-7a]  -157,131 
9  Marginal cost of policy (welfare cost/tax revenue) (€) [5+6]/[17]  3.40 
9a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([8]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  -10.00 
 
￿  Benefits of policy 2 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table  128:  Refrigerators;  Denmark:  Estimates  of  energy  savings  after  the 
implementation  of  policy  option  2  –  holding  the  total  number  of 
refrigerators constant 
2007    BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Energy use








C  300  2,000  600,000  151  45,171 
B  279  15,000  4,185,000  8,003  2,232,885 
A  271  198,000  53,658,000  163,084  44,195,724 
A+  192  84,000  16,128,000  126,635  24,313,991 
A++  114  2,000  228,000  3,127  356,482 
Total    301,000  74,799,000  301,000  71,144,254 
Energy savings (GWh) / year  3.7 
HH expenditure change per year (€)  -999,321 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  46.8 
Lifetime expenditures on energy (€)  -12,791,314 
Note: (a) kWh/year;  
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(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 129: Refrigerators; Denmark: GHG emissions of policy option 2 – additional 
electricity  price  increase  (10%)  –  total  number  of  refrigerators  held 
constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000336 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  1,228 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  15,718 
Lifetime savings (€)  314,367 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2  1,673.45 
(iii)  Financial gain with extra sales 
Table 130: Refrigerators; Denmark: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 2: 
additional energy price increase (10%) 
BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price (€)  Revenue  Revised sales  Price (€)  Revenue 
C  2,000  383.56  767,123  151  381.96  57,512 
B  15,000  400.45  6,006,705  8,003  400.45  3,204,846 
A  198,000  410.00  81,180,000  163,084  410.00  66,864,380 
A+  84,000  565.00  47,460,000  126,635  565.00  71,548,985 
A++  2,000  737.58  1,475,168  3,127  737.58  2,306,448 
Total  301,000    136,888,996  301,000    143,982,171 
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￿  Summary of policy 2 
Table 131: Refrigerators; Denmark: summary of policy option 2(10% electricity price 
increase) 
Summary  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Revenue raised in tax (€)  26,303,840 
Revenue gains to producers (€)  7,093,175 
Higher costs to consumers in capital exp. (€)  6,340,073 
Higher costs to consumers in energy exp. (€)  12,791,314 
GHG reductions   
Net welfare cost (€)  -157,131 
Welfare cost/tCO2 (€)  -10.00 
2.3.4.4  Comparison of policy options 
Table 132: Refrigerators; Denmark: Cost-benefit summary 
 
   
Policy option 1 
+ baseline 




Net welfare costs  -15,890  -157,131 
11  Administrative costs  493,655  52,608 
12  Benefits  GHG  766,216  314,367 
13  Benefit – costs  288,450  418,889 
14  Revenue gain to producers (€)  17,349,576  7,093,175 
15  Energy savings (GWh)  114.0  46.8 
15a  Lifetime GHG Savings (t/CO2)  38,310.8  15,718.3 
16  Expenditure in energy by households (€)  32,934,510  -12,791,314 
17  Revenue cost to government (€)  9,873,109  -26,303,840 
18  Welfare cost/tCO2  -0.41  -10.00 
2.3.4.5  Conclusion for this case-study 
The subsidy policy has a small welfare benefit of about €15,900 while the tax option 
also has a benefit of €157,000. In terms of GHG savings the subsidy option reduces  
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emissions by 38,000 tons against 16,000 tons for the energy policy option. In terms of 
the welfare costs per ton of CO2, the subsidy option has a benefit of €0.4/ton against a 
gain of €10/ton with the energy tax. The administrative cost of subsidy option is almost 
10 times higher than the energy tax option. Finally producers’ revenue gains are much 
greater with the subsidy option (€17 million against €7 million for the tax option). 
While both France and Denmark rank the two options similarly, the Danish case has 
much smaller welfare costs and benefits than the French case and has the subsidy also 
generating a welfare gain. One reason for the differences is the much smaller gain in 
welfare from the reduction of non-GHG gases in France  compared to Denmark. In 
France  one  kWh  is  assumed  to  generate  0.254  eurocents,  while  in  Denmark  it 
generates  1.048  euro  cents.  This  makes  the  subsidy  (which  saves  relatively  more 
energy than the tax) much more feasible in Denmark than in France.   
3.3.5.  CASE-STUDY 3: WASHING-MACHINES IN ITALY 
2.3.5.1  Data report and baseline scenario 
Table 133: Sales and prices of Washing machines in Italy per energy classes 
  A+  A  B  C and others 
Sales
(a) (2007)  175,000  1,536,000  65,000  68,000 
Average sales (2005 – 2007)  143,333  --  --  -- 
Prices
(b) (2007)  520 €  451 €  400 €  230 € 
Consumption (kWh/year)  201  210  238  250 
Energy price (€/kWh)  0.2329 
 Summary of main assumptions 
(i)  Each consumer buys one product only;  
(ii)  Washing machines have a fixed lifetime (5.7 years); 
(iii)  Washing machines are identical in terms of service provided but vary in 
terms of energy efficiency and quality; 
(iv)  Washing machines class ‘C’ have inferior quality and had their market price 
adjusted upwards by +56.52 %;  
(v)  WTP for more efficient washing machines: class ‘A+’ = 21%; class ‘A’ = 11%; 
class ‘B’ = 7.5% and class ‘C’ = 0; 
(vi)  The personal discount rate of consumers is normally distributed with mean 
equal to 39% and standard deviation equal to 18.7%; 
(vii)  When  energy  use  is  reduced  this  also  reduces  emissions  of  non-GHG 
pollutants. The average value per kWh of the reduction is taken as €cent 
0.779 for Italy. This is based on (a) the unit values of external costs of each 
type  of  fuel  cycle  from  the  CASES  Project  (http://www.feem- 
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project.net/cases)  and  (b)  the  fuel  mix  used  for  power  generation  in  the 
country in 2008, as provided by EUROSTAT. 
Table 134: Washing machines; Italy – Baseline scenario - increase in 12% of electricity 
prices due to ETS 
2007  BAU  Baseline scenario 
Class  Sales  Price (€)  mkt share  Revised sales  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt shr 
C  68,000  360.00  0.037  36,791  0.020  -31,209  -0.0169 
B  65,000  400.00  0.035  61,123  0.033  -3,877  -0.0021 
A  1,536,000  451.00  0.833  1,569,828  0.851  33,828  0.0183 
A+  175,000  520.00  0.095  176,258  0.096  1,258  0.0007 
Total  1,844,000  452.39  1.000  1,844,000  1.000     
2.3.5.2  Policy option 1: Tax credit for manufacturers (€100 per appliance class A+ sold 
above average levels) 
As  described  in  section  3.3.2.  ,  our  model  expresses  consumers’  behaviour  given 
changes either in energy prices and/or the price of appliances. In order to use our 
model for predicting sales of different energy types of washing machines given the 
introduction of a tax credit for manufactures we needed to assume that manufacturers 
would transfer part of their profit on selling extra washing machines type A+ to the 
market price, in order to make those washing machines more feasible for consumers. 
That is, we assumed that manufacturers would need to reduce the price of washing 
machines class ‘A+’ in order to increase sales of that type of product.  
We first calibrated the market data to fit our model by adjusting prices according to 
differences in quality among energy classes and the public good willingness to pay. We 
then used our model to predict new sales of washing machines class ‘A+’ given several 
price  reductions.  For  each  price  reduction  (and  correspondent  new  sales  level  of 
washing machine type A+) we estimated the manufacturers’ profit equal to 20% of 
sales revenue plus the €100 tax credit received for each appliance sold above the 3-
years average. We selected the maximum value that manufactures should reduce the 
final price of products class ‘A+’ without decreasing their profit with washing machines 
class A+. For Italy, this price reduction equalled €32. 
We acknowledge that this procedure does not reflect the complexity of tax systems in 
Europe. Tax credits only reduce the tax liability of manufacturers and it may not be the 
case that manufacturers will benefit of the total amount offered as a tax credit. This 
will depend on the level of production of the manufacturer, the tax rates in place etc. 
However, we believe that the procedure is based on the credible assumption that 
manufacturers would need to pass on to consumers part of the expected benefits 
obtained with the tax incentive in order to induce consumers to shift to class A+ and 
that they would do so to the extent that is was profitable for them.  
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Table 135: Washing machines; Italy: Tax credit for manufacturers: €100 for energy 
class ‘A+’ above the average sales 
2007  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 






∆sales  ∆mkt share 
C  68,000  360.00  0.037  18,791  360.00  0.010  -49,209  -0.0267 
B  65,000  400.00  0.035  31,219  400.00  0.017  -33,781  -0.0183 




A+  175,000  520.00  0.095  992,196  488.00  0.538  817,196  0.4432 
Total  1,844,000  452.39  1.000  1,844,000  469.12  1.000     
￿  Costs of policy option 1 
(i)  Revenue costs to the government 
Table 136: Washing machines; Italy: Revenue costs of a tax credit for manufacturers: 
€100  for  energy  class  ‘A+’  above  the  average  sales  –  total  number  of 
washing machines held constant 
2007  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Revised sales  Tax incentive (€)  Revenue cost (€) 
C  18,791  0  0 
B  31,219  0  0 
A  801,794  0  0 
A+  992,196 – 143,333 = 848,862  100  84,886,243 
Total      84,886,243 
 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
As discussed earlier, we assume that this policy option has negligible additional 
administrative costs. 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
These are made up of (a) the marginal cost of public funds, estimated at 26% of 
the amount of revenue raised; (b) gains in producers’ profits at 8% of the extra 
sales revenue, which is based on information provided by the consultants by  
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drawing  on  direct  data  collection;  and  (c)  the  gain  from  reduced  non-GHG 
emissions. 
Table 137: Washing machines; Italy: Welfare costs of a Tax credit for manufacturers: 
€100  for  energy  class  ‘A+’  above  the  average  sales  –  total  number  of 
washing machines held constant 
1  Welfare cost (marginal cost of public funds = 26% of the revenue 
cost) (€) 
22,070,423 
2  Welfare  gain  (profit  of  producers  =  8%  of  sales  revenue)  (€) 
(0.08*[14]) 
2,466,968 
2a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  455,974 
3  Net welfare cost (€) [1-2-2a]  19,147,481 
3a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([3]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  650.34 
￿  Benefits of policy 1 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table  138:  Washing  machines;  Italy:  Estimates  of  energy  savings  after  the 
implementation of a tax credit for manufacturers: €100 for energy class 
‘A+’ above the average sales – total number of washing machines held 
constant 













C  250  68,000  17,000,000  18,791  4,697,761 
B  238  65,000  15,470,000  31,219  7,430,074 
A  210  1,536,000  322,560,000  801,794  168,376,823 
A+  201  175,000  35,175,000  992,196  199,431,348 
Total    1,844,000  390,205,000  1,844,000  379,936,006 
Energy savings (GWh) / year  10.3 
Reductions in Expenditure on Energy (€)  2,678,646 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  58.5 
Lifetime expenditure savings on energy (€)  15,268,285 
Note: (a) kWh/year;   
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(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 139: Washing machines; Italy: GHG emissions of a tax credit for manufacturers: 
€100  for  energy  class  ‘A+’  above  the  average  sales  –  total  number  of 
washing machines held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000503 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  5,165 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  29,442 
Lifetime savings (€)  588,845 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2  2,883 
 
(iii)  Financial gains for manufacturers with extra sales 
Table 140: Washing machines; Italy: Financial gains – sales revenue – Tax credit for 
manufacturers: €100 for energy class ‘A+’ above the average sales 
  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price (€)  Revenue  Revised sales  Price (€)  Revenue 
C  68,000  360.00  24,480,000  18,791  360.00  6,764,776 
B  65,000  400.00  26,000,000  31,219  400.00  12,487,519 
A  1,536,000  451.00  692,736,000  801,794  451.00  361,609,272 
A+  175,000  520.00  91,000,000  992,196  488.00  484,191,532 
Total  1,844,000    834,216,000  1,844,000    865,053,100 
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￿  Summary of policy 1 
Table  141:  Washing  machines;  Italy:  summary  of  policy  option  1  (Tax  credit  for 
manufacturers: €100 for energy class ‘A+’ above the average sales) 
Summary  Policy 1 + baseline 
Revenue cost to government (€)  84,886,243 
Net welfare cost to society (€)  19,147,481 
GHG reductions   
Revenue cost / tCO2 (€)  2,883.15 
Net welfare cost / tCO2 (€)  650.34 
2.3.5.3  Policy option 2: B-class and lower removed from the market 
Table 142: Washing machines; Italy – B-class and lower removed from the market 
2007  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price (€)  mkt share  Revised sales  Price (€)  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
C  68,000  360.00  0.037  0  360.00  0.000  -68,000  -0.0369 
B  65,000  400.00  0.035  0  400.00  0.000  -65,000  -0.0352 
A  1,536,000  451.00  0.833  1,669,000  451.00  0.905  133,000  0.0721 
A+  175,000  520.00  0.095  175,000  520.00  0.095  0  0.0000 
Total  1,844,000  452.39  1.000  1,844,000  457.55  1.000     
￿    Costs of policy option 2 
(i)  Administrative costs 
As discussed earlier, we assume that this policy option has negligible additional 
administrative costs. 
(ii)  Welfare costs 
The welfare changes from the removal of B-class or lower from the market are 
made up of the following. First, we have a welfare cost arising from the fact that 
consumers are made to buy more expensive equipment than they would if there 
were no such policy. This cost is simply the difference in price (adjusted for 
quality) between the appliance bought without a tax and the one bought with a 
tax.  Second,  we  have  the  welfare  gain  to  producers  from  the  sale  of  more 
profitable equipment. This is calculated as in the case of the tax credit (see Table 
137). Finally, there are gains from the reduction of the emissions of non-GHG  
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pollutants in the generation of electricity, calculated at the average external cost 
per kWh for Italy (see section 2.3.4.2). 
Table 143: Washing machines; Italy: Welfare costs of policy option 2 – B-class and 
lower removed from the market; total number of washing machines held 
constant 
4  Dead-weight loss  (∆Q x ∆P) / 2 
5  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – energy (€)  0 
6  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – equipments (€)  6,274,275 
6a 
Welfare gain from savings in costs of raising funds from other taxes (€) 
(0.26*[17]) 
0 
7  Welfare gain (profit of producers = 8% of sales revenue) (€) (0.08*[14])  760,240 
7a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  201,590 
8  Net welfare cost (€) [5+6-6a-7-7a]  5,312,445 
9  Marginal cost of policy (welfare cost/tax revenue) (€) [5+6]/[17]  0.00 
9a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([8]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  408.13 
 
￿  Benefits of policy 2 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table  144:  Washing  machines;  Italy:  Estimates  of  energy  savings  after  the 
implementation of policy option 2: B-class and lower removed from the 
market – holding the total number of washing machines constant 













C  250  68,000  17,000,000  0  0 
B  238  65,000  15,470,000  0  0 
A  210  1,536,000  322,560,000  1,669,000  350,490,000 
A+  201  175,000  35,175,000  175,000  35,175,000 
Total    1,844,000  390,205,000  1,844,000  385,665,000 
Energy savings (GWh) / year  4.5  
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HH expenditure change per year (€)  1,184,250 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  25.9 
Lifetime expenditures on energy (€)  6,750,225 
Note: (a) kWh/year;  
(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 145: Washing machines; Italy: GHG emissions of policy option 2 – B-class and 
lower removed from the market – total number of washing machines held 
constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000503 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  2,284 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  13,017 
Lifetime savings (€)  260,333 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2  0.00 € 
(iii)  Financial gain with extra sales 
Table 146: Washing machines; Italy: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 2: 
B-class and lower removed from the market 
  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue  Revised sales  Price  Revenue 
C  68,000  360.00  24,480,000  0  360.00  0 
B  65,000  400.00  26,000,000  0  400.00  0 
A  1,536,000  451.00  692,736,000  1,669,000  451.00  752,719,000 
A+  175,000  520.00  91,000,000  175,000  520.00  91,000,000 
Total  1,844,000    834,216,000  1,844,000    843,719,000 
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￿  Summary of policy 2 
Table 147: Washing machines; Italy: summary of policy option 2(B-class and lower 
removed from the market) 
Summary  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Revenue raised in tax (€)  0 
Revenue gains to producers (€)  9,503,000 
Higher costs to consumers in capital exp. (€)  6,274,275 
Higher costs to consumers in energy exp. (€)  -6,750,225 
GHG reductions   
Net welfare cost (€)  5,312,445 
Welfare cost/tCO2 (€)  408.13 
2.3.5.4  Comparison of policy options 
Table 148: Washing machines; Italy: Cost-benefit summary 
 
   
Policy option 1 
+ baseline 




Net welfare costs  19,147,481  5,312,445 
11  Administrative costs  0  0 
12  Benefits  GHG  588,845  260,333 
13  Benefit – costs  -18,558,636  -5,052,113 
14  Revenue gain to producers (€)  30,837,100  9,503,000 
15  Energy savings (GWh)  58.5  25.9 
15a  Lifetime GHG Savings (t/CO2)  29,442.2  13,016.6 
16  Expenditure in energy by households (€)  15,268,285  6,750,225 
17  Revenue cost to government (€)  84,886,243  0 
18  Welfare cost/tCO2  650.34  408.13 
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2.3.5.5  Conclusions  
The tax credit has a net welfare cost of €19 million, against a net welfare cost of €5 
million from the removal of inefficient appliances from the market, making the removal 
option more feasible. However, the removal option generates a smaller saving in GHG 
than the tax credit (13,000 tons against 29,000 tons for the tax credit). In terms of the 
welfare costs per tCO2, the removal option is therefore cheaper at €408/ton against 
€650/ton  for  the  tax  credit.  Both  these  figures,  however,  would  be  considered 
unacceptably high for projects designed to reduce GHGs. Finally while producers make 
a gain from the removal of classes B and C (€10 million), they make an even bigger gain 
from the tax credit scheme (€31 million). The reason for the bigger gains with the tax 
credit is a huge shift from A to A+, while the removal of classes B and C only results in a 
move to class A, which is cheaper than A+. 
3.3.6.  CASE-STUDY 4: WASHING-MACHINES IN POLAND 
2.3.6.1  Data report and baseline scenario 
Table 149: Sales and prices of Washing machines in Poland per energy classes 
  A+  A  B  C and others 
Sales (2007)  23,000  839,000  11,000  90,000 
Average sales (2005 – 2007)  16,333  --  --  -- 
Prices (2007)  550 €  535 €  450 €  380 € 
Consumption (kWh/year)  201  210  238  250 
Energy price (€/kWh)  0.1216 
 Summary of main assumptions 
(i)  Each consumer buys one product only;  
(ii)  Washing machines have a fixed lifetime (5.7 years); 
(iii)  Washing machines are identical in terms of service provided but vary in terms 
of energy efficiency and quality; 
(iv)  Washing machines classes ‘C’ and ‘B’ have inferior quality and had their market 
price adjusted upwards by +23.68 % (class ‘C’) and +11.11 (class ‘B’);  
(v)  WTP for more efficient washing machines: class ‘A+’ = 10%; class ‘A’ = 8%; class 
‘B’ = 5% and class ‘C’ = 0; 
(vi)  The personal discount rate of consumers is normally distributed with mean 
equal to 39% and standard deviation equal to 18.7%; 
(vii)  When  energy  use  is  reduced  this  also  reduces  emissions  of  non-GHG 
pollutants. The average value per kWh of the reduction is taken as €cent 1.225  
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for Poland. This is based on (a) the unit values of external costs of each type of 
fuel cycle from the CASES Project (http://www.feem-project.net/cases) and (b) 
the fuel mix used for power generation in the country in 2008, as provided by 
EUROSTAT. 
Table  150:  Washing  machines;  Poland  –  Baseline  scenario  -  increase  in  12%  of 
electricity prices due to ETS 
2007  BAU  Baseline scenario 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share  Revised sales  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
C  90,000  470.00  0.093  48,552  0.050  -41,448  -0.0430 
B  11,000  500.00  0.011  9,757  0.010  -1,243  -0.0013 
A  839,000  535.00  0.871  880,539  0.914  41,539  0.0431 
A+  23,000  550.00  0.024  24,152  0.025  1,152  0.0012 
Total  963,000  528.88  1.000  963,000  1.000     
2.3.6.2  Policy option 1: Tax credit for manufacturers (€100 per appliance class A+ sold 
above average levels) 
Table 151: Washing machines; Poland: Tax credit for manufacturers: €100 for energy 
class ‘A+’ above the average sales 
2007  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share  Revised sales  Price  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
C  90,000  470.00  0.093  41,675  470.00  0.043  -48,325  -0.0502 
B  11,000  500.00  0.011  8,375  500.00  0.009  -2,625  -0.0027 
A  839,000  535.00  0.871  755,830  535.00  0.785  -83,170  -0.0864 
A+  23,000  550.00  0.024  157,119  538.00  0.163  134,119  0.1393 
Total  963,000  528.88  1.000  963,000  532.37  1.000     
Note: The maximum value that manufactures should reduce the final price of products 
class ‘A+’ without decreasing their profit with washing machines class A+ in Poland 
equalled 12€. 
￿  Costs of policy option 1: 
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Table  152:  Washing  machines;  Poland:  Revenue  costs  of  a  tax  credit  for 
manufacturers: €100 for energy class ‘A+’ above the average sales – total 
number of washing machines held constant 
2007  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Revised sales  Tax incentive (€)  Revenue cost (€) 
C  41,675  0  0 
B  8,375  0  0 
A  755,830  0  0 
A+  157,119 – 16,333 = 140,786  100  14,078,551 
Total      14,078,551 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
As  discussed  earlier,  we  assume  that  this  policy  option  has  no  or  negligible 
administrative costs. 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
These are made up of (a) the marginal cost of public funds, estimated at 26% of 
the amount of revenue raised; (b) gains in producers’ profits at 8% of the extra 
sales  revenue,  which  is  based  on  information  provided  by  the  consultants  by 
drawing  on  direct  data  collection;  and  (c)  the  gain  from  reduced  non-GHG 
emissions. 
Table  153:  Washing  machines;  Poland:  Welfare  costs  of  a  Tax  credit  for 
manufacturers: €100 for energy class ‘A+’ above the average sales – total 
number of washing machines held constant 
1  Welfare cost (marginal cost of public funds = 26% of the revenue 
cost) (€) 
3,660,423 
2  Welfare  gain  (profit  of  producers  =  8%  of  sales  revenue)  (€) 
(0.08*[14]) 
268,746 
2a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  224,386 
3  Net welfare cost (€) [1-2-2a]  3,167,292 
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￿  Benefits of policy 1 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table  154:  Washing  machines;  Poland:  Estimates  of  energy  savings  after  the 
implementation of a tax credit for manufacturers: €100 for energy class 
‘A+’ above the average sales – total number of washing machines held 
constant 













C  250  90,000  22,500,000  41,675  10,418,845 
B  238  11,000  2,618,000  8,375  1,993,327 
A  210  839,000  176,190,000  755,830  158,724,395 
A+  201  23,000  4,623,000  157,119  31,580,887 
Total    963,000  205,931,000  963,000  202,717,455 
Energy savings (GWh) / year  3.2 
Reductions in Expenditure on Energy (€)  437,659 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  18.3 
Lifetime expenditure savings on energy (€)  2,494,657 
Note: (a) kWh/year;  
(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table  155:  Washing  machines;  Poland:  GHG  emissions  of  a  tax  credit  for 
manufacturers: €100 for energy class ‘A+’ above the average sales – total 
number of washing machines held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000609 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  1,957 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  11,155 
Lifetime savings (€)  223,104 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2 (€)  1,262  
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(iii)  Financial gains for manufacturers with extra sales 
Table 156: Washing machines; Poland: Financial gains – sales revenue – Tax credit for 
manufacturers: €100 for energy class ‘A+’ above the average sales 
  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue  Revised sales  Price  Revenue 
C  90,000  470.00  42,300,000  41,675  470.00  19,587,429 
B  11,000  500.00  5,500,000  8,375  500.00  4,187,663 
A  839,000  535.00  448,865,000  755,830  535.00  404,369,292 
A+  23,000  550.00  12,650,000  157,119  538.00  84,529,937 
Total  963,000    509,315,000  963,000    512,674,320 
Financial gains for manufacturers  3,359,320 € 
 
￿  Summary of policy 1 
Table 157: Washing machines; Poland: summary of policy option 1 (Tax credit for 
manufacturers: €100 for energy class ‘A+’ above the average sales) 
Summary  Policy 1 + baseline 
Revenue cost to government (€)  14,078,551 
Net welfare cost to society (€)  3,167,292 
GHG reductions   
Revenue cost / tCO2 (€)  1,262.06 
Net welfare cost / tCO2 (€)  283.93 
2.3.6.3  Policy option 2: B-class and lower removed from the market 
Table 158: Washing machines; Poland – B-class and lower removed from the market 
2007  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share  Revised sales  Price  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
C  90,000  470.00  0.093  0  470.00  0.000  -90,000  -0.0935 
B  11,000  500.00  0.011  0  500.00  0.000  -11,000  -0.0114  
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A  839,000  535.00  0.871  940,000  535.00  0.976  101,000  0.1049 
A+  23,000  550.00  0.024  23,000  550.00  0.024  0  0.0000 
Total  963,000  528.88  1.000  963,000  535.36  1.000     
￿  Costs of policy option 2 
(i)  Administrative costs 
As  discussed  earlier,  we  assume  that  this  policy  option  has  no  or  negligible 
administrative costs. 
(ii)  Welfare costs 
The welfare changes from the removal of B-class or lower from the market are 
made up of the following. First, we have a welfare cost arising from the fact that 
consumers are made to buy more expensive equipment than they would if there 
were no such policy. This cost is simply the difference in price (adjusted for 
quality) between the appliance bought without a tax and the one bought with a 
tax.  Second,  we  have  the  welfare  gain  to  producers  from  the  sale  of  more 
profitable equipment. This is calculated as in the case of the tax credit (see Table 
153). Finally, there are gains from the reduction of the emissions of non-GHG 
pollutants in the generation of electricity, calculated at the average external cost 
per kWh for Poland (see section 2.3.6.2). 
Table 159: Washing machines; Poland: Welfare costs of policy option 2 – B-class and 
lower removed from the market; total number of washing machines held 
constant 
4  Dead-weight loss  (∆Q x ∆P) / 2 
5  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – energy (€)  0 
6  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – equipments (€)  3,358,250 
6a  Welfare gain from savings in costs of raising funds from other taxes (€) 
(0.26*[17])  0 
7  Welfare gain (profit of producers = 8% of sales revenue) (€) (0.08*[14])  498,800 
7a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  272,876 
8  Net welfare cost (€) [5+6-6a-7-7a]  2,586,574 
9  Marginal cost of policy (welfare cost/tax revenue) (€) [5+6]/[17]  0 
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￿  Benefits of policy 2 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table  160:  Washing  machines;  Poland:  Estimates  of  energy  savings  after  the 
implementation of policy option 2: B-class and lower removed from the 
market – holding the total number of washing machines constant 













C  250  90,000  22,500,000  0  0 
B  238  11,000  2,618,000  0  0 
A  210  839,000  176,190,000  940,000  197,400,000 
A+  201  23,000  4,623,000  23,000  4,623,000 
Total    963,000  205,931,000  963,000  202,023,000 
Energy savings (GWh) / year  3.9 
HH expenditure change per year (€)  532,238 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  22.3 
Lifetime expenditures on energy (€)  3,033,759 
Note: (a) kWh/year;  
(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 161: Washing machines; Poland: GHG emissions of policy option 2 – B-class and 
lower removed from the market – total number of washing machines held 
constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000609 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  2,380 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  13,566 
Lifetime savings (€)  271,317 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2  0.00 € 
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(iii)  Financial gain with extra sales 
Table 162: Washing machines; Poland: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 
2: B-class and lower removed from the market 
  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue  Revised sales  Price  Revenue 
C  90,000  470.00  42,300,000  0  470.00  0 
B  11,000  500.00  5,500,000  0  500.00  0 
A  839,000  535.00  448,865,000  940,000  535.00  502,900,000 
A+  23,000  550.00  12,650,000  23,000  550.00  12,650,000 
Total  963,000    509,315,000  963,000    515,550,000 
Financial gains for manufacturers  6,235,000 € 
 
￿  Summary of policy 2 
Table 163: Washing machines; Poland: summary of policy option 2(B-class and lower 
removed from the market) 
Summary  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Revenue raised in tax (€)  0 
Revenue gains to producers (€)  6,235,000 
Higher costs to consumers in capital exp. (€)  3,358,250 
Higher costs to consumers in energy exp. (€)  -3,033,759 
GHG reductions   
Net welfare cost (€)  2,586,574 
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2.3.6.4  Comparison of policy options 
Table 164: Washing machines; Poland: Cost-benefit summary 
 
   
Policy option 1 
+ baseline 




Net welfare costs  3,167,292  2,586,574 
11  Administrative costs  0  0 
12  Benefits  GHG  223,104  271,317 
13  Benefit – costs  -2,944,188  -2,315,257 
14  Revenue gain to producers (€)  3,359,320  6,235,000 
15  Energy savings (GWh)  18.3  22.3 
15a  Lifetime GHG Savings (t/CO2)  11,155.2  13,565.8 
16  Expenditure in energy by households (€)  2,494,657  3,033,759 
17  Revenue cost to government (€)  14,078,551  0 
18  Welfare cost/tCO2  283.93  190.67 
2.3.6.5  Conclusions  
The results for Poland are similar to those for Italy: there is a bigger welfare cost from 
the tax credit option but a smaller reduction in GHG from that option. The cost per ton 
of CO2 removed in tax credit option is now €284/tCO2, while it is €190/ton for the 
removal option. The revenue gain to producers under the removal option is about 
€6million,  while  under  tax  credit  option  it  is  less,  at  €3  million.  This  last  result  is 
different from that in Italy. Since a lot more people have B and C class machines in 
Poland compared to Italy, the removal of these in Poland creates a bigger demand 
(relatively speaking) than in Italy. Hence the profits to producers are bigger under the 
removal option in Poland. 
3.3.7.  CASE-STUDY 5: BOILERS IN DENMARK 
2.3.7.1  Data report and baseline scenario 
Table 165: Sales and prices of boilers in Denmark per type 
  Non-condensing  Condensing 
Sales (2007)  7,000  28,000 
Prices (€) (2007)  2,396  3,168  
216 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote  








Lifetime (years)  15 
Gas price (€/kWh)  0.45278 
 Summary of main assumptions 
(i)  Each consumer buys one product only;  
(ii)  Boilers have a fixed lifetime (15 years); 
(iii)  Boilers types are identical in terms of service provided but vary in terms of 
energy efficiency; 
(iv)  No adjustment in price due to quality of products;  
(v)  WTP for public good assumed 20% for condensing boilers; 
(vi)  The personal discount rate of consumers is normally distributed with mean 
equal to 39% and standard deviation equal to 18.7%; 
(vii)  Percentage of consumers assumed to pay income tax: 85%; 
(viii)  Average income tax level: 36.8% of income; 
(ix)  When  energy  use  is  reduced  this  also  reduces  emissions  of  non-GHG 
pollutants. The average value per kWh of the reduction is taken as €cent 
1.048 for Denmark. This is based on (a) the unit values of external costs of 
each  type  of  fuel  cycle  from  the  CASES  Project  (http://www.feem-
project.net/cases)  and  (b)  the  fuel  mix  used  for  power  generation  in  the 
country in 2008, as provided by EUROSTAT. 
Table 166: Boiler; Denmark – Baseline scenario - increase in 15% of gas prices due to 
ETS 
2007  BAU  Baseline scenario 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share  Revised sales  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
Non-cond.  7,000  2396  0.200  5,744  0.164  -1,256  -0.0359 
Condensing  28,000  3168  0.800  29,256  0.836  1,256  0.0359 
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2.3.7.2  Policy option 1: Tax credit for consumers (25% of condensing boilers’ prices to 
be deducted from income tax) 
Table 167: Boiler; Denmark : Tax credits for consumers: 25% of condensing boilers 
deducted from income tax 
2007  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share 
Revised 
sales 
Price  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
Non-cond.  7,000  2396  0.200  42  2,396  0.001  -6,958  -0.1988 
Condensing  28,000  3168  0.800  34,958  2,877  0.999  6,958  0.1988 
Total  35,000  3014  1.000  35,000  2,876  1.000     
￿  Costs of policy option 1 
(i)  Revenue costs to the government 
Table 168: Boiler; Denmark: Revenue costs of a tax credit for consumers – total 
number of boilers held constant 
2007  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Revised sales  Tax incentive (€)  Revenue cost (€) 
Non-cond.  42  0  0 
Condensing  (34,958 – 28,000) * 0.85 =5,914  792  4,684,269 
Total  5,956    4,684,269 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
As  discussed  earlier,  we  assume  that  this  policy  option  has  no  or  negligible 
administrative costs. 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
These are made up of (a) the marginal cost of public funds, estimated at 26% of 
the amount of revenue raised; (b) gains in producers’ profits at 8.5% of the extra 
sales  revenue,  which  is  based  on  information  provided  by  the  consultants  by 
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Table  169:  Boiler;  Denmark:  Welfare  costs  of  a  tax  credit  for  consumers  –  total 
number of boilers held constant 
1  Welfare cost (marginal cost of public funds = 26% of the revenue 
cost) (€)  1,217,910 
2  Welfare  gain  (profit  of  producers  =  8.5%  of  sales  revenue)  (€) 
(0.085*[14])  456,598 
2a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  3,245,856 
3  Net welfare cost (€) [1-2-2a]  -2,484,544 
3a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([3]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  -23.87 
 
￿  Benefits of policy 1 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table 170: Boiler; Denmark: Estimates of energy savings after the implementation of 
policy option 1 – total number of boilers held constant 
2007    BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Energy use (m








Non-cond.  2,000  7,000  151,620,000  42  905,098 
Condensing  1,726  28,000  523,392,240  34,958  653,459,200 
Total    35,000  675,012,240  35,000  654,364,298 
Energy savings (GWh)  20.6 
Savings on expenditure on energy (€)  91,666 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  309.7 
Lifetime expenditure savings on energy (€)  1,374,988 
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(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 171: Boiler; Denmark: GHG emissions of a tax credit for consumers – total 
number of boilers held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000336 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2/kWh)  6,938 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2/kWh)  104,066 
Lifetime savings (€)  2,081,313 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2 (€)  45.01 
(iii)  Financial gains for manufacturers with extra sales 
Table 172: Boiler; Denmark: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 1 
  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue  Revised sales  Price  Revenue 
Non-cond.  7,000  2396  16,772,000  42  2396.00  100,121 
Condensing  28,000  3168  88,704,000  34,958  3168.00  110,747,620 
Total  35,000    105,476,000  35,000    110,847,741 
Financial gains for manufacturers  5,371,741 € 
 
￿  Summary of policy 1 
Table 173: Boiler; Denmark: summary of policy option 1 (tax credit for consumers) 
Summary  Policy 1 + baseline 
Revenue cost to government (€)  4,684,269 
Net welfare cost to society (€)  -2,484,544 
GHG reductions   
Revenue cost / tCO2 (€)  45.01 
Net welfare cost / tCO2 (€)  -23.87  
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2.3.7.3  Policy option 2: Energy tax - additional increase in gas price (10%) 
Table 174: Boiler; Denmark – additional increase in 10% of gas prices 
2007  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share  Revised sales  Price  Mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
Non-cond.  7,000  2396  0.200  4,716  2,396  0.135  -2,284  -0.0653 
Condensing  28,000  3168  0.800  30,284  3,168  0.865  2,284  0.0653 
Total  35,000  3014  1.000  35,000  3064  1.000     
   
￿  Costs of policy option 2 
(i)  Revenue costs 
Table 175: Boiler; Denmark: Tax revenue with policy option 2 – energy price increase 
(10%); total number of boilers held constant 
Tax revenue (lifetime)  4,449,905 € 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
Table 176: Boiler; Denmark: Administrative costs of policy option 2 – energy price 
increase (10%); total number of boilers held constant 
Parameter:  0.20% of total tax revenue 
Administrative costs  8,900 € 
 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
The welfare changes from the tax are made up of the following. First, we have 
the deadweight loss from the imposition of the tax, based on the consumption of 
energy. Second, we have a welfare cost arising from the fact that consumers are 
made to buy more expensive equipment than they would if there were no tax. 
This cost is simply the difference in price (adjusted for quality) between the 
appliance bought without a tax and the one bought with a tax. Third, we have a 
welfare gain arising from the fact that the policy generates tax revenue and 
therefore reduces the cost of raising a similar amount of tax from other sources. 
This gain is calculated using the marginal cost of public funds. Fourth, we have 
the welfare gain to producers from the sale of more profitable equipment. This is 
calculated as in the case of the tax credit (see Table 169). Finally, there are gains 
from the reduction in the generation of electricity, calculated at the average 
external cost per kWh for Denmark (see section 2.3.7.2).  
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Table 177: Boiler; Denmark: Welfare costs of policy option 2 – energy price increase 
(10%); total number of boilers held constant 
4  Dead-weight loss  (∆Q x ∆P) / 2 
5  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – energy (€)  52,008 
6  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – equipments (€)  1,763,482 
6a  Welfare gain from savings in costs of raising funds from other taxes (€) 
(0.26*[17])  1,156,975 
7  Welfare  gain  (profit  of  producers  =  8.5%  of  sales  revenue)  (€) 
(0.085*[14])  149,896 
7a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  1,065,578 
8  Net welfare cost (€) [5+6-6a-7-7a]  -556,959 
9  Marginal cost of policy (welfare cost/tax revenue) (€) [5+6]/[17]  2.45 
9a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([8]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  -16.30 
 
￿  Benefits of policy 2 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table 178: Boiler; Denmark: Estimates of energy savings after the implementation of 
policy option 2 – holding the total number of boilers constant 
2007    BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Energy use (m








Non-cond.  2,000  7,000  151,620,000  4,716  102,141,989 
Condensing  1,726  28,000  523,392,240  30,284  566,091,764 
Total    35,000  675,012,240  35,000  668,233,752 
Energy savings (GWh)  6.8 
Household expenditure change (€)  -266,567 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  101.7 
Lifetime expenditures on energy (€)  -3,998,511 
Note: (a) Wh;   
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(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 179: Boiler; Denmark: GHG emissions of policy option 2 – additional gas price 
increase (10%) – total number of boilers held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000336 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2/kWh)  2,278 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2/kWh)  34,164 
Lifetime savings (€)  683,272 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2 (€)  130.25 
(iii)  Financial gain with extra sales 
Table  180:  Boiler;  Denmark:  Financial  gains  –  sales  revenue  –  policy  option  2: 
additional energy price increase (10%) 
  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue  Revised sales  Price  Revenue 
Non-cond.  7,000  2396  16,772,000  4,716  2396.00  11,298,809 
Condensing  28,000  3168  88,704,000  30,284  3168.00  95,940,673 
Total  35,000    105,476,000  35,000    107,239,482 
Financial gains for manufacturers  1,763,482 € 
 
￿  Summary of policy 2 
Table 181: Boiler; Denmark: summary of policy option 2(10% gas price increase) 
Summary  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Revenue raised in tax  4,449,905 
Revenue gains to producers  1,763,482 
Higher costs to consumers in capital exp.  1,763,482 
Higher costs to consumers in energy exp.  3,998,511 
GHG reductions    
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Net welfare cost  -556,959 
Welfare cost/tCO2  -16.30 
2.3.7.4  Comparison of policy options 
Table 182: Boiler; Denmark: Cost-benefit summary 
 
   
Policy option 1 
+ baseline 




Net welfare costs  -2,484,544  -556,959 
11  Administrative costs  0  8,900 
12  Benefits  GHG  2,081,313  683,272 
13  Benefit – costs  4,565,857  1,231,331 
14  Revenue gain to producers (€)  5,371,741  1,763,482 
15  Energy savings (GWh)  309.7  101.7 
15a  Lifetime GHG Savings (t/CO2)  104,065.6  34,163.6 
16  Expenditure in energy by households (€)  1,374,988  -3,998,511 
17  Revenue cost to government (€)  4,684,269  -4,449,905 
18  Welfare cost/tCO2  -23.87  -16.30 
2.3.7.5  Conclusions  
The tax credit has a higher welfare benefit than the gas price increase (€2.5 million for 
tax credit and €557,000 for the gas price increase). The tax credit option therefore is 
also very cost-effective in per tCO2 (a gain of €24/ton), while the gas price has a smaller 
welfare gain of €16/tCO2. The tax credit reduces GHGs by 100,000 tons against 34,000 
tons for the gas price increase. The other big difference between the options concerns 
the  revenue  cost  for  the  government  –  the  tax  option  generates  revenue  of  €4.5 
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3.3.8.  CASE-STUDY 6: BOILERS IN ITALY 
2.3.8.1  Data report and baseline scenario 
Table 183: Sales and prices of boilers in Italy per type 
  Non-condensing  Condensing 
Sales (2007)  1,009,000  138,000 








Lifetime (years)  15 
Gas price (€/kWh)  0.19202 
Summary of main assumptions 
(i)  Each consumer buys one product only;  
(ii)  Boilers have a fixed lifetime (15 years); 
(iii)  Boilers types are identical in terms of service provided but vary in terms of 
energy efficiency; 
(iv)  No adjustment in price due to quality of products;  
(v)  WTP for public good assumed 20% for condensing boilers; 
(vi)  The personal discount rate of consumers is normally distributed with mean 
equal to 39% and standard deviation equal to 18.7%; 
(vii)  Percentage of consumers assumed to pay income tax: 69%; 
(viii)  Average income tax level: 17.9% of income; 
(ix)  When  energy  use  is  reduced  this  also  reduces  emissions  of  non-GHG 
pollutants. The average value per kWh of the reduction is taken as €cent 
0.779 for Italy. This is based on (a) the unit values of external costs of each 
type  of  fuel  cycle  from  the  CASES  Project  (http://www.feem-
project.net/cases)  and  (b)  the  fuel  mix  used  for  power  generation  in  the 
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Table 184: Boiler; Italy – Baseline scenario - increase in 15% of gas prices due to ETS 
2007  BAU  Baseline scenario 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share 
Revised 
sales 
mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
Non-cond.  1,009,000  926.00  1,009,000  960,362  0.837  -48,638  -0.0424 
Condensing  138,000  1224.00  138,000  186,638  0.163  48,638  0.0424 
Total  1,147,000  961.85  1.000  1,147,000  1.000     
2.3.8.2  Policy option 1: Tax credit for consumers (25% of condensing boilers’ prices to 
be deducted from income tax) 
Table  185:  Boiler;  Italy:  Tax  credits  for  consumers:  25%  of  condensing  boilers 
deducted from income tax 
2007  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share 
Revised 
sales 
Price  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
Non-cond.  1,009,000  926  0.880  103,755  926.00  0.090  -905,245  -0.7892 
Condensing  138,000  1224  0.120  1,043,245  1,169.23  0.910  905,245  0.7892 
Total  1,147,000  961.8  1.000  1,147,000  1147.22  1.000     
 
￿  Costs of policy option 1 
(i)  Revenue costs to the government 
Table 186: Boiler; Italy: Revenue costs of a tax credit for consumers – total number of 
boilers held constant 
2007  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Revised sales  Tax incentive (€)  Revenue cost (€) 
Non-cond.  103,755  0  0 
Condensing 
(1,043,245 – 138,000) * 0.69 
= 624,619 
306  191,133,374 
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(ii)  Administrative costs 
As  discussed  earlier,  we  assume  that  this  policy  option  has  no  or  negligible 
administrative costs. 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
These are made up of (a) the marginal cost of public funds, estimated at 26% of 
the amount of revenue raised; (b) gains in producers’ profits at 8.5% of the extra 
sales revenue, which is based on information provided by the consultants by 
drawing  on  direct  data  collection;  and  (c)  the  gain  from  reduced  non-GHG 
emissions. 
Table 187: Boiler; Italy: Welfare costs of a tax credit for consumers – total number of 
boilers held constant 
1  Welfare cost (marginal cost of public funds = 26% of the revenue 
cost) (€) 
49,694,677 
2  Welfare  gain  (profit  of  producers  =  8.5%  of  sales  revenue)  (€) 
(0.085*[14]) 
22,929,849 
2a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  313,887,301 
3  Net welfare cost (€) [1-2-2a]  -287,122,473 
3a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([3]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  -14.17 
￿  Benefits of policy 1 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table  188:  Boiler;  Italy:  Estimates  of  energy savings  after  the  implementation  of 
policy option 1 – total number of boilers held constant 
2007    BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Energy use (m








Non-cond.  2000  1,009,000  21,854,940,000  103,755  2,247,338,951 
Condensing  1726  138,000  2,579,576,040  1,043,245  19,500,935,745 
Total    1,147,000  24,434,516,040  1,147,000  21,748,274,696 
Energy savings (GWh)  2,686.2 
Savings on expenditure on energy (€)  5,057,460 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  40,293.6 
Lifetime expenditure savings on energy (€)  75,861,894 
Note: (a) kWh;   
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(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 189: Boiler; Italy: GHG emissions of a tax credit for consumers – total number 
of boilers held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000503 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  1,351,179 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  20,267,691 
Lifetime savings (€)  405,353,819 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2 (€)  9.43 
 
(iii)  Financial gains for manufacturers with extra sales 
Table 190: Boiler; Italy: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 1 
  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue  Revised sales  Price  Revenue 
Non-cond.  1,009,000  926  934,334,000  103,755  926.00  96,077,372 
Condensing  138,000  1224  168,912,000  1,043,245  1224.00  1,276,931,561 
Total  1,147,000    1,103,246,000  1,147,000    1,373,008,932 
Financial gains for manufacturers  269,762,932 € 
 
￿  Summary of policy 1 
Table 191: Boiler; Italy: summary of policy option 1 (tax credit for consumers) 
Summary  Policy 1 + baseline 
Revenue cost to government (€)  191,133,374 
Net welfare cost to society (€)  -287,122,473 
GHG reductions   
Revenue cost / tCO2 (€)  9.43 
Net welfare cost / tCO2 (€)  -14.17  
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2.3.8.3  Policy option 2: Energy tax - additional increase in gas price (10%) 
Table 192: Boiler; Italy – additional increase in 10% of gas prices 
2007  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 








∆sales  ∆mkt share 
Non-cond.  1,009,000  926  0.880  923,063  926  0.805  -85,937  -0.075 
Condensing  138,000  1224  0.120  223,937  1,224  0.195  85,937  0.075 
Total  1,147,000  961.8  1.000  1,147,000  984.2  1.000     
￿  Costs of policy option 2 
(i)  Revenue costs 
Table 193: Boiler; Italy: Tax revenue with policy option 2 – energy price increase 
(10%); total number of boilers held constant 
Tax revenue (lifetime)  68,285,117 € 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
Table  194:  Boiler;  Italy:  Administrative  costs  of  policy  option  2  –  energy  price 
increase (10%); total number of boilers held constant 
Parameter:  0.20% of total tax revenue 
Administrative costs  136,570 € 
 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
The welfare changes from the tax are made up of the following. First, we have the 
deadweight loss from the imposition of the tax, based on the consumption of 
energy. Second, we have a welfare cost arising from the fact that consumers are 
made to buy more expensive equipment than they would if there were no tax. 
This  cost  is  simply  the  difference  in  price  (adjusted  for  quality)  between  the 
appliance bought without a tax and the one bought with a tax. Third, we have a 
welfare  gain  arising  from  the  fact  that  the  policy  generates  tax  revenue  and 
therefore reduces the cost of raising a similar amount of tax from other sources. 
This gain is calculated using the marginal cost of public funds. Fourth, we have the 
welfare gain to producers from the sale of more profitable equipment. This is 
calculated as in the case of the tax credit (see Table 187). Finally, there are gains 
from  the  reduction  in  the  generation  of  electricity,  calculated  at  the  average 
external cost per kWh for Italy (see section 2.3.8.2). 
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Table  195:  Boiler;  Italy: Welfare  costs  of  policy  option  2  –  energy  price  increase 
(10%); total number of boilers held constant 
4  Dead-weight loss  (∆Q x ∆P) / 2 
5  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – energy (€)  829,766 
6  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – equipments (€)  25,609,225 
6a  Welfare gain from savings in costs of raising funds from other taxes (€) 
(0.26*[17])  17,754,130 
7  Welfare  gain  (profit  of  producers  =  8.5%  of  sales  revenue)  (€) 
(0.085*[14])  2,176,784 
7a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  29,798,054 
8  Net welfare cost (€) [5+6-6a-7-7a]  -23,289,977 
9  Marginal cost of policy (welfare cost/tax revenue) (€) [5+6]/[17]  2.58 
9a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([8]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  -12.10 
 
￿  Benefits of policy 2 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table  196:  Boiler;  Italy:  Estimates  of  energy savings  after  the  implementation  of 
policy option 2 – holding the total number of boilers constant 
2007    BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Energy use (m








Non-cond.  2000  1,009,000  21,854,940,000  923,063  19,993,544,655 
Condensing  1726  138,000  2,579,576,040  223,937  4,185,960,223 
Total    1,147,000  24,434,516,040  1,147,000  24,179,504,878 
Energy savings (GWh)  255.0 
Household expenditure change (€)  -4,072,225 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  3,825.2 
Lifetime expenditures on energy (€)  -61,083,370 
Note: (a) Wh;   
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(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table  197:  Boiler;  Italy:  GHG  emissions  of  policy  option  2  –  additional  gas  price 
increase (10%) – total number of boilers held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000503 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  128,271 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  1,924,059 
Lifetime savings (€)  38,481,184 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2 (€)  35.49 
(iii)  Financial gain with extra sales 
Table 198: Boiler; Italy: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 2: additional 
energy price increase (10%) 
  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue  Revised sales  Price  Revenue 
Non-cond.  1,009,000  926  934,334,000  923,063  926.00  854,756,341 
Condensing  138,000  1224  168,912,000  223,937  1224.00  274,098,884 
Total  1,147,000    1,103,246,000  1,147,000    1,128,855,225 
Financial gains for manufacturers  25,609,225 € 
￿  Summary of policy 2 
Table 199: Boiler; Italy: summary of policy option 2(10% gas price increase) 
Summary  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Revenue raised in tax (€)  68,285,117 
Revenue gains to producers (€)  25,609,225 
Higher costs to consumers in capital exp. (€)  25,609,225 
Higher costs to consumers in energy exp. (€)  61,083,370 
GHG reductions   
Net welfare cost (€)  -23,289,977 
Welfare cost/tCO2 (€)  -12.10  
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2.3.8.4  Comparison of policy options 
Table 200: Boiler; Italy: Cost-benefit summary 
 
   
Policy option 1 
+ baseline 




Net welfare costs  -287,122,473  -23,289,977 
11  Administrative costs  0  136,570 
12  Benefits  GHG  405,353,819  38,481,184 
13  Benefit – costs  692,476,292  61,634,591 
14  Revenue gain to producers (€)  269,762,932  25,609,225 
15  Energy savings (GWh)  40,293.6  3,825.2 
15a  Lifetime GHG Savings (t/CO2)  20,267,690.9  1,924,059.2 
16  Expenditure in energy by households (€)  75,861,894  -61,083,370 
17  Revenue cost to government (€)  191,133,374  -68,285,117 
18  Welfare cost/tCO2  -14.17  -12.10 
2.3.8.5  Conclusions  
In the case of Italy a much bigger gain is made from switching out of non-condensing 
boilers.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  while  in  Denmark  most  boilers  are  condensing 
boilers (80% of the market) in Italy most are not (only 12%). Hence both polices in Italy 
have a bigger impact, but especially the tax credit. This option generates a huge net 
welfare gain of €287 million because of the profits of producers. On the other hand the 
tax  option  has  a  net  welfare  benefit of  €23 million.  As  a  result  the  cost  per  tCO2 
removed  is  negative  with  the  tax  credit  at  €14.2/ton  and  €10/ton  with  the  price 
increase. Both figures would be considered acceptable as a policy for reducing GHGs. 
We also note that the amount of GHG reduced under the tax credit is very large (1.3 
million tons per year) while with the price increase it is 128,000 tons per year. Finally, 
while tax credit budgetary cost of €191 million the tax option generates a revenue gain 
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3.3.9.  CASE-STUDY 7: CFLI IN POLAND 
2.3.9.1  Data report and baseline scenario 
Table 201: Sales and prices of lamps in Poland per type 

















Energy price (€/kWh)  0.1216 
Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime. 
 Summary of main assumptions 
(i)  Each consumer buys one product only;  
(ii)  Lamps have a fixed lifetime (1,000 or 6,000 hours); 
(iii)  Lamp types are NOT identical in terms of service provided and vary in terms 
of energy efficiency. We harmonised the products by assuming that the 
service provided by one CFLi is given by a set of 6 incandescent lamps; 
(iv)  No adjustment in price due to quality of products;  
(v)  WTP for more efficient lamps equal to 5%; 
(vi)  The personal discount rate of consumers is normally distributed with mean 
equal to 39% and standard deviation equal to 18.7%; 
(vii)  When  energy  use  is  reduced  this  also  reduces  emissions  of  non-GHG 
pollutants. The average value per kWh of the reduction is taken as €cent 
1.225 for Poland. This is based on (a) the unit values of external costs of each 
type  of  fuel  cycle  from  the  CASES  Project  (http://www.feem-
project.net/cases)  and  (b)  the  fuel  mix  used  for  power  generation  in  the 
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Table 202: CFLi; Poland – Baseline scenario - increase in 12% of electricity prices due 
to ETS 
2007  BAU  Baseline scenario 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share  Revised sales  mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt shr 
Incand
 (a)  15,316,667  3.00  0.510  14,176,069  0.472  -1,140,598  -0.0380 
CFLi  14,700,000  4.25  0.490  15,840,598  0.528  1,140,598  0.0380 
Total  30,016,667  3.61  1.000  30,016,667  1.000     
Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
2.3.9.2  Policy option 1: Subsidy for consumers (€1 for all CFLi) 
Table 203: CFLi; Poland: Subsidy for more energy efficient lamps: €1 for all CFLi 
2007  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 






∆sales  ∆mkt shr 
Incand
 (a)  15,316,667  3.00  0.510  658,264  3.00  0.022  -14,658,402  -0.4883 
CFLi  14,700,000  4.25  0.490  29,358,402  3.25  0.978  14,658,402  0.4883 
Total  30,016,667  3.61  1.000  30,016,667  3.24  1.000     
Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
￿  Costs of policy option 1 
(i)  Revenue costs to the government 
Table 204: CFLi; Poland: Revenue costs of a subsidy for more energy efficient lamps 
(€1 for all CFLi) – total number of CFLi held constant 
2007  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Revised sales  Tax incentive (€)  Revenue cost (€) 
Incand
 (a)  658,264  0  0 
CFLi  29,358,402  1  29,358,402 
Total  30,016,667    29,358,402 
Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values.  
234 
European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote  
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
December 2008 
 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
Table 205: CFLi; Poland: Administrative costs of a subsidy for more energy efficient 
lamps (€1 for all CFLi) – total number of CFLi held constant 
Parameter:  5% of total revenue cost 
Administrative costs  1,467,920 € 
 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
These are made up of (a) the marginal cost of public funds, estimated at 26% of 
the amount of revenue raised; (b) gains in producers’ profits at 6% of the extra 
sales revenue, which is based on information provided by the consultants by 
drawing  on  direct  data  collection;  and  (c)  the  gain  from  reduced  non-GHG 
emissions. 
Table 206: CFLi; Poland: Welfare costs of a subsidy for more energy efficient lamps 
(€1 for all CFLi) – total number of CFLi held constant 
1  Welfare cost (marginal cost of public funds = 26% of the revenue 
cost) (€)  7,633,185 
2  Welfare  gain  (profit  of  producers  =  6%  of  sales  revenue)  (€) 
(0.06*[14])  1,099,380 
2a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  43,472,790 
3  Net welfare cost (€) [1-2-2a]  -36,938,986 
3a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([3]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  -17.09 
 
￿  Benefits of policy 1 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table 207: CFLi; Poland: Estimates of energy savings after the implementation of 
policy option 1 – total number of CFLi held constant 













 (b)  0.0540  15,316,667  827,100  658,264  35,546 
CFLi  0.0137  14,700,000  200,655  29,358,402  400,742 
Total    30,016,667  1,027,755  30,016,667  436,288  
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Energy savings (GWh)  0.5915 
Savings on expenditure on energy (€)  80,553 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  3,548.8 
Lifetime expenditure savings on energy (€)  483,318,063 
Notes: (a) kWh; 
(b) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
 
(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 208: CFLi; Poland: GHG emissions of a subsidy for more energy efficient lamps 
(€1 for all CFLi) – total number of CFLi held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000609 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  360.20 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  2,161,219 
Lifetime savings (€)  43,224,374 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2 (€)  13.58 
(iii)  Financial gains for manufacturers with extra sales 
Table 209: CFLi; Poland: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 1 
  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue 
Revised 
sales 
Price  Revenue 
Incand
 (a)  15,316,667  3.00  45,950,000  658,264  3.00  1,974,793 
CFLi  14,700,000  4.25  62,475,000  29,358,402  4.25  124,773,210 
Total  30,016,667    108,425,000  30,016,667    126,748,003 
Financial gains for manufacturers  18,323,003 € 
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￿  Summary of policy 1 
Table 210: CFLi; Poland: summary of policy option 1 (€1 for all CFLi) 
Summary  Policy 1 + baseline 
Revenue cost to government (€)  29,358,402 
Net welfare cost to society (€)  -36,938,986 
GHG reductions   
Revenue cost / tCO2 (€)  13.58 
Net welfare cost / tCO2 (€)  -17.09 
2.3.9.3  Policy option 2: Energy tax - additional increase in electricity price (10%) 
Table 211: CFLi; Poland – additional increase in 10% of electricity prices 
2007  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 








∆sales  ∆mkt shr 
Incand
 (a)  15,316,667  3.00  0.510  14,381,797  3.00  0.479  -934,870  -0.0311 
CFLi  14,700,000  4.25  0.490  15,634,870  4.25  0.521  934,870  0.0311 
Total  30,016,667  3.61  1.000  30,016,667  3.65  1.000     
Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
￿  Costs of policy option 2 
(i)  Revenue costs 
Table 212: CFLi; Poland: Tax revenue with policy option 2 – energy price increase 
(10%); total number of CFLi held constant 
Tax revenue (lifetime)  80,900,745 € 
 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
Table  213:  CFLi;  Poland:  Administrative  costs  of  policy  option  2  –  energy  price 
increase (10%); total number of CFLi held constant 
Parameter:  0.20% of total tax revenue 
Administrative costs  161,801 €  
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(iii)  Welfare costs 
The welfare changes from the tax are made up of the following. First, we have 
the deadweight loss from the imposition of the tax, based on the consumption of 
energy. Second, we have a welfare cost arising from the fact that consumers are 
made to buy more expensive equipment than they would if there were no tax. 
This cost is simply the difference in price (adjusted for quality) between the 
appliance bought without a tax and the one bought with a tax. Third, we have a 
welfare gain arising from the fact that the policy generates tax revenue and 
therefore reduces the cost of raising a similar amount of tax from other sources. 
This gain is calculated using the marginal cost of public funds. Fourth, we have 
the welfare gain to producers from the sale of more profitable equipment. This is 
calculated as in the case of the subsidy (see Table 206). Finally, there are gains 
from the reduction in the generation of electricity, calculated at the average 
external cost per kWh for Poland (see section 2.3.9.2). 
Table 214: CFLi; Poland: Welfare costs of policy option 2 – energy price increase 
(10%); total number of CFLi held constant 
4  Dead-weight loss  (∆Q x ∆P) / 2 
5  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – energy (€)  3,192,549 
6  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – equipments (€)  1,168,587 
6a  Welfare gain from savings in costs of raising funds from other taxes (€) 
(0.26*[17])  21,034,194 
7  Welfare gain (profit of producers = 6% of sales revenue) (€) (0.06*[14])  70,115 
7a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  2,772,567 
8  Net welfare cost (€) [5+6-6a-7-7a]  -19,515,740 
9  Marginal cost of policy (welfare cost/tax revenue) (€) [5+6]/[17]  18.55 
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￿  Benefits of policy 2 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table 215: CFLi; Poland: Estimates of energy savings after the implementation of 
policy option 2 – holding the total number of CFLi constant 













 (b)  0.0540  15,316,667  827,100  14,381,797  776,617 
CFLi  0.0137  14,700,000  200,655  15,634,870  213,416 
Total    30,016,667  1,027,755  30,016,667  990,033 
Energy savings (GWh)  0.0377 
Household expenditure change (€)  -8,346 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  226.3 
Lifetime expenditures on energy(€)  -50,076,137 
Note: (a) Wh; 
(b) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 216: CFLi; Poland: GHG emissions of policy option 2 – additional electricity 
price increase (10%) – total number of CFLi held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000609 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  22.97 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  137,836.19 
Lifetime savings (€)  2,756,724 
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(iii)  Financial gain with extra sales 
Table 217: CFLi; Poland: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 2: additional 
energy price increase (10%) 
  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue 
Revised 
sales 
Price  Revenue 
Incand
 (a)  15,316,667  3.00  45,950,000  14,381,797  3.00  43,145,390 
CFLi  14,700,000  4.25  62,475,000  15,634,870  4.25  66,448,197 
Total  30,016,667    108,425,000  30,016,667    109,593,587 
Financial gains for manufacturers  1,168,587 
Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
 
￿  Summary of policy 2 
Table 218: CFLi; Poland: summary of policy option 2(10% electricity price increase) 
Summary  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Revenue raised in tax (€)  80,900,745 
Revenue gains to producers (€)  1,168,587 
Higher costs to consumers in capital exp. (€)  1,168,587 
Higher costs to consumers in energy exp. (€)  50,076,137 
GHG reductions   
Net welfare cost (€)  -19,515,740 
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2.3.9.4  Comparison of policy options 
Table 219: CFLi; Poland: Cost-benefit summary 
 
   
Policy option 1 
+ baseline 




Net welfare costs  -36,938,986  -19,515,740 
11  Administrative costs  1,467,920  161,801 
12  Benefits  GHG  43,224,374  2,756,724 
13  Benefit – costs  78,695,440  22,110,662 
14  Revenue gain to producers (€)  18,323,003  1,168,587 
15  Energy savings (GWh)  3,548.8  226.3 
15a  Lifetime GHG Savings (t/CO2)  2,161,218.7  137,836.2 
16  Expenditure in energy by households (€)  483,318,063  -50,076,137 
17  Revenue cost to government (€)  29,358,402  -80,900,745 
18  Welfare cost/tCO2  -17.09  -141.59 
2.3.9.5  Conclusions  
The net welfare benefit of the two options is similar: the subsidy option has a gain of 
€37 million while the tax option has a gain of €20 million. However, the administration 
costs of the subsidy are much higher: €1.5 million against €160,000 for the tax. On the 
other hand the subsidy option reduces CO2 by 2.2 million tons (lifetime basis) million 
tons per annum while the tax option reduces only 138,000 on the same basis. The cost 
per tCO2 removed is negative at €17/tCO2 while for the tax it is €142/ton. Finally note 
that while the subsidy option will cost the government €30million the tax option will 










European Commission, DG TAXUD 
Study on the costs and benefits of tax incentives to promote 
Manufacturing and consumer purchasing of energy efficient equipment 
241 
 
3.3.10.   CASE-STUDY 8: CFLI IN FRANCE 
2.3.10.1  Data report and baseline scenario 
Table 220: Sales and prices of lamps in France per type 

















Energy price (€/kWh)  0.1211 
Note: Harmonised lifetime. 
 Summary of main assumptions 
(i)  Each consumer buys one product only;  
(ii)  Lamps have a fixed lifetime (1,000 or 6,000 hours); 
(iii)  Lamp types are NOT identical in terms of service provided and vary in terms 
of  energy  efficiency.  We  harmonised  the  products  by  assuming  that  the 
service provided by one CFLi is given by a set of 6 incandescent lamps;  
(iv)  No adjustment in price due to quality of products;  
(v)  WTP for more efficient lamps equal to 22%; 
(vi)  The personal discount rate of consumers is normally distributed with mean 
equal to 39% and standard deviation equal to 18.7%; 
(vii)  When  energy  use  is  reduced  this  also  reduces  emissions  of  non-GHG 
pollutants. The average value per kWh of the reduction is taken as €cent 
0.254 for France. This is based on (a) the unit values of external costs of each 
type  of  fuel  cycle  from  the  CASES  Project  (http://www.feem-
project.net/cases)  and  (b)  the  fuel  mix  used  for  power  generation  in  the 
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Table 221: CFLi; France – Baseline scenario - increase in 12% of electricity prices due 
to ETS 
2007  BAU  Baseline scenario 
Class  Sales  Price  mkt share 
Revised 
sales 
mkt share  ∆sales  ∆mkt share 
Incand
 (a)  23,750,000  2.40  0.508  22,294,138  0.477  -1,455,862  -0.0311 
CFLi  23,000,000  4.25  0.492  24,455,862  0.523  1,455,862  0.0311 
Total  46,750,000  3.31  1.000  46,750,000  1.000     
Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
2.3.10.2  Policy option 1: Subsidy for consumers (€1 for all CFLi) 
Table 222: CFLi; France: Subsidy for more energy efficient lamps: €1 for all CFLi 
2007  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 












 (a)  23,750,000  2.40  0.508  1,016,234  3.00  0.022  -22,733,766  -0.4863 
CFLi  23,000,000  4.25  0.492  45,733,766  3.25  0.978  22,733,766  0.4863 
Total  46,750,000  3.31  1.000  46,750,000  3.24  1.000     
Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
￿  Costs of policy option 1 
(i)  Revenue costs to the government 
Table 223: CFLi; France: Revenue costs of a subsidy for more energy efficient lamps 
(€1 for all CFLi) – total number of lamps held constant 
2007  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Revised sales  Tax incentive (€)  Revenue cost (€) 
Incand
 (a)  1,016,234  0  0 
CFLi  45,733,766  1  45,733,766 
Total  46,750,000    45,733,766 
Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values.  
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(ii)  Administrative costs 
Table 224: CFLi; France: Administrative costs of a subsidy for more energy efficient 
lamps (€1 for all CFLi) – total number of CFLi held constant 
Parameter:  5% of total revenue cost 
Administrative costs  2,286,688 € 
 
(iii)  Welfare costs 
These are made up of (a) the marginal cost of public funds, estimated at 26% of 
the amount of revenue raised; (b) gains in producers’ profits at 6% of the extra 
sales revenue, which is based on information provided by the consultants by 
drawing  on  direct  data  collection;  and  (c)  the  gain  from  reduced  non-GHG 
emissions. 
Table 225: CFLi; France: Welfare costs of a subsidy for more energy efficient lamps 
(€1 for all CFLi) – total number of CFLi held constant 
1  Welfare cost (marginal cost of public funds = 26% of the revenue 
cost) (€)  11,890,779 
2  Welfare  gain  (profit  of  producers  =  6%  of  sales  revenue)  (€) 
(0.06*[14])  2,523,448 
2a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  13,979,766 
3  Net welfare cost (€) [1-2-2a]  -4,612,435 
3a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([3]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  -11.32 
 
￿  Benefits of policy 1 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table 226: CFLi; France: Estimates of energy savings after the implementation of 
policy option 1 – total number of CFLi held constant 













 (b)  0.0540  23,750,000  1,282,500  1,016,234  54,877 
CFLi  0.0137  23,000,000  313,950  45,733,766  624,266 
Total    46,750,000  1,596,450  46,750,000  679,143  
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Energy savings (GWh)  0.9173 
Savings on expenditure on energy (€)  124,416 
Lifetime energy savings (GWh)  5,503.8 
Lifetime revenue savings (€)  746,497,473 
Note: (a) Wh; 
(b) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 227: CFLi; France: GHG emissions of a subsidy for more energy efficient lamps 
(€1 for all CFLi) – total number of CFLi held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000074 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  67.8808 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  407,284.51 
Lifetime savings (€)  8,145,690 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2 (€)  112.29 
(iii)  Financial gains for manufacturers with extra sales 
Table 228: CFLi; France: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 1 
  BAU  Policy option 1 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue 
Revised 
sales 
Price  Revenue 
Incand
 (a)  23,750,000  2.40  57,000,000  1,016,234  2.40  2,438,961 
CFLi  23,000,000  4.25  97,750,000  45,733,766  4.25  194,368,506 
Total  46,750,000    154,750,000  46,750,000    196,807,467 
Financial gains for manufacturers  42,057,467 € 
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￿  Summary of policy 1 
Table 229: CFLi; France: summary of policy option 1 (€1 for all CFLi) 
Summary  Policy 1 + baseline 
Revenue cost to government (€)  45,733,766 
Net welfare cost to society (€)  -4,612,435 
GHG reductions   
Revenue cost / tCO2 (€)  112.29 
Net welfare cost / tCO2 (€)  -11.32 
2.3.10.3  Policy option 2: Energy tax - additional increase in electricity price (10%) 
Table 230: CFLi; France – additional increase in 10% of electricity prices 
2007  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 








∆sales  ∆mkt share 
Incand
 (a)  23,750,000  2.40  0.508  21,973,871  2.40  0.470  -1,776,129  -0.0380 
CFLi  23,000,000  4.25  0.492  24,776,129  4.25  0.530  1,776,129  0.0380 
Total  46,750,000  3.31  1.000  46,750,000  3.38  1.000     
Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
 
￿  Costs of policy option 2 
(i)  Revenue costs 
Table 231: CFLi; France: Tax revenue with policy option 2 – energy price increase 
(10%); total number of CFLi held constant 
Tax revenue (lifetime)  124,085,636 € 
(ii)  Administrative costs 
Table  232:  CFLi;  France:  Administrative  costs  of  policy  option  2  –  energy  price 
increase (10%); total number of CFLi held constant 
Parameter:  0.20% of total tax revenue 
Administrative costs  248,171 €  
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(iii)  Welfare costs 
The welfare changes from the tax are made up of the following. First, we have 
the deadweight loss from the imposition of the tax, based on the consumption of 
energy. Second, we have a welfare cost arising from the fact that consumers are 
made to buy more expensive equipment than they would if there were no tax. 
This  cost  is  simply  the  difference  in  price  (adjusted  for  quality)  between  the 
appliance bought without a tax and the one bought with a tax. Third, we have a 
welfare gain arising from the fact that the policy generates tax revenue and 
therefore reduces the cost of raising a similar amount of tax from other sources. 
This gain is calculated using the marginal cost of public funds. Fourth, we have 
the welfare gain to producers from the sale of more profitable equipment. This is 
calculated as in the case of the subsidy (see Table 225). Finally, there are gains 
from the reduction in the generation of electricity, calculated at the average 
external cost per kWh for France (see section 2.3.10.2). 
Table 233: CFLi; France: Welfare costs of policy option 2 – energy price increase 
(10%); total number of CFLi held constant 
4  Dead-weight loss  (∆Q x ∆P) / 2 
5  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – energy (€)  6,065,420 
6  Welfare cost of the tax (DWL) – equipments (€)  3,285,839 
6a  Welfare gain from savings in costs of raising funds from other taxes (€) 
(0.26*[17])  32,262,265 
7  Welfare gain (profit of producers = 6% of sales revenue) (€) (0.06*[14])  197,150 
7a  Welfare gain from reduced emissions of non-GHG pollutants  1,092,202 
8  Net welfare cost (€) [5+6-6a-7-7a]  -24,225,299 
9  Marginal cost of policy (welfare cost/tax revenue) (€) [5+6]/[17]  13.27 
9a  Welfare Cost per Ton of GHG ([8]/[15]) (€/tCO2)  -761.32 
￿  Benefits of policy 2 
(i)  Energy savings 
Table 234: CFLi; France: Estimates of energy savings after the implementation of 
policy option 2 – holding the total number of CFLi constant 
2007    BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 









 (b)  0.0540  23,750,000  1,282,500  21,973,871  1,186,589  
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CFLi  0.0137  23,000,000  313,950  24,776,129  338,194 
Total    46,750,000  1,596,450  46,750,000  1,524,783 
Energy savings (kWh)  0.0717 
Household expenditure change (€)  -10,961 
Lifetime energy savings (kWh)  430.0 
Lifetime expenditures with energy (€)  -65,763,758 
Note: (a) Wh;  
(b) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
(ii)  GHG emissions 
Table 235: CFLi; France: GHG emissions of policy option 2 – additional electricity price 
increase (10%) – total number of CFLi held constant 
Parameter: tCO2/kWh  0.000074 
Parameter: €/tCO2  €20 
GHG savings / year (tCO2)  5.30 
Lifetime GHG savings (tCO2)  31,820.06 
Lifetime savings (€)  636,401.28 
Revenue cost to Government / tCO2 (€)  3,899.60 
 
(iii)  Financial gain with extra sales 
Table 236: CFLi; France: Financial gains – sales revenue – policy option 2: additional 
energy price increase (10%) 
  BAU  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Class  Sales  Price  Revenue  Revised sales  Price  Revenue 
Incand
 (a)  23,750,000  2.40  57,000,000  21,973,871  2.40  52,737,290 
CFLi  23,000,000  4.25  97,750,000  24,776,129  4.25  105,298,549 
Total  46,750,000    154,750,000  46,750,000    158,035,839 
Financial gains for manufacturers  3,285,839 €  
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Note: (a) Harmonised lifetime: total number of incandescent lamps equals 6 times the 
harmonised values. 
￿  Summary of policy 2 
Table 237: CFLi; France: summary of policy option 2(10% electricity price increase) 
Summary  Policy option 2 + baseline 
Revenue raised in tax (€)  124,085,636 
Revenue gains to producers (€)  3,285,839 
Higher costs to consumers in capital exp. (€)  3,285,839 
Higher costs to consumers in energy exp. (€)  65,763,758 
GHG reductions   
Net welfare cost (€)  -24,225,299 
Welfare cost/tCO2 (€)  -761.32 
2.3.10.4  Comparison of policy options 
Table 238: CFLi; France: Cost-benefit summary 
 
   
Policy option 1 
+ baseline 




Net welfare costs  -4,612,435  -24,225,299 
11  Administrative costs  2,286,688  248,171 
12  Benefits  GHG  8,145,690  636,401 
13  Benefit – costs  10,471,437  24,613,529 
14  Revenue gain to producers (€)  42,057,467  3,285,839 
15  Energy savings (GWh)  5,503.8  430.0 
15a  Lifetime GHG Savings (t/CO2)  407,284.5  31,820.1 
16  Expenditure in energy by households (€)  746,497,473  -65,763,758 
17  Revenue cost to government (€)  45,733,766  -124,085,636 
18  Welfare cost/tCO2  -11.32  -761.32 
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2.3.10.5  Conclusions  
The major differences between France and Poland are: (a) the welfare gain of the 
subsidy  option  at  €4.6million  is  still  lower  than  the  tax  option  €24million.  The 
reductions  in  GHG  are  much  greater  for  the  subsidy  option  but  the  difference  is 
smaller. The subsidy option reduces CO2 by 400,000 tons (lifetime basis) while the tax 
option reduces €32,000. The gain/tCO2 removed is higher than for Poland. The figures 
are €11 for subsidy and €761 for the tax option. The main reason for this is that in 
Poland a reduction in energy consumption generates a higher cost due to the use of 
coal for electricity generation. Finally note that while the subsidy option will cost the 
government  €46  million  while  the  tax  option  will  generate  €124  million  revenue. 
However, the administration costs for the subsidy are much higher: €2.3 million against 
€250,000 for the tax option. 
3.3.11.   SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
For all sensitivity analysis we present only the summary tables but the full set of tables 
for each sensitivity analysis is available on request. 
2.3.11.1  Washing machines, Italy: Class C only removed from market instead of classes B 
and C 
Excluding from the market only washing machines class ‘C’ significantly increases the 
relation benefits minus cost when compared to excluding classes ‘B’ and ‘C’ (see Table 
148 and Table 239): 
Table 239: Washing machines; Italy: Cost-benefit summary Comparing Class C only 
removed from the market with Classes B and C removed from Market) 
    Removal B and C  Removal only C 
   
Policy option 2 + 
baseline 
Policy option 2 + 
baseline 
Costs 
Net welfare costs  5,312,445  2,466,167 
Administrative costs  0  0 
Benefits  GHG  260,333  46,791 
Benefit – costs  -5,052,113  -2,419,376 
Revenue gain to producers (€)  9,503,000  2,720,000 
Energy savings (GWh)  25.9  4.7 
Lifetime GHG savings (t/CO2)     
Expenditure in energy by households (€)  6,750,225  1,213,256 
Revenue cost to government (€)  0  0 
Welfare cost/tCO2      
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2.3.11.2  Washing machines, Poland: Class C only removed from market 
Excluding from the market only washing machines class ‘C’ significantly increases the 
relation benefits minus cost when compared to excluding classes ‘B’ and ‘C’ (see Table 
164 and Table 240): 
Table 240: Washing machines; Poland: Cost-benefit summary (Class C only removed 
from the market) 
    Removal B and C  Removal only C 
   
Policy option 2 + 
baseline 
Policy option 2 + 
baseline 
Costs  Net welfare costs  2,586,574  2,408,589 
  Administrative costs  0  0 
Benefits  GHG  271,317  74,980 
Benefit – costs  -2,315,257  -2,333,609 
Revenue gain to producers (€)  6,235,000  2,700,000 
Energy savings (GWh)  22.3  6.2 
Lifetime GHG savings (t/CO2)     
Expenditure  in  energy  by  households 
(€)  3,033,759  838,398 
Revenue cost to government (€)  0  0 
Welfare cost/tCO2     
 
2.3.11.3  Washing machines; Italy: Mean Discount rates  
We assumed that the personal discount rate of consumers is normally distributed with 
mean equal to 39% and standard deviation equal to 18.7% (Revelt and Train, 1998). 
The results were presented in Table 134 to Table 148. Here we performed a sensitivity 
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￿  Comparison of policy option 1: tax credit to manufacturers  
Table 241: Washing machines; Italy: Cost-benefit summary – policy option 1 
    Policy option 1 + baseline 
   
DR = 20% 
Std = 10% 
DR = 39% 
Std = 18.7% 
DR = 45% 
Std = 25% 
Costs 
Net welfare costs  8,220,609  19,147,481  17,238,332 
Administrative costs  0  0  0 
Benefits  GHG  333,917  588,845  519,911 
Benefit – costs  -7,886,692  -18,558,636  -16,718,421 
Revenue gain to producers (€)  12,701,023  30,837,100  26,719,979 
Energy savings (GWh)  33.2  58.5  51.7 
Lifetime GHG savings (t/CO2)       
Expenditure  in  energy  by 
households (€)  8,658,196  15,268,285  13,480,880 
Revenue cost to government (€)  36,520,231  84,886,243  76,071,249 
Welfare cost/tCO2       
￿  Comparison of policy option 2: removal of class B and lower from the market 
Table 242: Washing machines; Italy: Cost-benefit summary – policy option 2 
    Policy option 2 + baseline 
   
DR = 20% 
Std = 10% 
DR = 39% 
Std = 18.7% 
DR = 45% 
Std = 25% 
Costs 
Net welfare costs  5,312,445  5,312,445  5,312,445 
Administrative costs  0  0  0 
Benefits  GHG  260,333  260,333  260,333 
Benefit – costs  -5,052,113  -5,052,113  -5,052,113 
Revenue gain to producers (€)  9,503,000  9,503,000  9,503,000 
Energy savings (GWh)  25.9  25.9  25.9  
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Lifetime GHG savings (t/CO2)       
Expenditure  in  energy  by 
households (€)  6,750,225  6,750,225  6,750,225 
Revenue cost to government (€)  0  0  0 
Welfare cost/tCO2       
Note: Since the policy option involves the market share shift to class ‘A’, the discount 
rates did not affect consumers’ choice so the results are identical.   
2.3.11.4   Refrigerators; France: Marginal cost of public funds  
Table 243: Refrigerators; France: Welfare costs of a subsidy for consumers (€50 for 
energy class ‘A+’ 
Percentage of the revenue cost  15%  26%  30% 
Welfare cost (marginal cost of public funds)  14,120,049  24,474,751  28,240,097 
 
Table 244: Refrigerators; France: Cost-benefit summary 
    Policy option 1 + baseline 
    15%  26%  30% 
Costs 
Net welfare costs  -3,961,670  6,393,033  10,158,379 
Administrative costs  4,706,683  4,706,683  4,706,683 
Benefits  GHG  2,121,404  2,121,404  2,121,404 
Benefit – costs  1,376,391  -8,978,311  -12,743,657 
Revenue gain to producers (€)  180,511,623  180,511,623  180,511,623 
Energy savings (GWh)  1,433.4  1,433.4  1,433.4 
Lifetime GHG savings (t/CO2)       
Expenditure  in  energy  by 
households (€)  194,412,381  194,412,381  194,412,381 
Revenue cost to government (€)  94,133,658  94,133,658  94,133,658 
Welfare cost/tCO2       
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2.3.11.5  Conclusions on the sensitivity analysis 
We  investigated  the  sensitivity  of  our  results  to  variations  in  some  of  the  key 
assumptions used in our model. Namely, we investigated how our results varied when 
(i) different figures were assumed for the marginal cost of public funding (MCPF); (ii) 
the mean and standard deviation of consumers’ discount rate was varied; (iii) only 
washing machines energy class ‘C’ were removed from the market; and (iv) different 
figures were assumed for the producers’ surplus. 
Our results proved sensitive to the value assumed for the parameter MCPF, which we 
assumed to be equal to 26% in Europe. The net welfare cost of a subsidy to more 
efficient refrigerators in France varied from – €4.0M (a benefit) when MCPF equalled 
15% of the revenue cost of the subsidy to €10M when MCPF was assumed equal to 
30%.  The  relative  ranking  of  taxes  versus  subsidies  did  change  as  a  result  of  this 
modification.  Further  investigation  on  the  country-specific  value  of  this  parameter 
would contribute to obtaining more precise results with our model. 
The choice of consumers’ mean discount rate and standard deviation did not affect the 
results significantly. For example, when increasing the mean discount rate value from 
39% to 45% (standard deviation from 18.7% to 25%) the benefit-cost relation did not 
change  significantly  when  using  as  an  example  the  tax  credit  to  manufactures  of 
washing machines in Italy (-€18.5M and -€16.7M, respectively). However, when much 
lower  figures  were  assumed  for  mean  discount  rate  (20%)  and  standard  deviation 
(10%)  the  benefit-cost  estimate  reduced  to  -€7.9Mn.  None  of  the  modifications 
changed the ranking of policy options, i.e. the removal of washing machines classes ‘C 
and B’ is still more feasible than the tax credit to manufacturers. 
The removal from the market of washing machines energy class ‘C’ instead of classes ‘B 
and C’ showed significant benefits in Italy, mainly, due to the lower welfare cost to 
consumers  forced  to  purchase  more  expensive  appliances  when  the  least  efficient 
models  were  removed  from  the  market.  In  Italy,  the  removal  of  classes  ‘B  and  C’ 
resulted in costs equal to €5M while the removal of class ‘C’ only resulted in costs 
equal to €2.4M. However, a different result was observed in Poland, where no change 
in the relationship benefit minus cost was observed (-€2.3M in both cases). In both 
countries the removal of washing machines class ‘C’ only is still more feasible than the 
tax credit scheme.   
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis presented in this report indicates that incentives to promote the use of 
energy efficient appliances can be cost effective, but whether or not this is the case 
depends  essentially  on  the  particular  product,  the  Member  State,  the  market 
conditions, and the design of the incentive policy instrument. Of the cases considered 
in this study, tax credits on boilers appear to be a feasible option in both Denmark and 
Italy, while subsidies on CFLi bulbs in both France and Poland are cost effective in 
terms of €/ton of CO2 abated (with the French case having a lower benefit than the 
Polish one). 
There are two key incentive options that are relevant for promoting the use of energy 
efficient appliances: 1) subsidies, and 2) energy-tax policies. Comparing the subsidies to 
the energy-tax options, we find that the subsidies in most cases are less cost effective 
than the energy tax. Subsides are only preferable to taxes in the case of CFLi bulbs in 
Poland. Tax credits are more cost effective than energy taxes for boilers in both Italy 
and Poland. The tax option of course has the advantage of generating revenue that 
could be used for promoting energy efficiency while the subsidy option places a burden 
on  the  budget.  In  principle,  this  burden  has  been  accounted  for  in  this  study  by 
imposing  a  cost  on  the  subsidy  equal  to  the  welfare  cost  of  raising  public  funds. 
However, in situations of fiscal constraints additional pressures on the budget may 
need to be taken into account. 
The method used to estimate the welfare gains and losses in this study is one based on 
a  partial  equilibrium  approach,  i.e.  it  looks  at one market  at  a time  and  does  not 
consider the impacts of changes in prices across markets. An economy-wide approach 
would certainly be more inclusive of other effects but would run into problems of 
estimation  of  many  of  the  parameters,  for  which data  are  very  limited.  There  are 
studies that look at multi-market impacts that consider energy taxes (see for example 
Bergin, 2002; and Kim, 2002)
138 but they do not operate at a detailed enough level to 
consider specific commodities such as energy efficient versions of durable goods. Our 
study is one of the first to compare energy taxation and subsidies for specific versions 
of consumer durables. We should also note that we did not have the resources to 
undertake  such  an  economy-wide  analysis,  which would  indeed  be  further original 
work. Nevertheless, we believe the relative results obtained here are valid and would 
not be overturned in a more sophisticated study, using CGE models. The same applies 
to the limitation of looking at environmental effects only from the use of the durable 
equipment and not from its manufacture.   
To further strengthen the analysis presented here, a number of issues would need to 
be considered. First, there are distributional factors to take into account. Although 
evidence  suggests  that  the  long  run  income  elasticity  of  demand  is  around  unity, 
implying that a tax on energy is not regressive, there is concern that increasing energy 
prices hurt the very poor, who face fuel poverty (defined in the UK as spending more 
than 10 percent of household income on energy). Likewise the option of removing 
                                                           
138 Bergin et al. (2002), “The Macro-economic Effects of Using Fiscal Instruments to Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions”, available online at http://www.esri.ie/pdf/Sky_JFitz_Paper1.PDF 
Kim (2002), "Environmental Taxes and Economic Welfare: The Welfare Cost of Gasoline Taxation in the 
U.S. 1959-1999," Public Economics, 0201003, EconWPA.  
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cheaper less efficient appliances would have a bigger impact on the budget of the poor 
than on that of the rich. These considerations need further investigation and possible 
policies to alleviate serious negative impacts accompanying any tax measures.     
Second, the model does not fully allow for ‘spill over’ effects of the incentives. If a 
subsidy is provided for an appliance, there will be a tendency for more appliances to be 
sold, but also the savings in energy from the more efficient appliances could result in 
increased  energy  use  elsewhere  (the  so-called  ‘rebound’  effect).  We  have  not 
accounted for these effects. Bringing this into the analysis would require further work 
on behavioural economics. 
Third, our assumption of the welfare gains of producers (i.e. the producer surplus) is 
based on somewhat weak data and further studies would be of benefit to estimate this 
variable more accurately. 
Fourth,  It  should  also  be  noted  that  for  the  sake  of  comparability  with  tax  policy 
options the value of energy savings over the life cycle of the product were not included 
in welfare cost calculations. These savings would offset the costs from the need to buy 
more  expensive  appliances  to  consumers  and  would  thus  make  the  option  more 
favourable to consumers than the CBA analysis applied here implies. 
Finally, we have to allow for more limited rationality than has been assumed here. 
Individuals do not make decisions with as much concern for the net costs of appliances 
as a minimisation of net present value assumes, although that does not mean that such 
a model cannot be a good representation of statistical regularity in the pattern of 
purchases. More practically, we would expect adjustment to the full rational choice to 
take place over time, rather than in one year alone. Introducing a lagged adjustment 
component to the model, and making it dynamic would be a worthwhile extension to 
the model presented so far. Another component that could be added is the value of 
information in improving decision-making among appliances with different energy and 
environmental attributes.  
This first analysis presents some interesting insight to the issue. However, additional 
future  work  is  required  to  understand  the  subject  from  different  perspectives, 
especially regarding whether incentives will lead to higher consumption levels. One 
policy approach could be to complement the incentives for efficient products with a 
penalty  on  non-efficient  ones,  an  approach  currently  under  implementation  and 
testing in France (Bonus-Malus), which is under trial for cars since 2007. The usefulness 
of  incentives  has  been  recently  highlighted  in  the  Action  Plan  for  Sustainable 
Consumption  and  Production  (SCP)  and  Sustainable  Industrial  Policy  (SIP)  of  the 
European Commission. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the perverse or 
negative effects of a future subsidy scheme (even if devised for a good environmental 
cause) as the EU is trying hard to eliminate environmentally harmful subsidies
139 as also 
recommended by the OECD in its international initiative in this direction. 
 
                                                           
139 COM(2007) 140 final Green paper on market-based instruments  
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per GWh saved 
(€/GWh) 
Refrigerator 





class A+ only) 




3,371,769  237  14,227 







Tax credit for 
manufacturers 
(€100 per appliance 
cl. A+; sold above 
historical levels - 3 
years average) 
-18,558,636  59  -314,553 
B-class and lower 
removed from the 
market (market 
share of classes B 
and C shifted to 
class A) 
-5,052,113  26  -194,312 






Tax credit for 
consumers 
(deducted from 
income tax; 25% of 
the appliance price 
for condensing 
boiler) 
4,565,857  310  14,729 
Energy tax: further 
increase in gas price 
(10%) 
1,231,331  102  12,072 
Italy  692,476,292  40,294  17,186  61,634,591  3,825  16,114 
CFLi 





classes A and B) 




22,110,662  226  97,835 
France  10,471,437  5,504  1,903  24,613,529  430  57,241 
 (*) Policies 1 and 2 are applied on top of baseline scenario.  
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